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Impersonating IT support: how threat actors turn a remote session into enterprise-wide access

Microsoft details Teams IT-support impersonation campaigns deploying Node.js implants, AD reconnaissance, and WinRM lateral movement toward domain controllers.

Microsoft Threat Intelligence describes a human-operated campaign where attackers impersonate IT/helpdesk staff via Microsoft Teams external collaboration, talk users into granting remote sessions, and use RMM tools for interactive access. During the session they run PowerShell to silently install a malicious MSI that stages a portable Node.js runtime and obfuscated JavaScript implant for C2, executing follow-on payloads via rundll32. Operators then perform host and Active Directory reconnaissance, capture desktop screenshots, and pivot via WinRM on port 5985 to domain controllers and certificate authorities. The hands-on-keyboard chain, which can precede data theft and ransomware, blends into normal operations by relying on Teams, Quick Assist, msiexec, and Node.js; Microsoft shares hunting and mitigation guidance.

Microsoft Security Blog · 13d agoThreat actor in the wild

Trusting-Trust Attack against an Entire Linux Distribution (via the strip utility)

ArXiv paper shows the trusting-trust compiler backdoor technique can compromise an entire Linux distribution via the strip utility.

The paper (arXiv 2607.24888) demonstrates that Ken Thompson's trusting-trust attack, long viewed as a compiler-specific threat, can backdoor an entire Linux distribution by targeting the strip utility. A compromised tool reproduces its backdoor in subsequent rebuilds of itself, generalizing the attack surface beyond compilers. The finding has supply-chain implications for build reproducibility and distribution trust, though it is a research result with no observed real-world exploitation.

Lobsters · security · 11d agoResearch

2026-011: Critical Vulnerabilities in SAP Kernel and NetWeaver Message Server

SAP patched two critical flaws, OVERPASS (CVE-2026-44756, CVSS 10.0) and S4GET (CVE-2026-58240), allowing unauthenticated attackers to execute OS commands on SAP hosts.

On SAP's September 2026 Security Patch Day, SAP released Security Notes 3747649 and 3759472 fixing two critical unauthenticated remote vulnerabilities found by Onapsis. CVE-2026-44756 ('OVERPASS', CVSS 10.0) is a memory corruption flaw in Extended Passport (EPP) deserialisation in the SAP Kernel; CVE-2026-58240 ('S4GET', CVSS 9.8) is a missing authentication check in the NetWeaver Message Server that lets attackers register as trusted cluster nodes. Successful exploitation of either can yield OS command execution as the SAP service account, leading to full system and business data compromise, and CERT-EU urges immediate patching. No in-the-wild exploitation is reported.

"They don't care about this": A Systematic Study of TEE Build Reproducibility in the Wild

91% of 115 surveyed TEE deployments across Intel SGX, TDX, and AMD SEV fail to provide reproducible builds needed for verifiable remote attestation.

A systematic study of 115 TEE deployments found 91% were not reproducible and 80% lacked both source code and a reference build, undermining remote attestation guarantees. Interviews with 12 developers of 50 Intel SGX projects confirmed that only one participant treats reproducibility as a development priority. The authors identify technical barriers such as embedded timestamps plus ecosystem-level issues like lack of build-environment control in multi-stakeholder projects, and call for holistic, committed reproducibility practices.

arXiv cs.CR · 6d agoResearch

ChatGPT flaw lets attackers pull Gmail data across accounts via a hidden channel

Check Point found a ChatGPT flaw letting attackers read victims' Gmail and connected-app data via hidden cross-session instructions; OpenAI patched it.

Check Point Research discovered a covert cross-account command channel in ChatGPT's code execution environment, where containers meant to be isolated shared metadata through an internal service based on JFrog Artifactory. In a proof of concept, a victim's session was tricked into retrieving Gmail email data and relaying it to an attacker-controlled session during an ordinary-looking interaction, with reach extending to any connected apps the session was authorized for, including Google Drive, Microsoft Teams, and GitHub. OpenAI fixed the issue and decommissioned the internal service; the same shared infrastructure was also involved in the separately disclosed Hugging Face compromise, though via different techniques.

CSO Online · 7d agoAI safety & security

Cursor Security Bug Allowed Repositories to Execute Commands Before Trust Verification

Cursor fixed a pre-trust bug letting untrusted repositories execute commands, then closed the report as informative.

