Search: “web-hosting”

Trends in Web Threats: Old Web Skimmer Still Active Today

Unit 42 detected 577,000 landing URL incidents in Q1 2022, with an old web skimmer family still actively stealing payment card data.

Palo Alto Unit 42 detected 577,275 landing URL incidents (116,643 unique) and 2,043,862 malicious host URL incidents (180,370 unique) between January and March 2022. Web threat volumes declined after the November 2021 holiday peak, but an old web skimmer family remained active. Business and economy sites overtook personal sites as the most common apparently benign entry points. Most malicious domains geolocated to the United States, Germany, and Russia, though proxy servers and VPNs obscure true locations.

Palo Alto Unit 42·Aug 17, 13:05 UTC · Aug 17, 2026Research

Trends in Web Threats in CY Q2 2022: Malicious JavaScript Downloaders Are Evolving

Unit 42 detected 751,000 landing URL incidents in Q2 2022 and documented malicious JavaScript downloaders evolving to evade detection.

Unit 42 detected 751,331 landing URL incidents (253,644 unique) and 1,744,629 malicious host URL incidents (256,844 unique) from April through June 2022. Total landing URL incidents rose compared with Q1 2022, and unique host URL incidents grew 42%, indicating attackers deploying more variants. The report includes a case study of a JavaScript downloader campaign demonstrating new evasion techniques. Personal sites, blogs, and business sites were the top apparently benign entry points.

Palo Alto Unit 42·Aug 17, 13:05 UTC · Aug 17, 2026Research

[dos] LuCI DHCPv6 - Lease Hostname Stored Cross-Site Scripting

Stored cross-site scripting in OpenWrt LuCI via malicious DHCPv6 lease hostnames allows router interface attacks.

Exploit-DB entry 52637 describes a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in LuCI, the OpenWrt web administration interface. A attacker on the local network can set a malicious hostname that gets stored in DHCPv6 lease data and rendered unsafely in the LuCI UI. When an administrator views the lease status page, the injected script executes in the router's management context.

Exploit-DB·Aug 11, 00:00 UTC · Aug 11, 2026Exploit / PoC

Third-Party Script Security: How Tags, Pixels, and Embeds Can Put Websites at Risk

Sucuri details how third-party tags, pixels, and embeds expand website attack surface, letting compromised vendors read data and alter pages.

The article explains that third-party scripts used for analytics, ads, chat, payments, and video can read page content, collect visitor data, and change what users see. A compromise of the vendor, account, or integration configuration can affect every page loading the script. It recommends inventorying scripts, understanding their purpose and ownership, and detecting unexpected changes rather than removing useful integrations.

Sucuri Blog·Aug 24, 22:31 UTC · 22d agoResearch

What Is a Website Attack Surface? A Beginner’s Guide to Reducing Risk

Sucuri's beginner guide explains how logins, plugins, APIs, and forgotten backups expand a website's attack surface and how to reduce that risk.

Sucuri published educational guidance explaining that login pages, contact forms, plugins, APIs, staging sites, and forgotten backups each add exposed components that constitute a website's attack surface. The article frames continuous attack surface reduction as a risk management practice for website owners. It is evergreen educational content rather than breaking incident news.

Sucuri Blog·Aug 19, 20:06 UTC · 27d agoIndustry

[webapps] Bludit CMS - Stored XSS

A stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Bludit CMS was disclosed through a public proof-of-concept published on Exploit-DB.

Exploit-DB published a webapps entry for a stored XSS flaw in Bludit CMS, an open-source flat-file content management system. Stored XSS allows an attacker to persist malicious scripts that execute in other users' browsers, potentially enabling session theft or unauthorized actions. The listing did not include a CVE identifier or affected version range.

Exploit-DB·Sep 1, 00:00 UTC · 15d agoExploit / PoC1

[webapps] webpack_devserver 5.2.5 - CSRF

Exploit-DB published a cross-site request forgery proof of concept for webpack_devserver 5.2.5.

Exploit-DB lists a webapps CSRF proof-of-concept against webpack_devserver version 5.2.5. The flaw affects the local webpack development server, where cross-site requests could be issued against it. No CVE id is cited in the entry and no active exploitation is reported.

