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Multiple ArtraDownloader Variants Used by BITTER to Target Pakistan

BITTER used three ArtraDownloader variants since 2015 to target Pakistan, China, and Saudi Arabia, deploying BitterRAT and exploiting CVE-2017-11882 in one wave.

Palo Alto Unit 42 documents ArtraDownloader, a previously unreported downloader family used by the suspected South Asian group BITTER, with three variants and roughly 80 unique samples dating back to February 2015. Between September 2018 and January 2019, BITTER used spearphishing documents hosted on compromised Pakistani websites to target Pakistan and, for the first time, Saudi Arabia; one RTF sample exploited the EQNEDT vulnerability CVE-2017-11882. The downloader retrieves BitterRAT over HTTP, uses simple registry keys for persistence, and byte-level string obfuscation. Infrastructure overlap with the previously reported MY24 InPage-exploit payload was also observed.

Palo Alto Unit 42 · Aug 17, 2026Threat actor in the wildCVE-2017-11882

RANCOR: Targeted Attacks in South East Asia Using PLAINTEE and DDKONG Malware Families

Unit 42 names RANCOR, a previously unidentified espionage group targeting Southeast Asian political entities with newly discovered PLAINTEE and DDKONG malware families.

Unit 42 tracks a previously unidentified group it dubs RANCOR conducting highly targeted espionage attacks in Singapore and Cambodia using two custom malware families, DDKONG and PLAINTEE. Attacks appear to have begun with spear phishing, with decoy political news documents hosted on legitimate sites including a Cambodian government website and Facebook. Infrastructure links to IP 89.46.222[.]97 and KHRAT-associated domains such as facebook-apps[.]com, and the activity is grouped into two clusters tied together by PLAINTEE usage and similar targeting.

Palo Alto Unit 42 · Aug 17, 2026Threat actor1

DPRK APTs: Ted backdoor and curlRAT target South Korean media and automotive sectors

Rapid7 uncovered a DPRK-linked Linux toolkit using a HAProxy-embedded ted backdoor, SSH keylogger, and curlRAT against South Korean media and automotive firms.

Rapid7 Labs identified a previously undocumented framework attributed with medium confidence to DPRK actors, targeting South Korean automotive and media organizations likely since early 2025. The toolkit embeds a backdoor compiled into HAProxy 2.8.12 using its filter API, plus trojanized crond, agetty, atd, sshd, and polkitd, an SSH keylogger storing credentials under /var/lib/sshd/, and a curl-based RAT with a watchdog thread. It enables remote command execution, malicious script injection into served webpages (a watering-hole loop), credential harvesting, and long-term surveillance. Hardcoded C2s are associated with APT37 via ThreatFox, and exposed groupware portals and mail servers align with Kimsuky tradecraft; the initial access vector and any CVE remain unconfirmed.

Rapid7 Blog · 12d agoThreat actor in the wild1

Patchwork Continues to Deliver BADNEWS to the Indian Subcontinent

Unit 42 details Patchwork APT campaigns against the Indian subcontinent using EPS exploits and an updated BADNEWS backdoor targeting Pakistani military and nuclear interests.

Unit 42 observed the Patchwork group (also known as Dropping Elephant and Monsoon) conducting campaigns against targets in the Indian subcontinent using weaponized documents that exploit CVE-2015-2545 and CVE-2017-0261. The documents deliver an updated BADNEWS backdoor that grants attackers full control of victim machines, using dead drop resolvers on legitimate third-party websites for C2 and HTTP for communications. Lures referenced Pakistan Army promotions, the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission and the Ministry of the Interior, and in late January 2018 the group shifted from CVE-2017-0261 to the older CVE-2015-2545.

Palo Alto Unit 42 · Aug 17, 2026Threat actor in the wildCVE-2015-2545CVE-2017-0261

Aggah Campaign: Bit.ly, BlogSpot, and Pastebin Used for C2 in Large Scale Campaign

Aggah campaign abuses Bit.ly, BlogSpot, and Pastebin as multi-hop C2 to deliver RevengeRAT across the Middle East, US, Europe, and Asia.