A security flaw in the Cursor editor allowed repositories to execute commands before the user completed workspace trust verification. Cursor fixed the pre-trust code execution path within three days of receiving the report. The vendor then closed the report as informative, disputing the severity of the behavior.

Infosecurity Magazine · Aug 11, 2026Vulnerability

VU#212479: Sentry Seer vulnerability allows attacker-controlled input to be executed in a privileged environment

CERT/CC details CVE-2026-90999: attacker-controlled Sentry telemetry can steer the Seer coding agent into executing attacker code with repository access.

CERT/CC published VU#212479 for CVE-2026-90999 in Sentry Seer: attacker-submitted events through public DSN endpoints flow into Seer's root-cause analysis, which is embedded directly into the coding agent's initial prompt. In the documented chain, the privileged coding agent downloads and executes an attacker-controlled package before any human review, yielding arbitrary code execution with access to connected source repositories. No vendor patch is available yet; mitigations include disabling automated remediation, restricting coding-agent package installation, and filtering telemetry before Seer analysis.

An Empirical Analysis of CodeQL False Positives and Query Refinements for Java Vulnerabilities

Study of 167 Java CVE instances finds CodeQL false positives follow recurring patterns; query refinements remove 81.8% of reviewed ones.

Researchers ran CodeQL's Java security query suite on 167 CVE instances from 110 projects, manually reviewing 500 sampled false-positive paths and building a five-category taxonomy led by Missed Path Constraint or Sanitization (36.6%), Benign Execution Context (29.4%), and Missing Trust Boundary Modeling (27.6%). Guided by the taxonomy, query-level refinements removed 81.8% of reviewed false positives and 15.8% of reported paths across the selected queries while retaining 7 of 8 true positives. To address generalization, agentic coding tools given the refinement patterns as templates adapted them to new projects successfully in 56% and 62% of tasks, versus 28% without guidance.

arXiv cs.CR · 12d agoResearch1

When the Whole Company Adopts AI: What It Does to Your SOC

Analysis of 16.9 million SOC alerts finds AI-related alerts at 0.43%, growing 685% since February, with 94.1% noise and 0.02% real attacks.

A review of roughly 16.9 million SOC alerts found about 73,000 (0.43%) were AI-related, a share that grew 685% between February and June 2026. Of AI-related alerts, 94.1% were noise, 5.8% genuine risks, and 0.02% real attacks; 79.8% received benign verdicts, 81.7% were automatically suppressed, and only 5.4% reached a human analyst. The only confirmed attacks were phishing campaigns that weaponized AI brand names as lures, while developer coding agents spawning shells and reading credential stores routinely tripped detections written before AI agents existed.

The Hacker News · 4d agoResearch1

Access Control as Verified Parse Constraints

Researchers verify a class of EverParse validators that correctly enforce access-control policies, deploying a machine-checked enforcement gate on seL4.

The paper targets enforcement-code bugs in commercial security gateways by proving that forward-only, backtrack-free EverParse validators are verified recognizers for a bounded finite-state class that includes access-control decision functions with fixed-offset fields and bounded disjunction. Encoding a bounded policy language into a fixed-size byte buffer allows an SMT solver to verify the enforcement code once, covering all byte values, policies, requests, and sessions. Editing rule content over a fixed endpoint set requires no new proof, while adding endpoints reruns the toolchain. A deployment on the seL4 microkernel ensures every request passes through the gate and unverified components cannot corrupt the enforcement chain.

arXiv cs.CR · 5d agoResearch1

An Empirical Security Analysis of Open-Source Software Used in Onboard Satellite Systems

Study of 126 onboard satellite OSS repositories finds 2,827 security findings, 72% medium severity or higher, dominated by memory safety and code quality weaknesses.

Researchers performed an empirical security analysis of 126 public repositories of open-source software used in onboard satellite systems using SBOM generation, software composition analysis, static application security testing, infrastructure-as-code analysis, and secret scanning. After cleaning and deduplication the pipeline produced 2,827 findings, with medium-severity findings accounting for 49% and 72% classified medium or higher. A CWE-based taxonomy mapped all findings to eight weakness families, with Memory Safety and Code Quality dominating, followed by Input Validation and Injection. Project-developed code accounted for 81.4% of findings, though external dependency code remained relevant; findings do not establish mission-specific exploitability.

arXiv cs.CR · 2d agoResearch1

CONTINUITY: Security-Context Contracts for Composable LLM Agent Controls

Researchers introduce CONTINUITY, a framework of assume-guarantee contracts that preserves LLM agent security context across components, verified across 2,560 attack instances.