Exploit-DB·Aug 17, 00:00 UTC · Aug 17, 2026Exploit / PoC

[webapps] CubeCart 6.7.4 - Stored XSS

A proof-of-concept stored cross-site scripting exploit targeting CubeCart 6.7.4 was published on Exploit-DB.

Exploit-DB lists a proof-of-concept exploit for a stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in CubeCart 6.7.4, a PHP-based e-commerce web application. The listing demonstrates injection of attacker-controlled script that persists in the application, but no exploitation in the wild or CVE assignment is reported in the provided text.

Exploit-DB·Aug 31, 00:00 UTC · 16d agoExploit / PoC1

A rant about phishing: It's not the user's fault (and not DNS either)

Opinion piece argues multi-domain login redirects make legitimate flows indistinguishable from phishing, urging organizations to standardize on one recognizable root domain.

The author shows a real-world login flow that chains through numerous third-party domains (identity providers, cloud auth endpoints, OAuth APIs, 2FA pages), none on the company's own domain, so credentials and 2FA prompts are trivially impersonable. The piece argues URLs are inherently confusing because the security-relevant second-level domain sits mid-string, and that users trained to ignore URLs cannot distinguish legitimate pages from scams. It proposes RFC 2119-style requirements: single recognizable root domain, internal services on its subdomains, emailed or SMS links on that domain, and local redirects instead of third-party hosted pages.

Lobsters · security·Sep 10, 15:14 UTC · 6d agoPhishing & fraud

You Get What You Sample: Evaluating Sampling Strategies for Web Security Measurements

Evaluation of 500k Tranco and 24.8M Common Crawl hosts shows Top-N domain sampling biases web security measurements; probability sampling yields unbiased estimates.

The study is the first comprehensive investigation of how sampling strategies affect web security measurement conclusions, comparing datasets and strategies across 500k Tranco domains and 24.8M Common Crawl hosts. It shows Top-N selection does not reflect the overall web distribution and may bias observed vulnerability rates, while probability-based strategies yield stable, unbiased prevalence and impact estimates. Hybrid sampling offers no advantage because its deterministic prefix consistently hurts accuracy, and the authors propose an adaptive probability-based strategy effective even when target prevalence is unknown.

arXiv cs.CR·Sep 10, 08:21 UTC · 6d agoResearch1

Your DNS Is Hiding in HTTPS — This Is Why It Matters

Akamai argues that unmanaged DNS over HTTPS (DoH) creates enterprise visibility gaps and advocates controlled DoH strategies to restore DNS monitoring.

Akamai published a blog post arguing that unmanaged DNS over HTTPS encrypts DNS queries outside enterprise visibility, creating security monitoring gaps. The post advocates a controlled DoH strategy that restores DNS visibility for defenders while preserving user privacy. No specific incidents, vulnerabilities, or products are cited in the advisory-style piece.

Akamai Blog·Sep 2, 13:00 UTC · 14d agoIndustry

PEEP Turns Chrome and Edge Into Post-Compromise Backdoors for Host Command Execution

SOCRadar disclosed PEEP, a post-exploitation Chromium extension toolkit that turns Chrome and Edge into host-level backdoors via native messaging and C2 polling.

SOCRadar researchers detailed PEEP, a Chromium-based post-exploitation toolkit masquerading as a 'Smart Bookmarks' extension injected directly into Chrome and Edge profiles by forging Secure Preferences integrity values, bypassing Web Store checks. A native-messaging host binary (nm_host.exe) extends the browser agent to host-level command execution, file management, credential theft, and session hijacking, while the extension polls C2 endpoints at 206.237.30.232 or xfjcc.fun every 30 seconds over plaintext HTTP and exfiltrates browsing history, cookies, and tab metadata. PEEP is derived from the open-source RedExt red teaming framework, adds PowerShell persistence scripts, and includes a Linux-targeting Python script, suggesting cross-platform intent. The activity is unattributed but contains Chinese-language artifacts; a C2 /health endpoint showed 34 agent entries and 10 active sessions.