Unit 42 details the Aggah campaign, which began with spearphishing emails in March 2019 spoofing a large financial institution and targeting education, media/marketing, and government organizations in the Middle East, later expanding to the US, Europe, and Asia. Delivery documents use Template Injection to load a remote OLE file whose macro runs mshta against a Bit.ly link redirecting to a BlogSpot post, which then uses Pastebin pastes to download RevengeRAT configured with a duckdns[.]org C2 domain. The embedded script also deletes Microsoft Defender signatures and kills Defender and Office processes, and modifies registry keys to enable macros. High-level TTPs resemble the Gorgon Group, but Unit 42 could not confirm attribution.

Palo Alto Unit 42 · Aug 17, 2026Threat actor

xHunt Campaign: New PowerShell Backdoor Blocked Through DNS Tunnel Detection

xHunt's new CASHY200 PowerShell backdoor used DNS tunneling for C2; DNS security blocked beaconing at a Kuwait organization in September 2019.

Unit 42 describes CASHY200, a new PowerShell-based backdoor tied to the xHunt campaign that communicates with its C2 server windows64x[.]com via DNS tunneling, parsing commands from DNS answers. In September 2019, a Kuwait-based organization's DNS security service blocked the beaconing minutes after detection, cutting off adversary access. Samples dating to May and June 2018 and open source collection suggest the tool was used against Kuwait government organizations from spring 2018 through 2019, with malicious Word documents observed installing CASHY200 payloads configured with C2 domains such as firewallsupports[.]com and winx64-microsoft[.]com. The tool's name derives from identifiers stored under the registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Cashe and the command value 200.

Palo Alto Unit 42 · Aug 17, 2026Threat actor

MILE TEA: Cyber Espionage Campaign Targets Asia Pacific Businesses and Government Agencies

Unit 42 names MILE TEA, a cyber-espionage campaign since 2011 targeting Japanese and Taiwanese businesses and government agencies with e-ticket phishing lures and Elirks-family malware.

Unit 42 tracks the MILE TEA espionage campaign, observed as early as 2011, targeting Japanese trading, petroleum, and mobile companies, a Beijing office of a Japanese public organization, and a Taiwanese government agency. The primary infection vector is spear-phishing emails with attachments, mostly custom executable installers posing as flight e-tickets, dropping Elirks, Micrass, or Logedrut as initial bridgehead malware. Elirks and Logedrut retrieve encrypted C2 addresses from attacker-posted blog articles, decoded with Base64 and TEA or DES ciphers. The campaign's focus shifted from Taiwan to Japan around 2013.

Palo Alto Unit 42 · Aug 17, 2026Threat actor in the wild1

Stately Taurus Activity in Southeast Asia Links to Bookworm Malware

Unit 42 links Stately Taurus APT activity in ASEAN region and Myanmar to the decade-old Bookworm malware family via infrastructure overlaps.

Unit 42 connected Stately Taurus (aka Mustang Panda) espionage activity targeting ASEAN-affiliated organizations and Myanmar to the Bookworm malware family, first published in 2015. Earlier attacks delivered the PubLoad stager via DLL sideloading, with a PubLoad variant communicating with C2 at 123.253.32[.]15 while mimicking Windows Update URLs. Three previously unreported loader samples from 2021-2022 used UUID-decoded shellcode loaded via heap allocation and API callbacks, ultimately decrypting and loading Bookworm DLLs. A ToneShell backdoor variant shared debug paths with Bookworm loaders, and the January 2024 CSIRT CTI post corroborated the Myanmar attacks.

Palo Alto Unit 42 · Aug 17, 2026Threat actor in the wild1

EITest Campaign Evolution: From Angler EK to Neutrino and Rig

Unit 42 details the EITest campaign's shift from Angler to Neutrino and Rig exploit kits while distributing ransomware, downloaders, and banking trojans.

Unit 42 updated its tracking of the EITest campaign, first identified in October 2014, which compromises websites with injected scripts that redirect victims through a gate to exploit kits. After Angler EK disappeared in June 2016, EITest switched to Neutrino and then primarily used Rig EK by August 2016. In September 2016 the campaign began using hex-obfuscated JavaScript and simplified gate URLs, while continuing to distribute payloads including Gootkit, Cerber, Bart, CryptFile2, Vawtrak, Ursnif, and Tinba. Gate infrastructure consistently reused IP blocks such as 85.93.0.0/24 even as domain names changed.

Palo Alto Unit 42 · Aug 17, 2026Threat actor in the wild