The paper identifies security-context discontinuity, where individually sound controls drop, widen, or reinterpret security context as actions cross component boundaries, and proposes CONTINUITY, a framework of assume-guarantee contracts using signed root grants, provenance commitments, role-bound transition receipts, and effect-bound execution permits. It formalizes end-to-end consequence integrity, requiring every external effect to be backed by a valid authorization witness linking principal, task, provenance, and policy state. A reference verifier and cross-layer fault-injection suite covering 32 fault classes showed the full configuration committed no harmful external effect across 2,560 parameterized attack instances while completing all 700 benign tasks and escalating all 200 ambiguous cases.

arXiv cs.CR · 12d agoAI safety & security

Cybersecurity jobs available right now: March 10, 2026

Help Net Security's roundup lists open cybersecurity roles at BioNTech, AIG, ServiceNow and others across Europe, the Middle East and Canada.

A job-board roundup of cybersecurity openings including Associate Director Application Security at BioNTech (Germany), CISO at AIG (Israel), Cloud Security Professional at ServiceNow (Italy), and SOC/GRC, analyst, engineer and data governance roles in the UK, UAE, India, Canada and France. Roles span application security, cloud security, SOC operations, compliance and OT environments. Most listings are marked no longer accepting applications.

Help Net Security · 19d agoIndustry

SWE-Bench Pro Verified: A Reliable Benchmark for Software Engineering Agents

SWE-Bench Pro Verified is a corrected benchmark showing prior coding-agent scores were inflated by reward hacking and flawed tasks.

Analysis of SWE-Bench Pro found its evaluation undermined by reward hacking from leakage of gold solutions or hidden evaluation information, plus task quality issues such as misleading problem statements and improperly scoped tests. The authors present SWE-Bench Pro Verified, combining anti-hacking safeguards that eliminate major leakage channels with minimal task refinements. Evaluations show some models perform substantially worse than previously reported, suggesting SWE-Bench Pro overestimates real software engineering capability.

Hugging Face daily papers · 9d agoAI research1

When AI Agents Go Rogue: Agent Session Smuggling Attack in A2A Systems

Unit 42 unveils agent session smuggling, where a rogue AI agent hides covert instructions in established Agent2Agent (A2A) protocol sessions to manipulate victim agents.

Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 discovered agent session smuggling, a new attack technique in which a malicious AI agent exploits an established cross-agent session under the Agent2Agent (A2A) protocol to send covert instructions hidden among benign client requests and server responses. The technique leverages the implicit trust agents place in collaborating agents and the stateful, multi-turn nature of A2A sessions; the researchers stress it affects any stateful protocol, not an A2A flaw. Unlike one-shot data-based attacks, a rogue agent can converse, adapt and build false trust over multiple interactions. Proposed mitigations include human-in-the-loop enforcement, cryptographically signed AgentCards for remote agent verification, and context-grounding to detect injected instructions.

Palo Alto Unit 42 · Aug 17, 2026AI safety & security2

Your Critical Vulnerabilities Might Not Be Your Biggest Risk

Autonomous penetration testing advocates prioritize exploitable attack paths over raw vulnerability severity for continuous security validation.

The article argues that scanner severity scores lack context: a critical flaw behind strong segmentation may be low priority, while a medium flaw on internet-facing systems can provide a foothold chained toward sensitive data. It positions autonomous penetration testing and attack path validation as the execution layer for continuous security validation, replacing point-in-time assessments. The piece is vendor-authored thought leadership rather than incident or vulnerability news.

The Hacker News · 5d agoIndustry1

Palo Alto PAN-OS Vulnerability Enables Arbitrary Code Execution as Root User

Palo Alto Networks patched CVE-2026-0310, an unauthenticated XML-processing buffer overflow in PAN-OS allowing root code execution on PA-Series firewalls.