The Hacker News·Sep 7, 18:12 UTC · 8d agoMalware in the wild

Next.js 16.4.0-canary.13 Image Optimizer DNS Rebinding TOCTOU SSRF Still Exists

Next.js 16.4.0-canary.13 Image Optimizer retains a DNS rebinding TOCTOU SSRF in fetchExternalImage() allowing requests to private network resources.

Next.js 16.4.0-canary.13 contains a DNS rebinding time-of-check-to-time-of-use Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerability in the Image Optimizer's fetchExternalImage() function. The code resolves the supplied hostname and checks the resulting addresses with isPrivateIp(), but a TOCTOU gap between resolution and the actual fetch allows an attacker-controlled DNS record to change and reach private network resources.

Full Disclosure·Sep 4, 00:13 UTC · 12d agoVulnerability

Can Foundation Models Moderate Online Content? Evaluating Instruction- vs. Example-Driven Policy Operationalization

ModerationBench shows foundation models can nearly triple Bluesky's moderation F1 (0.60 vs 0.22), with instruction- and example-driven guidance performing comparably.

Researchers built ModerationBench, a new benchmark of 4,000 manually annotated in-the-wild posts from Bluesky, to test whether foundation models can reliably operationalize content moderation policies. They systematically compare instruction-driven guidance (reasoning from policy precepts) with example-driven guidance (generalizing from precedents) for Vision-Language Models. Both paradigms achieve comparable peak effectiveness, and foundation models nearly triple the F1 of Bluesky's deployed moderation system on Random Posts (0.60 vs 0.22).

arXiv cs.AI / cs.LG / cs.CL·Sep 9, 16:30 UTC · 6d agoAI research1

CVE-2026-73334: Apache Parquet Hadoop: File-controlled KMS URL is forwarded to pluggable KmsClient that skips host validation

Apache Parquet Hadoop CVE-2026-73334: a file-controlled KMS URL reaches pluggable KmsClients without host validation in parquet-java 1.12 through 1.18.0.

Apache disclosed CVE-2026-73334, a moderate issue in the org.apache.parquet.crypto.keytools package of parquet-java, versions 1.12 through 1.18.0. The package implements envelope encryption that wraps data keys via a Key Management Service. A KMS URL controlled by the Parquet file is forwarded to a pluggable KmsClient that skips host validation, which could allow crafted files to redirect KMS requests.

oss-security·Sep 8, 15:46 UTC · 7d agoVulnerabilityCVE-2026-733341

A stranger has been reading Salesforce and ServiceNow portals worldwide for 17 months

Reco tracks City-Forum, an actor abusing Salesforce and ServiceNow guest-user access from one IP for 17 months to enumerate portal data.

Reco's City-Forum investigation found one IP address, tied to a dormant 2002 domain, anonymously enumerating Salesforce Experience Cloud and ServiceNow portals across telecoms, banks, enterprise software vendors, and public sector since at least March 2025. No vulnerability was exploited and no credentials were used; the actor abused over-permissioned guest users, including a previously undocumented ServiceNow portal search endpoint, with the busiest single target logging over 560,000 events. Audit logs show what was requested but not which records or fields were returned, so defenders must replay anonymous requests to assess exposure.

Help Net Security·Aug 12, 00:00 UTC · Aug 12, 2026Threat actor

Advanced URL Filtering Archives

Palo Alto Networks markets Advanced URL Filtering as combining a malicious URL database with real-time ML and DL web protection.

The Unit 42 blog page is a product category archive for Advanced URL Filtering. The product description states it combines a malicious URL database with a real-time web protection engine powered by machine learning and deep learning models. No research findings, incidents, or vulnerabilities are discussed.

Palo Alto Unit 42·Sep 8, 14:27 UTC · 8d agoIndustry 6 sources

TCRF taken offline by DDoS attack after Claude user ban

The Cutting Room Floor game wiki was taken offline by a DDoS attack after a user leveraging Claude was banned.

The Cutting Room Floor (TCRF), a wiki documenting unused video game content, was knocked offline by a distributed denial-of-service attack. The attack reportedly followed moderation action banning a user who was using Anthropic's Claude. The incident highlights friction between community sites and AI-assisted users and tools.

