60
60
60
60
60
60
60
60
⚡ Weekly Recap: Instagram Account Hacks, Android Zero
60
60
60
DPRK APTs: Ted backdoor and curlRAT target South Korean media and automotive sectors
Rapid7 uncovered a DPRK-linked Linux toolkit using a HAProxy-embedded ted backdoor, SSH keylogger, and curlRAT against South Korean media and automotive firms.
Rapid7 Labs identified a previously undocumented framework attributed with medium confidence to DPRK actors, targeting South Korean automotive and media organizations likely since early 2025. The toolkit embeds a backdoor compiled into HAProxy 2.8.12 using its filter API, plus trojanized crond, agetty, atd, sshd, and polkitd, an SSH keylogger storing credentials under /var/lib/sshd/, and a curl-based RAT with a watchdog thread. It enables remote command execution, malicious script injection into served webpages (a watering-hole loop), credential harvesting, and long-term surveillance. Hardcoded C2s are associated with APT37 via ThreatFox, and exposed groupware portals and mail servers align with Kimsuky tradecraft; the initial access vector and any CVE remain unconfirmed.
68
60
60
60
APT28-Linked HOOKEDGE Backdoor Targets European Government and Diplomatic Organizations
Recorded Future links new HOOKEDGE batch-script backdoor campaigns against Romanian, Spanish and Turkish government targets to Russia's APT28 (BlueDelta).
Recorded Future's Insikt Group identified campaigns deploying the previously undocumented HOOKEDGE backdoor against government and diplomatic organizations in Romania, Spain and Türkiye from late September 2025 to early April 2026. The lightweight Windows batch backdoor is delivered via macro-enabled Word documents and attributed with moderate confidence to APT28 (Fancy Bear, tracked as BlueDelta), described as the evolutionary successor to HEADLACE, using webhook.site for C2, payload staging and exfiltration. HOOKEDGE fetches .cmd payloads and returns output through headless Microsoft Edge HTTP requests, maintains a 30-minute scheduled task, and a second-stage implant gives high-value targets five-minute beaconing for interactive operator tasking.
78
60
60
60
60
May 2026 CVE Landscape
60
Chinese Hacker Commands DeepSeek via Telegram to Launch Autonomous Attacks
60
60
60
HBO Max Reddit Account Hijacked to Spread PasteSwitch ClickFix Malware
Hijacked HBO Max verified Reddit account ran 108 ClickFix malvertising ads delivering AMOS and Amatera stealers plus crypto clippers to macOS and Windows users.
Threat actors hijacked HBO Max's verified Reddit account (u/hbomax) to run 108 malicious ClickFix ads over 48 hours in a campaign tracked as PasteSwitch, researched by Hudson Rock and ADAMnetworks. macOS victims were served curl | zsh chains deploying MacSync and Atomic macOS Stealer (AMOS), which harvest browser credentials, Telegram data, Apple Notes, and macOS passwords, while fake Ledger, Trezor, and Exodus apps targeted BIP39 seed phrases. Windows users received an InstallFix chain using an MP3/HTA polyglot with mshta and PowerShell, scheduled-task persistence, AMSI disabling, and in-memory Amatera Stealer that hid C2 traffic (77.91.65.13:443) behind a facebook.com TLS SNI. AnimateClipper and ZigClipper components swapped copied crypto wallet addresses and used Binance Smart Chain contracts as mutable C2 dead drops; Reddit paused the ads and the initial access path remains undisclosed.
68
North Korea-linked Hackers Hide a Backdoor Inside HAProxy
Rapid7 reports North Korea-linked hackers implanted a backdoor compiled into HAProxy at South Korean automotive and media firms, enabling covert C2 and credential theft.
Rapid7 documented a previously undocumented Linux toolkit hitting South Korean automotive and media organizations, centered on a backdoor compiled directly into victims' HAProxy 2.8.12. The 'ted backdoor' uses HAProxy's native filter API to intercept HTTP traffic, receive C2 commands hidden in requests to a fake image path, and erase all traces from logs and counters; the toolkit also trojanizes crond, agetty, atd, sshd, and polkitd, adds an SSH keylogger, and runs curlRAT with virtualization checks. It can inject scripts or replace page content for selected victims, turning the load balancer into a watering hole. Attribution sits at medium confidence toward North Korean state actors, with overlaps to APT37-linked infrastructure and a concurrent Lazarus campaign; the campaign's command domains have since gone dark.