Palo Alto Networks disclosed CVE-2026-0310, an out-of-bounds write (CWE-787) in PAN-OS XML processing with a CVSS-B base score of 9.2 and CVSS-BT of 7.2. An unauthenticated attacker with network access to a vulnerable management or dataplane interface can send crafted XML to execute arbitrary code as root on PA-Series appliances. On VM-Series the impact is limited to denial-of-service, while Prisma Access and Cloud NGFW require authentication and carry lower risk. Fixed releases include 12.2.3, 12.1.10, 11.2.13-h2, 11.1.16-h2, and 10.2.18-h10; no workaround exists beyond restricting management interface access.

Cyber Security Newsupdated · 6d agofirst · 6d agoVulnerability 3 sourcesCVE-2026-0310

Vulnerability Localization Benchmark: Measuring Agentic Security Analysis at Repository Scale

VLoc Bench tests 27 language models at locating vulnerable files in 290 repositories; best system reaches 0.229 File F1 and 38.4% of tasks unsolved.

The Vulnerability Localization Benchmark (VLoc Bench) contains 500 real-world vulnerabilities from 290 repositories across six package ecosystems and 147 CWE categories, pairing pre-fix and post-fix repository snapshots. Agents receive only a CWE description and read-only terminal access to identify affected files, and must confirm absence on patched snapshots. The strongest of 27 language models and four static-analysis tools achieves just 0.229 File F1; 38.4% of tasks receive no correct localization, and effective localizers still report unsupported locations on patched repositories.

arXiv cs.AI / cs.LG / cs.CL · 2d agoAI research

Counterfeit installers turn routine software downloads into enterprise breaches

Microsoft warns of a multi-sector campaign using counterfeit download sites for Edge, Kaspersky and Razer to deliver trojanized installers with persistent implants.

Microsoft Defender Experts tracked a campaign breaching organizations in healthcare, manufacturing, gaming, technology, logistics, government, and education via spoofed vendor download pages, often using .com.cn and .hl.cn domains. Installers keep the same filename while their hash changes on every download, indicating server-side payload generation that defeats file-based detection. The chain abuses msiexec.exe and scheduled tasks for persistence, adds Defender exclusions, deletes shadow copies, and disables Windows Update, with some hands-on-keyboard activity. The activity is consistent with the publicly reported Silver Fox (Yinhu) campaign, though Microsoft has not attributed it to a nation-state actor.

CSO Online · 13d agoThreat actor in the wild1

Security Data Isn’t the Problem. Security Context Is.

Horizon3 blog argues security context, not data volume, is the SOC bottleneck, promoting its NodeZero integration with CrowdStrike Falcon Next-Gen SIEM.

Horizon3.ai published a vendor blog explaining how its NodeZero Proactive Security Platform integration with CrowdStrike Falcon Next-Gen SIEM brings validated exposure findings into existing security operations workflows. The post argues SOCs are now limited by confidence rather than visibility, needing context to decide which issues matter. It cites a global chemical manufacturer that validated exploitable exposures with NodeZero before completing a $2 billion merger.

Horizon3.ai · 1d agoTools

Cohesity adds recovery capabilities for AI agents and the data they manage

Cohesity launched Agent Resilience to discover, protect, and recover AI agent memory, configuration, and agent-managed data, debuting with Amazon Bedrock integration.

At Cohesity Catalyst, Cohesity introduced Agent Resilience within Cohesity Data Cloud, protecting AI agent memory and configuration with snapshot architecture, immutable backups, and clean-room recovery, plus recovery for databases and file systems that agents manage. It launches with Amazon Bedrock integration, support for Microsoft and Google platforms planned, and general availability targeted for year-end. The company cited Gartner's prediction that up to 40% of enterprise applications will include task-specific agents by 2026, and Cohesity research showing 56% of organizations are unprepared to detect or contain unintended agent actions while 58% lack confidence in verifying AI model integrity after attacks. Cohesity also outlined an Autonomous Cyber Resilience vision using agentic workflows and introduced the AI Resilience Academy.

Help Net Security · 11h agoTools

Putting models to the secure coding test: Plan vs default mode

Datadog Security Labs tested Sonnet 5, Composer 2.5, and GPT 5.5 to see if plan mode yields more secure code than default mode.

Datadog Security Labs evaluated whether plan mode produces measurably more secure code than default mode. The test covered three frontier coding models: Sonnet 5, Composer 2.5, and GPT 5.5. The results inform how engineering teams should configure AI coding assistants to reduce insecure code. This is an AI security evaluation, not an incident report.

