oss-security thread flags collateral of emSign ECC root distrust
First merged summary.
Replies on the eMudhra intermediates thread describe collateral distrust under emSign ECC Root CA - G3, not the compromise itself.
On the oss-security thread titled eMudhra Intermediates Compromise, Stuart Henderson said collateral damage for emSign ECC Root CA - G3 includes three Internet2 InCommon intermediates and eMudhra Technologies Limited intermediates. He said briefly removing the RSA root, as was done for a time, would widen that impact. Other replies do not describe how any compromise occurred. Hanno Böck said his badkeys scans of CCADB certificates do not yet check for small ECDSA keys. Peter Gutmann said Let's Encrypt and his own code reject RSA keys whose primes are too close. Jeffrey Walton corrected that CA/Browser Forum baseline rules set root CA notAfter at 25 years.
- Henderson named InCommon Intermediate CA - DVG3C, EVG3C and OVG3C, C=US, O=Internet2.
- Those intermediates sit under emSign ECC Root CA - G3 with eMudhra intermediates.
- He said a brief RSA-root removal made the impact wider.
- Böck has not yet added a small-ECDSA-key check to badkeys.
- Walton cites CA/B BR 7.1.2.1.1: root CA validity is 25 years.
Timeline
dated events in the reporting · oldest first- Oct 21, 2026Böck says small-ECDSA-key checks are not implemented yet. · oss-security
- Oct 21, 2026Gutmann notes Let's Encrypt rejects RSA keys with close primes. · oss-security
- Oct 22, 2026Henderson lists InCommon and eMudhra collateral under emSign ECC root. · oss-security
- Oct 24, 2026Walton corrects root CA notAfter to 25 years. · oss-security
What each outlet adds
beyond the shared facts- oss-security (Henderson)Names three Internet2 InCommon intermediates and wider RSA-root impact.
- oss-security (Böck)badkeys scans CCADB certs but lacks small-ECDSA-key checks.
- oss-security (Gutmann)Let's Encrypt uses Fermat factorisation for close RSA primes.
- oss-security (Walton)Corrects root CA notAfter to 25 years under CA/B BR.
- Organizations
- InCommoneMudhraCCADBLet's Encrypt
Coverage
oldest first · one row per article · UTC- · 21d ago
oss-securityFirst report
badkeys author says he already scans CCADB certs for weak keys
Hanno Böck has not yet added checks for small ECDSA keys and plans a later write-up.
- · 21d ago
Gutmann cites Fermat checks for RSA keys with close primes
On the eMudhra intermediates thread, he says Let's Encrypt rejects public keys whose primes are too close.