Lobsters · security·Aug 28, 21:26 UTC · 18d agoAI safety & security in the wild

Honeypot-Omaha and batch.py [Guest Diary], (Wed, Sep 2nd)

A SANS ISC guest diary describes batch.py, a Python tool that consolidates honeypot logs and enriches IOCs with threat intelligence data.

Written by a SANS.edu BACS intern, the diary explains analysis of the DShield Honeypot-Omaha sensor, which uses Cowrie to emulate SSH and Telnet and log attacker activity. The author's batch.py script implements a four-phase pipeline with SHA-256-generated master and guest authentication to consolidate JSON and log files, correlate data via external APIs, and produce MITRE, CVE, geolocation, threat-score and fingerprint enrichment for investigated indicators.

SANS Internet Storm Center·Sep 3, 02:02 UTC · 13d agoTools1

Permify: Open-source authorization as a service

Help Net Security profiles Permify, an open-source Zanzibar-style authorization service supporting RBAC, ABAC, and relationship-based rules with multi-tenant deployments.

Permify is an open-source authorization-as-a-service project modeled on Google Zanzibar that centralizes access-control decisions outside application code. It supports role-based, relationship-based, and attribute-based access rules, answers checks in tens of milliseconds via REST and gRPC, and runs from a single Docker command. It is a CNCF member and is freely available on GitHub.

Help Net Security·Sep 14, 05:30 UTC · 2d agoTools1

FlyWP Adds Proactive Vulnerability Protection with Patchstack

FlyWP integrated Patchstack into its managed WordPress hosting platform via a new FlySecurity Pro add-on for proactive vulnerability protection.

FlyWP, a managed WordPress cloud hosting and server management provider, has integrated Patchstack vulnerability intelligence into its platform. The new FlySecurity Pro add-on gives customers proactive protection against WordPress vulnerabilities from a single dashboard. The announcement is a vendor partnership rather than a new flaw or incident.

Patchstack·Aug 17, 15:16 UTC · Aug 17, 2026Tools1

ChatGPT and Reddit now face EU's toughest online safety rules

ChatGPT and Reddit now fall under the EU's toughest online safety rules, adding new regulatory burdens after rapid growth.

Ars Technica reports that ChatGPT and Reddit are now subject to the European Union's strictest online safety rules, following their explosive user growth. This brings the AI chatbot and the social platform under heightened EU oversight and compliance obligations. The move signals that fast-scaling AI consumer products face the same regulatory scrutiny as major online platforms in the EU.

Ars Technica · AI·Aug 31, 13:41 UTC · 16d agoAI policy

Phishers are hijacking legitimate cloud infrastructure

Kaspersky Securelist·Aug 4, 12:00 UTC · Aug 4, 2026Threat actor1

τ^τ-Bench: An Environment for End-To-End, Realistic Agent Construction

New τ^τ-bench tasks coding agents with building deployable customer-service agents; best config, Claude Opus 5, passes only 23.9% of simulations.

Researchers introduce τ^τ-bench, an end-to-end benchmark where a developer agent must build a complete customer-service agent from real business records, a client with requirements, a production API, an inherited codebase, and cost/model limits, then is scored by deploying it against held-out simulated users. Across 53 tasks in four domains, the strongest configuration, Claude Opus 5 under Claude Code, passes just 23.9% of evaluation simulations versus an 82.2% expert-authored reference ceiling. Failure modes mirror those of human developers: shallow queries instead of deep record comprehension, almost no client communication, and shipping the first architecture that runs rather than experimenting.

Hugging Face daily papers·Sep 3, 20:00 UTC · 12d agoAI research

Trends in Web Threats: Attackers Were More Active During Holiday Season

Unit 42 tracked 533,000 malicious landing URL incidents from October-December 2021, showing web threats peaked during the holiday shopping season.

Unit 42 detected 533,452 malicious landing URL incidents (120,753 unique) and 2,906,875 malicious host URL incidents (165,255 unique) from October through December 2021. Threat activity peaked in November, likely tied to Black Friday in the United States, United Kingdom, and Germany. Most malicious domains appeared to originate in the United States, followed by Russia and Germany. Personal sites, blogs, business sites, and shopping sites were the most common apparently benign entry points for attacks.