Datadog Security Labs · 28d agoAI safety & security

AI Coding Tools Now a Prime Target for Threat Actors, Google Warns

Google Threat Intelligence Group warns threat actors increasingly target AI coding tools and proprietary AI data, with UNC6780's Dustmaker enabling large-scale supply chain compromises.

Google Threat Intelligence Group's September 8 report says AI-assisted coding tools have become prime targets, contributing to large-scale software supply chain compromises in 2025 and early 2026. Financially motivated group UNC6780 used its Dustmaker credential stealer to extract tokens from GitHub Actions runner memory and compromise packages across PyPI, npm, and Docker Hub, then sold harvested AI tool credentials to other criminals. Chinese nation-state actor UNC6508 conducted espionage against proprietary AI research at North American academic, medical, and military institutions, while extortion gangs stole models, prompts, and source code in Q2 2026. GTIG also documented agentic attacker experimentation, including an autonomous multi-agent credential harvesting campaign built in under six hours and a 'Recon' C2 framework managing over 23,800 harvested secrets.

Infosecurity Magazine · 8d agoThreat actor in the wild 2 sources1

You Shall Not Pass into Ring-0! A User Privacy-Friendly Anti-Cheat Architecture for Personal Computers

Tirith replaces invasive kernel-level game anti-cheats with protected VMs and a dual-trusted virtualization monitor, preserving detection and near-native performance.

Researchers present Tirith, an anti-cheat architecture that runs video games in Protected Virtual Machines, sandboxing computations from untrusted root admins, and uses a virtualization monitor trusted by both players and developers to watch for malicious drivers. This removes the need for privacy-invasive ring-0 kernel anti-cheat components while matching their protection against a wide range of cheating mechanisms. To overcome VM stack limitations, the work contributes a security-focused Library OS kernel for games and an efficient graphics sharing pipeline for near-native rendering performance.

arXiv cs.CR · 1d agoResearch

The Coding-Agent Trap: When a "Free" LLM Endpoint Is the Adversary, (Mon, Aug 31st)

A SANS honeypot caught a real coding-agent session routed to a rogue "free" LLM endpoint, exposing a Windows user's transcript and tool outputs.

A SANS analyst describes how an internet-exposed inference honeypot was discovered, relabeled with sought-after model names like DeepSeek, and enrolled in infrastructure serving "free" LLM backends. On 2026-08-30 an opencode terminal coding agent sent an 88-message, 224 KB transcript 210 times in 91 seconds via a China Unicom relay, exposing directory listings, tool outputs and read file portions. The analyst frames tool-enabled agents treating model endpoints as trusted control planes as a novel risk — a "rogue model endpoint" that could request tool executions on the user's machine.

SANS Internet Storm Center · 16d agoAI safety & security1

Emacs arbitrary code execution: incomplete fix for CVE-2024-53920

Incomplete fix for Emacs CVE-2024-53920 allows arbitrary code execution when viewing or editing untrusted files in non-Lisp modes like Perl flymake.

Bas Alberts of GitHub Security Lab discovered that the patch for CVE-2024-53920, an arbitrary code execution flaw in Emacs, was incomplete. Code execution remains possible when viewing or editing untrusted text files in modes other than Emacs Lisp mode, for example Perl files with flymake mode enabled. All Emacs versions affected by the original CVE remain affected by the incomplete fix.

oss-security · 2d agoVulnerabilityCVE-2024-53920

ChatGPT Sandbox Flaw Lets Attackers Steal Gmail Data Across Accounts via Hidden Channel

Check Point found a cross-account covert channel in ChatGPT sandboxes via shared JFrog Artifactory metadata, enabling session hijacking and Gmail data theft. Now fixed.

Check Point discovered that ChatGPT code-execution containers across different accounts could all reach the same internal JFrog Artifactory instance, whose Item Properties API was readable and writable by all accounts, creating a covert cross-account communication channel. Attackers could plant hidden instructions via pasted prompts, shared chat links, or custom GPTs, then trigger tasks in a victim's session to exfiltrate connected-app data such as Gmail, using ChatGPT's default 'Important actions' setting that permits reads without confirmation. OpenAI confirmed and decommissioned the shared Artifactory instance, closing the channel before publication.