60
60
An AI-Assisted Cyber Attack: Inside a Unit 42 Investigation
Unit 42 investigated a ransom attack in which frontier AI agents autonomously breached an enterprise network, compressing weeks of tradecraft into under 10 hours.
Unit 42 incident responders documented an intrusion where a single human operator directed frontier AI agents to breach an enterprise network autonomously as part of a ransom attack. The agents executed more than 50 MITRE ATT&CK techniques in under 10 hours, work that would normally require roughly two weeks of human red-team effort. They breached a public-facing web service, mapped internal microservices, scraped hard-coded secrets from code repositories, harvested root credentials from the secrets manager, and hijacked CI/CD builds to exfiltrate cloud access keys. The attacker also used stolen cloud keys to repurpose the victim's AI endpoints as post-compromise infrastructure and left behind an 80-page AI-generated security audit documenting dozens of exploited findings.
80
60
60
Hackers Exploit Critical FortiGate Flaw to Deploy AI-Assisted PivotC2 RAT
SOCRadar says attackers exploit FortiGate CVE-2025-25249 to deploy the PivotC2 Node.js RAT, compromising 178 of 30,000 targeted devices and stealing credentials.
SOCRadar's Threat Research Unit reports active exploitation of CVE-2025-25249, a CVSS 9.8 heap-based buffer overflow in the cw_acd daemon of FortiOS and FortiSwitchManager, via crafted CAPWAP requests to UDP port 5246, compromising at least 178 of 30,000 targeted internet-exposed FortiGate devices since July 2026. The campaign deploys PivotC2, a Node.js RAT that provides interactive shells, SOCKS5/HTTP proxying, port forwarding, network scanning, and automated configuration harvesting that decrypts stored FortiGate credentials, including VPN pre-shared keys, SSL-VPN credentials, and LDAP secrets. Russian-language artifacts, AD enumeration, browser credential theft, RDP enablement, and exfiltration of Exchange .pst files to Wasabi S3 point to a Russian-speaking, financially motivated group; two US organizations confirmed full-network intrusions. Fixes include FortiOS 7.6.4/7.4.9/7.2.12/7.0.18+ and FortiSwitchManager 7.2.7/7.0.6+, plus blocking CAPWAP on internet-facing interfaces.
72
60
Hackers Exploit FortiGate SSL-VPN Vulnerability to Attack Broadband Provider
Exposed attacker staging server reveals intrusion of Thai broadband provider 3BB via actively exploited FortiGate SSL-VPN flaw CVE-2024-21762.
Hunt.io found an open directory on server 92.63.180[.]133 holding 298 files detailing an intrusion into Triple T Broadband's 3BB brand, starting from a FortiGate 60F SSL-VPN at mail.3bb.co[.]th:10443. The actor weaponized CVE-2024-21762 (CVSS 9.8, KEV-listed since February 2024) using heap spraying and a ROP chain to gain a reverse shell. Post-exploitation included MeshCentral root-level persistence via www.ayuthayatech[.]com, Dirty COW/PwnKit privilege escalation, credential harvesting, SSH spraying against 55+ internal addresses, and log-deleting cleanup scripts; a stolen OpenVPN certificate and key from Triple T's PKI may still be valid.
75
60
CISA Warns Water Utilities: Find Your Exposed PLCs Before Attackers Do
CISA urged water utilities to secure internet-exposed PLCs after July 2026 attacks compromised over 100 US water and wastewater systems, suspected Iran-linked.
CISA's exposure-reduction guidance, published August 21, follows July 2026 attacks in which threat actors remotely accessed PLCs connected directly through cellular modems, changed device IP addresses and passwords, and in some cases disabled alarms and shutdown processes without notifying operators. Iran is the suspected actor, though officials stopped short of formal attribution. CISA recommends routing remote access through centrally managed secure gateways, phishing-resistant MFA, unique credentials, and external scanning of industrial protocols such as Modbus, EtherNet/IP, DNP3, BACnet and OPC UA.
72
60
60
HTTP/2 CONTINUATION Flood technique can be exploited in DoS attacks
60
60
60