Palo Alto Unit 42·Aug 17, 13:06 UTC · Aug 17, 2026Research

ApateWeb: An Evasive Large-Scale Scareware and PUP Delivery Campaign

Unit 42 uncovers ApateWeb, a campaign using over 130,000 domains and multilayered redirects to deliver scareware, adware and PUPs to millions of users.

Unit 42 discovered ApateWeb, a large-scale campaign using a network of more than 130,000 domains to deliver scareware, potentially unwanted programs, adware including a rogue browser and browser extensions, and scam pages. The campaign uses a three-layer structure with deceptive emails as the entry point, centralized victim tracking via UUIDs, intermediate adware or anti-bot redirections, and evasion tactics such as cloaking, bot detection error pages, and wildcard DNS abuse. Activity spiked since August 2022, with several hundred attacker-controlled sites remaining in Tranco's top 1 million rankings and millions of monthly hits; Unit 42 blocked an estimated 3.5 million sessions across 74,711 devices in November 2023.

Palo Alto Unit 42·Aug 17, 12:48 UTC · Aug 17, 2026Phishing & fraud in the wild

[webapps] Bludit CMS 3.20.0 - Reflected Cross-Site Scripting

A reflected cross-site scripting flaw in Bludit CMS 3.20.0 is documented with a public proof-of-concept exploit on Exploit-DB.

Exploit-DB published exploit ID 52678 targeting Bludit CMS 3.20.0, a web application affected by reflected cross-site scripting. The listing contains a proof-of-concept but includes no CVE identifier or evidence of active exploitation.

Exploit-DB·Sep 2, 00:00 UTC · 14d agoExploit / PoC

1.1.1.1 now supports post-quantum DNSSEC, all 2,420 bytes of it

Cloudflare's 1.1.1.1 resolver now validates post-quantum DNSSEC signatures using ML-DSA-44, a 2,420-byte NIST algorithm, preparing DNS for post-quantum migration by 2029.

Cloudflare enabled 1.1.1.1 to validate DNSSEC signatures using ML-DSA-44 (algorithm 18), a NIST-standardized post-quantum signature with 1,312-byte public keys and 2,420-byte signatures, roughly 38x larger than ECDSA P-256. The large signatures exceed common DNS-over-UDP limits, forcing fallback to TCP and creating downgrade risks while conventional algorithms must be published alongside. Cloudflare cites the risk of a quantum computer breaking RSA/ECDSA signatures by 2030 and plans full post-quantum security by 2029.

Cloudflare Blog·Sep 10, 13:00 UTC · 6d agoTools1

Unit 42 Deep and Dark Web Service Archives

Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 describes its Deep and Dark Web service monitoring underground forums for compromised credentials and leaked data.

Unit 42's Deep and Dark Web Service page describes monitoring underground forums to identify compromised credentials and leaked data. Analysts investigate suspicious content, escalate prioritized findings, and deliver actionable intelligence to customer SOCs. The page is a service description rather than a news report or incident disclosure.

Palo Alto Unit 42·Aug 18, 22:02 UTC · 28d agoIndustry

Everything in Moderation: Per-Domain Coverage Optima and Alignment-Resistant Domain Gaps in Multi-Domain Mid-Training

Controlled mid-training experiments on Qwen3-8B-Base find each domain has a 10-40% coverage optimum and domain gaps survive alignment SFT.

Using Qwen3-8B-Base (with a 4B replication) across five semantically rule-disjoint KOR-Bench domains, the authors train 30 data allocations spanning the five-domain simplex at five seeds each. All five domains show interior optima in the moderate 10-40% coverage band, and domain gaps persist after a fixed-budget compensatory SFT pass, which raises 116/120 cells yet bridges 0/240 pairs at a 5% threshold. Zero coverage collapses mid-training-only accuracy, though a FineWeb-Edu-only control shows the collapse is partly generic drift. The results argue mid-training data composition requires principled design rather than reliance on later alignment.

arXiv cs.AI / cs.LG / cs.CL·Sep 8, 17:31 UTC · 7d agoAI research1