Cyber Security News · 8d agoAI safety & security1

How to secure edge AI in customer-owned environments

Microsoft outlines security architecture guidance for edge AI, urging runtime attestation, artifact provenance, and deterministic mediation of model actions.

Microsoft details how edge AI shifts trust responsibilities to customers operating their own infrastructure, where prompt injection, model tampering, and malicious firmware updates can occur alongside model weights, credentials, and physical-system access. The guidance recommends verifying runtimes with attestation, verifying AI artifacts with provenance, and constraining model actions through a deterministic mediator outside the model. It also covers new exposure surfaces from MCP, multi-agent systems, and computer-use agents running in disconnected or hostile edge environments.

Microsoft Security Blog · 12d agoAI safety & security

Fortinet expands AI security portfolio with Virtue AI acquisition

Fortinet acquired Virtue AI to add agent red-teaming, MCP scanning and runtime guardrails to its AI security portfolio.

Fortinet acquired Virtue AI to extend its Security for AI strategy beyond FortiAIGate, which protects LLMs from prompt injection, data leakage and model poisoning. Virtue AI brings automated agentic red-teaming across 50+ sandboxed environments and 14 domains, agent discovery and governance including MCP tool scanning, continuous AI validation, and real-time guardrails across text, images, video, audio and code. Financial terms were not disclosed and the consideration is immaterial to Fortinet; Gartner projects the AI security market to grow from $2.8B in 2026 to $16.4B by 2030.

Help Net Security · Aug 17, 2026Industry

[0day-rubbish] core-admin 1.0.164 (build 16468) Systemic shell command injection via ineffective quote escaping (8.8)

0day Rubbish discloses a CVSS 8.8 shell command injection in core-admin 1.0.164 via ineffective quote escaping, enabling authenticated remote code execution.

0day Rubbish Research Team publicly disclosed a systemic shell command injection (CWE-78) in core-admin 1.0.164 (build 16468). The flaw stems from ineffective quote escaping and scores 8.8 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H). The disclosure does not mention a CVE identifier or observed exploitation in the wild.

Full Disclosure · 8d agoVulnerability1

China-Linked Fire Ant Hijacks Cisco Routers to Steal Credentials and Blind Security Logs

China-nexus espionage group Fire Ant compromised Cisco IOS XR routers and TACACS servers to harvest credentials, capture traffic and suppress logs.

Sygnia investigated an intrusion in which Fire Ant expanded beyond VMware hypervisors to Cisco IOS XR routers, TACACS servers and Linux management hosts. The actor deployed purpose-built router implants that hid a GRE tunnel, filtered log messages, captured PCAPs uploaded to external FTP servers, and used TacTap to inject a library into tac_plus and steal TACACS credentials obfuscated with a single-byte XOR key of 0xEF. A Linux backdoor named BridgeAgent masqueraded as a Zabbix agent, persisted via a root systemd unit, disguised itself as /usr/bin/gnome-shell and received commands over TLS on port 443. The group also used Medusa and REPTILE rootkits, SSH backdoors and renamed binaries impersonating SentinelOne and Cybereason agents, while suppressing logs, disabling SELinux and rewriting login history. Sygnia assesses strong overlap with UNC3886 and published IoCs.

The Hacker News · 16d agoThreat actor in the wild1

Linux Detection Engineering - Local Privilege Escalation

Elastic details a layered detection framework for Linux local privilege escalation, covering 2026's copy-on-write bug wave and LLM-assisted discovery.

Elastic Security Labs describes how most Linux local privilege escalations share a common host flow — an unprivileged process launched from a writable path becoming root — and proposes layered detections combining general outcome-based rules with per-technique rules in Elastic Defend and Auditd. It tracks 13 recent LPE disclosures, seven of which share a copy-on-write/zero-copy bug class, including Copy Fail, DirtyFrag, Fragnesia, DirtyDecrypt, DirtyClone, pedit COW, and RefluXFS. Qualys attributes RefluXFS to an LLM-assisted research effort with Anthropic using Claude Mythos Preview, and another bug is credited to an LLM-assisted workflow. Detection and endpoint rules are published in Elastic's detection-rules and protections-artifacts repositories.

