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Amazon Kiro Prompt Injection Can Exfiltrate Sensitive Data Through Kiro Powers
Mindgard found a prompt injection flaw in Amazon Kiro IDE letting attacker-controlled workspace files exfiltrate sensitive local data; fixed in version 0.8.140.
Mindgard disclosed a prompt injection flaw in Amazon Kiro, an agentic AI IDE, that lets attacker-controlled repository content steer the agent into exfiltrating sensitive workspace data through Kiro Powers, which bundles MCP server configurations, POWER.md steering files, hooks, and contextual knowledge. Exploitation requires the user to open a malicious project via a workspace file and send any message to the agent; difficulty is rated low and it works in both trusted and untrusted workspaces. Amazon fixed the issue in Kiro IDE 0.8.140; the flaw has no CVE identifier and follows earlier Kiro bugs including CVE-2026-10591, plus related prompt-injection and code-execution issues in Codex CLI, Cursor, Gemini CLI, Copilot CLI, and Claude Code.
VU#718077: UEFI Shell module embedded in SPI Flash can be used to bypass Secure Boot
CERT/CC details VU#718077: UEFI Shell embedded in SPI flash lets attackers bypass Secure Boot and execute pre-boot code; patches issued.
CERT/CC's VU#718077, reported by Eclypsium researcher Stas Lyakhov, describes how a UEFI Shell embedded in SPI flash can be abused by attackers who can modify UEFI boot configuration, creating multiple boot entries that bypass controls preventing the Shell from launching under Secure Boot. The Shell's dmem and mm commands allow arbitrary physical memory read/write, letting attackers overwrite Secure Boot values and execute unauthorized pre-boot code that can persist across reboots and OS reinstalls while degrading EDR effectiveness. AMI confirmed its Aptio UEFI BDS module is affected (CVE-2026-33197), and Cisco published an advisory for a variation affecting UCS Servers and UCS-based appliances (CVE-2026-20293). Firmware patches are being rolled out through OEM and IBV BIOS build pipelines.
Seeing is Not Believing: Breaking the Physical-to-Digital Trust Boundary in Robotics
Researchers show a single ROS 2 environment variable lets attackers inject fake telemetry and hijack robots while spoofing downstream remote attestation.
A pre-built hook loaded via one modified environment variable covertly intercepts and injects both telemetry and control signals before publication in ROS 2, breaking the physical-to-digital trust boundary in multi-robot task handovers. Attackers can also distribute compromised third-party Docker containers and auxiliary tools embedding the hooks. On a physical Franka Emika arm running Secure ROS 2, the attack injects fabricated telemetry in real time with roughly 3 ms jitter and achieved an 87% success rate even against an AI-based detector. Findings were responsibly disclosed to the ROS 2 development team.