Retrospectively Reverse-Engineering Apple's Neural Engine
A developer reverse-engineers Apple's M1 Neural Engine architecture, mapping compute cores, MAC datapaths, and schedulers to explain the NPU's decline as transformers displaced CNN workloads.
A developer who previously maintained a reverse-engineered Linux driver for Apple's Neural Engine (ANE) published a retrospective deep dive mapping the M1 ANE's full internal architecture: compute, datapath, scheduler, memory, and execution model. The M1 ANE has 16 compute cores with 128 FP16 (or 256 INT8) MAC lanes each, totaling 2048 parallel MAC lanes, using 32-bit Q16.16 fixed-point accumulation with FP16 readout and an accumulator that saturates at 2^15. The author argues the ANE's dataflow was architected around the predictable reuse patterns of 2017-era CNN workloads (dating to the A11 Bionic), which autoregressive transformer decode broke, limiting its usefulness for general ML. With Apple's M5 folding ANE cores into GPU cores to tout LLM performance, the post frames this as the beginning of the end for the standalone NPU.
JSCeal Hides Crypto Malware in V8 Bytecode
Check Point details JSCeal, a crypto-stealing malware delivered as compiled V8 bytecode, and built a decompiler pipeline to expose its capabilities.
JSCeal, tracked by Check Point Research since early 2025, is a cryptocurrency stealer delivered as heavily obfuscated JavaScript compiled to V8 bytecode (.jsc) and run by a bundled Node.js runtime. Check Point, presenting at Black Hat USA 2026, extended the open-source View8 decompiler into a pipeline that recovered readable code from 23 samples, revealing theft of browser credentials and cookies, Telegram sessions, keystrokes, screenshots, HTTPS traffic interception with attacker-controlled certificates, and automated Google account takeover. Targeted overrides rewrite content for Binance, Bybit, and Ledger users. Later samples added AES-256-CBC encryption with externally supplied keys and expanded targeting to macOS.
Breaking the Seal: Static Deobfuscation of JSCeal’s Compiled V8 Bytecode
Check Point's hasherezade details static deobfuscation of JSCeal, a V8-bytecode stealer targeting cryptocurrency applications since March 2024.
JSCeal is an infostealer distributed as compiled V8 bytecode (.jsc) executed by a bundled Node.js runtime, aimed at cryptocurrency applications. Other vendors track the same family under the names WEEVILPROXY or MeadowLocust. Check Point Research has tracked the campaign since early 2024, with activity dating back to March 2024. The write-up presents a static approach to unpacking the bytecode without executing it.
Google’s open-source HEIR lets AI work with data it can’t see
Google open-sourced HEIR, a compiler toolchain that converts pre-trained AI models to operate on homomorphically encrypted data without exposing it.
Google's HEIR (Homomorphic Encryption Intermediate Representation) is an open-source compiler toolchain and development platform for fully homomorphic encryption, announced in 2023 and now supporting four peer-reviewed publications. It compiles Python programs handling sensitive data into implementations that process encrypted inputs, supporting multiple FHE schemes, libraries, front-end languages, and hardware accelerators such as GPUs, TPUs, FPGAs, and custom ASICs. Demonstrated applications include private recommendations, credit card fraud detection, network intrusion detection, and hotword recognition.
NOKKI Almost Ties the Knot with DOGCALL: Reaper Group Uses New Malware to Deploy RAT
Unit 42 links NOKKI malware to North Korea's Reaper group, uncovering the Final1stspy dropper that deploys the DOGCALL RAT in politically motivated attacks.
Unit 42 analyzed the NOKKI malware family used in politically themed attacks against Russian and Cambodian speakers since July 2018. The researchers linked NOKKI to the Reaper group, publicly attributed to North Korea, whose custom DOGCALL RAT uses third-party hosting services to upload data and receive commands. A previously unreported family, Final1stspy, was found deploying DOGCALL, sharing a unique base64-to-hex deobfuscation routine with NOKKI droppers. Attacks used malicious Microsoft Word macros that download and execute payloads while opening decoy documents.
Stately Taurus Activity in Southeast Asia Links to Bookworm Malware
Unit 42 links Stately Taurus APT activity in ASEAN region and Myanmar to the decade-old Bookworm malware family via infrastructure overlaps.
Unit 42 connected Stately Taurus (aka Mustang Panda) espionage activity targeting ASEAN-affiliated organizations and Myanmar to the Bookworm malware family, first published in 2015. Earlier attacks delivered the PubLoad stager via DLL sideloading, with a PubLoad variant communicating with C2 at 123.253.32[.]15 while mimicking Windows Update URLs. Three previously unreported loader samples from 2021-2022 used UUID-decoded shellcode loaded via heap allocation and API callbacks, ultimately decrypting and loading Bookworm DLLs. A ToneShell backdoor variant shared debug paths with Bookworm loaders, and the January 2024 CSIRT CTI post corroborated the Myanmar attacks.
Testing race conditions with memory access tracing and stack-based delay injection
Google Project Zero released MAccConc, Linux kernel tooling that traces memory accesses to explore and test race condition interleavings.
A Google Project Zero researcher published MAccConc (Memory Access Concurrency), tooling for exploring possible interleavings of multithreaded test cases in the Linux kernel, available on GitHub. The tools use KCOV with ASAN outline-mode instrumentation to record per-access memory traces, enabling automatic testing of all A-B-A interleavings plus terminal and GUI explorers for manual analysis. The work targets confirming race condition candidates, building reliable regression tests, and enabling concurrency fuzzing, drawing on ideas from SKI and Ned Williamson's sockfuzzer.
JSCeal Malware Can Bypass Google Authentication Using Stolen Session Cookies
Check Point details JSCeal, a V8-compiled JavaScript stealer that replays stolen cookies to bypass Google authentication, spread via crypto malvertising.
Check Point Research's new report analyzes JSCeal, a compiled V8 JavaScript malware obfuscated with javascript-obfuscator using RC4-protected strings, control-flow flattening, and proxy functions. Delivered through fake TradingView installers on malvertising sites overlapping the WEEVILPROXY/MeadowLocust and SourTrade campaigns, it harvests cookies, passwords and OAuth tokens from Chromium browsers, records keystrokes and screenshots, and can replay stolen Google session cookies to bypass authentication. It also installs a local proxy with service-specific handlers for Binance, Bybit, and Ledger to intercept and modify cryptocurrency-related traffic.
Multiple ArtraDownloader Variants Used by BITTER to Target Pakistan
BITTER used three ArtraDownloader variants since 2015 to target Pakistan, China, and Saudi Arabia, deploying BitterRAT and exploiting CVE-2017-11882 in one wave.
Palo Alto Unit 42 documents ArtraDownloader, a previously unreported downloader family used by the suspected South Asian group BITTER, with three variants and roughly 80 unique samples dating back to February 2015. Between September 2018 and January 2019, BITTER used spearphishing documents hosted on compromised Pakistani websites to target Pakistan and, for the first time, Saudi Arabia; one RTF sample exploited the EQNEDT vulnerability CVE-2017-11882. The downloader retrieves BitterRAT over HTTP, uses simple registry keys for persistence, and byte-level string obfuscation. Infrastructure overlap with the previously reported MY24 InPage-exploit payload was also observed.