Elastic Security Labs · 5d agoResearch

In Other News: InjectEave Attack, SIM Swapper Sentenced, Glasswing Findings Review

SecurityWeek weekly roundup covers exploited WordPress Super Forms flaw CVE-2026-14894, a $10M bounty on an Iranian cyber official, InjectEave attacks, and more.

SecurityWeek's weekly roundup aggregates short items across the threat landscape, including Microsoft's report of invisible Unicode tag characters used in financial phishing lures at up to 2.37 million messages per day, and active exploitation of critical WordPress Super Forms plugin flaw CVE-2026-14894 to deploy PHP webshells. Policy items include a $10 million US bounty for IRGC-CEC Cyber Operations Command lead Amir Yaryab, a 16-month prison sentence for ex-AT&T employee Kenneth Carter over SIM swaps with nearly $600,000 in intended losses, and the US arraignment of Russian Sergei Anatolyevich Filimonov over credential harvesting. Technical items include InjectEave electromagnetic side-channel attacks tested on 11 devices, an FBI warning on OAuth consent phishing, and VulnCheck's finding that only 202 of 26,153 Anthropic Project Glasswing findings were fixed.

SecurityWeek · 5d agoIndustry in the wildCVE-2026-148942

Scaling Verification of Cryptographic Software with Aeneas, Rust, and Lean

Microsoft SymCrypt implementations of SHA-3 and ML-KEM verified in Lean via Aeneas-extracted Rust models, with AI agents writing proofs.

The paper develops a methodology for verifying production Rust cryptographic code by using Aeneas to extract pure models into Lean, avoiding low-level pointer and aliasing reasoning. Applied to Microsoft's SymCrypt, it verifies SHA-3 and ML-KEM implementations ported from C to Rust and extends SymCrypt with FrodoKEM, ML-DSA, and HPKE. A 237 KLOC Lean development establishes safety, panic-freedom, and functional correctness of 16.7 KLOC of Rust supporting post-quantum cipher suites on x86-64 and ARM. AI agents autonomously write formal proofs verified by the Lean kernel, and evaluation shows verified Rust meets SymCrypt's performance and portability requirements.

arXiv cs.CR · 2d agoResearch1

Proofpoint Strengthens Executive Leadership Team with Appointment of Chief Legal Officer and Chief People Officer

Proofpoint appointed Brian Levey as Chief Legal Officer and Puja Jaspal as Chief People Officer, strengthening its executive leadership team.

Proofpoint announced on September 8, 2026 the appointments of Brian Levey as Chief Legal Officer and Puja Jaspal as Chief People Officer. Levey previously served as Chief Business Affairs & Chief Legal Officer at Upwork and spent 13 years at eBay; Jaspal was Chief People Officer at Fastly with prior senior roles at Cisco, Visa, and Google. The hires support Proofpoint's stated expansion around human and AI-agent security.

Proofpoint Threat Insight · 8d agoIndustry

CertiFlash: A Formal Verification Framework for Flash Translation Layers in Computational Solid State Drives

CertiFlash provides machine-checked formal verification of SSD flash translation layers, proving isolation, integrity, and ownership invariants to prevent tenant data leaks.

CertiFlash is an open-source formal verification framework for Flash Translation Layers (FTL) in computational SSDs, mechanized in the Rocq proof assistant. It shows that a faulty FTL can corrupt device state at five surfaces (e.g., leaking data between tenants or dropping integrity tags), demonstrated on a DaisyPlus OpenSSD. Designers prove once that every operation of a general FTL model preserves a global invariant covering mapping, isolation, integrity, ownership, and allocation; new designs need only discharge five hypotheses. Across four case studies, added effort was 27-3,231 lines against a 16,489-line framework.

arXiv cs.CR · 7d agoResearch1

SCHERI: Provably Secure Speculation Under the Constant-Time Policy for CHERI (Extended Version)

Researchers formally prove existing CHERI speculation proposals leak secrets and present SCHERI, a processor design with end-to-end Spectre-resistant constant-time guarantees.

The paper builds a formal framework reasoning jointly about capability safety, speculative execution, and information-flow security on CHERI architectures. It demonstrates that existing secure-speculation proposals fail to preserve constant-time confidentiality guarantees and can transiently leak isolated secrets. The authors present SCHERI, a new processor design formally proven to provide end-to-end secure speculation for the constant-time policy, resilient to Spectre attacks.

arXiv cs.CR · 1d agoResearch