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GPUThor: Amplifying Rowhammer Attacks via Non-Uniform Patterns to Exploit ECC-Protected GPUs

GPUThor uses non-uniform hammering to amplify Rowhammer on NVIDIA GPUs, achieving 500X-23,500X more bit flips and first exploits of ECC-protected GPUs.

GPUThor is a Rowhammer attack on NVIDIA GPUs that reverse-engineers memory-access coalescing behavior to enable non-uniform hammering patterns activating aggressor rows more intensely than decoy rows. By identifying refresh instances where in-DRAM mitigations apply, it constructs longer patterns that escape mitigation across refresh intervals. It yields 500X to 23,500X more bit flips than prior GPU Rowhammer attacks across NVIDIA A4000, A4500, A5000, and A6000 GPUs, and enables the first Rowhammer exploits on ECC-protected GPUs via uncorrectable double and triple bit flips, making denial-of-service and privilege-escalation attacks practical.

arXiv cs.CR · 2d agoResearch

SpliTEE: Improving LLM Inference on Trusted Hardware with Differentially Private GPU Outsourcing

SpliTEE splits LLM inference between Intel TDX trusted execution and untrusted GPUs, using differential privacy instead of encryption to protect intermediate representations.

SpliTEE extends split inference to LLMs, running inference partly inside an Intel TDX TEE while masking intermediate inputs sent to untrusted GPUs with differential privacy rather than encryption. The authors show a prompt-reconstruction attack recovers nearly 80% of prompts from unmasked intermediate representations, motivating the masking. A global sensitivity analysis bounds the required DP noise scale, avoiding quantization and keeping models in floating point. The implementation is nearly twice as fast as full CPU-based TDX inference and 5-15 seconds faster than encryption-based Slalom with higher accuracy, evaluated on Llama-3.2-3B and Qwen3-4B.

arXiv cs.CR · 3d agoResearch

Compiler Can Undo Your Security Checks

Chris Domas explains at Black Hat how legal compiler optimizations can strip security checks and memory-clearing operations, turning secure C source into vulnerable binaries.

David Bombal interviews researcher Chris Domas at Black Hat USA 2026 about how the C abstract machine permits compilers to legally transform code in ways that remove security protections, delete memory-clearing operations, and introduce time-of-check to time-of-use vulnerabilities. Factors like register pressure, structure layout, and data size affect vulnerability, with examples where 17 or 33 byte buffers are safe while nearby sizes produce vulnerable code. An AI-assisted analysis of 500 million lines of open-source code identified 300 potentially dangerous patterns. Recommended mitigations include enabling compiler warnings, using sanitizers, analyzing optimized builds, and testing the exact binary that ships.

Hacker News · security · 4d agoResearchHN 22↑ · 27 comments

Locus: A Framework for Exploring and Optimizing Point Addition Hardware for Zero-Knowledge Proofs

Locus framework automates ASIC and FPGA point-addition designs for elliptic curves, achieving 2.71x speedups and 3.11x area reductions for ZKPs.

Locus is a framework that automatically generates ASIC and FPGA implementations of elliptic curve point addition (PADD) for supported equation forms, enabling exploration of over 1,000 design points. On a 12nm technology node, its designs achieve a 2.71x geomean speedup and 3.11x geomean area reduction versus prior ASICs, plus 34.67x geomean speedup over CPU. Integrated into a prior ZKP accelerator at iso-area, it yields a 3.15x geomean speedup on end-to-end proof generation. The framework is open source on GitHub.

arXiv cs.CR · 20h agoResearch

Building a Linux GPU Driver for the M4 Mac Mini in One Month

Two developers built a fully OpenGL ES 3.0 compliant Linux GPU driver for the M4 Mac Mini in one month via clean-room reverse engineering.

Niklas and the author reverse engineered Apple's AGX GPU firmware ABI and user-space components in about a month, a process that normally takes years, producing an OpenGL ES 3.0 conformant driver fast enough to run Minecraft at 200fps on an M4 Mac Mini. The work was done transparently using hypervisor traces without examining Apple binaries, following clean-room practices, and included a custom shader compiler, command stream builder, and a full Linux kernel driver for the firmware ABI. The A18 Pro firmware ABI proved significantly more complex than the M1's, with 1.5x as many structs and twice as many pointers. All experiments and provenance evidence were published in public agx-re repositories.

Hacker News · AI · 1d agoResearchHN 40↑ · 5 comments

MacOS 27 - First Boot, (Tue, Sep 15th)

SANS ISC documents the expected network traffic macOS 27 'Golden Gate' generates on first boot to help defenders baseline their networks.

Johannes Ullrich of SANS Internet Storm Center captured roughly 300 packets from a macOS 27 'Golden Gate' system before user login, covering DHCP, IPv6 duplicate address discovery, DNS, and TCP behavior. macOS 27 resolves hostnames like albert.apple.com (device activation, certificate-pinned), push messaging hosts, and ipv4only.arpa for NAT64 networks. The OS still uses a TCP window scale of 6, ECN, and random timestamps, with only four TCP connections observed during boot. The analysis provides a reference baseline for security teams monitoring Apple endpoints.

SANS Internet Storm Center · 1d agoResearch

New DDRop Attack Breaks Intel TDX and AMD SEV-SNP With $159 DDR5 Device

DDRop uses a $159 DDR5 RDIMM interposer to silently drop memory writes and break Intel TDX and AMD SEV-SNP confidential VMs.

Researchers published DDRop, a physical attack built from about $159 in parts that uses a custom DDR5 RDIMM interposer to inject parity errors and silently discard selected cache-line writebacks. Intel TDX, Intel Scalable SGX, and AMD SEV-SNP are affected because they lack per-line cryptographic freshness, so processors can accept stale encrypted data as valid state. The team demonstrated deterministic plaintext copying between pages, malicious Secure EPT entry injection, forcing trust domains into debug mode, and forging attestation measurements. The attack requires privileged host control plus brief physical access, and researchers say no simple software patch exists.

Cyber Security News · 2d agoResearch 2 sources

From Hypervisor to Container: Cloud Security Vulnerabilities, Defense Mechanisms, and Open Challenges

Survey of 120+ cloud security papers (2008-2025) reviews hypervisor and container isolation attacks, scoring defenses with the ADPO framework and CIA impact scale.

This survey reviews over 120 security publications from 2008 to 2025 on breaches of cloud isolation boundaries via virtual machines and containers. Threats examined include VM escape, VM hopping, CPU cache side-channels, container breakouts, vulnerable container images, and DDoS attacks. The authors introduce ADPO, a 0-3 scoring framework rating defenses on accuracy, deployment ease, performance impact, and operational overhead, plus a 1-5 CIA severity mapping for attack impact.

arXiv cs.CR · 2d agoResearch