China-Made ZBT Routers Ship With Two Implants Giving Unauthenticated Attackers Root Access
VulnCheck discloses two factory implants, SPEAKINGSTONE and DARKLANTERN, in ZBT router firmware granting unauthenticated remote attackers root command execution.
VulnCheck found two previously undocumented implants in firmware from Shenzhen Zhibotong Electronics (ZBT), tracked as CVE-2026-74232 (SPEAKINGSTONE) and CVE-2026-74233 (DARKLANTERN), each rated 9.8 on CVSS 3.1. SPEAKINGSTONE (yunmgrd) beacons to a hardcoded C2 over UDP port 10000 and supports root command execution, PPPoE credential exfiltration, DNS hijacking, and reverse SSH tunnels; DARKLANTERN (infosrvd) listens on UDP port 9992 with weak hardcoded authentication. Scanning found 203 internet-facing DARKLANTERN instances across 22 countries, and 392 devices reported to the SPEAKINGSTONE backup C2, nearly all in China on China Mobile. No fixed firmware release is named, and ZBT's white-labeling means model number rather than brand is the reliable detection check.
A Deep Dive Into Attempted Exploitation of CVE-2023
Mirai-like botnet scans exploit TP-Link EOL router flaw CVE-2023-33538 after CISA KEV addition, though observed exploit code is flawed.
Unit 42 observed large-scale automated scans attempting to exploit CVE-2023-33538 in end-of-life TP-Link TL-WR940N, TL-WR740N and TL-WR841N routers after CISA added the flaw to its KEV catalog in June 2025. HTTP GET requests inject commands via the ssid1 parameter at the /userRpm/WlanNetworkRpm endpoint to download and execute an arm7 ELF binary, a Mirai variant related to the Condi IoT botnet. Firmware emulation and reverse engineering showed the observed exploits are flawed and would fail, but the underlying vulnerability is real and successful exploitation requires authentication to the router's web interface. TP-Link confirmed the devices are end-of-life with no patches available and recommends replacing units and eliminating default credentials.
Hackers Compromised 14,500+ Dahua Devices Using Credential Attacks, Auth Bypasses, and P2P
Hunt.io disclosed Operation CameraSwarm, compromising 14,500+ Dahua cameras via credential attacks, auth bypass CVEs, and P2P relay techniques across Ukraine and Russia.
Hunt.io reconstructed a campaign codenamed Operation CameraSwarm that compromised over 14,530 Dahua devices between June 17 and July 22, 2026. Attack paths included credential attacks against 12,324 IPs, exploitation of CVE-2021-33044 and CVE-2021-33045 affecting 1,923 cameras, and P2P relay access to 283 devices behind NAT. The operator, assessed as Russian-speaking, left behind 2,616 files including tooling and campaign logs, with confirmed compromises concentrated in Ukraine and Russia. Dahua advises factory resets and firmware updates; both 2021 CVEs remain in CISA's KEV catalog.
CISA tells operators to harden Siemens S7 PLCs. Here’s how to do it without disrupting production
CISA, NSA, FBI and other agencies warn of active targeting of internet-exposed Siemens S7 PLCs and urge patching, exposure removal and hardening.
Joint advisory AA26-231A from the NSA, CISA, FBI, Department of Energy and EPA warns that actors are actively targeting Siemens S7 PLCs using internet scanning, AI-assisted scripts and libraries such as Snap7 and python-snap7 over S7comm on TCP port 102. The advisory covers S7-200 through S7-1500 series controllers and recommends patching, removing internet exposure, access controls, monitoring and disabling unneeded services. Siemens states no new S7 vulnerabilities are involved, only misconfigurations addressed in existing ProductCERT guidance SSB-104599. The article details how to apply each measure without breaking production dependencies such as remote I/O, HMI links and diagnostics.
Week in review: Firmware-level Android backdoor found on tablets, Dell zero-day exploited since 2024
Muhstik Botnet Attacks Tomato Routers to Harvest New IoT Devices
Unit 42 found a Muhstik botnet variant brute-forcing Tomato router web authentication to harvest IoT devices for crypto mining and DDoS attacks.
Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 researchers in December 2019 identified a new Muhstik botnet variant scanning Tomato routers on TCP 8080 and brute-forcing default admin credentials, targeting roughly 4,600 exposed devices found via Shodan. The variant also scans WordPress and Webuzo installations and exploits the Oracle WebLogic deserialization flaw CVE-2019-2725 for unauthenticated remote code execution. Muhstik, active since March 2018, self-propagates like a worm and typically monetizes infections through cryptocurrency mining and DDoS attacks controlled via an IRC C2 channel.