eMudhra thread: root CA notAfter period is 25 years
Jeffrey Walton corrects himself and cites CA/Browser Forum baseline requirements for root CA validity.
Jeffrey Walton corrects himself and cites CA/Browser Forum baseline requirements for root CA validity.
Of 8,947 IGOD hosts checked on October 23, 156 still presented certificates revoked on October 19.
A researcher showed eight intermediate private keys from an April 2025 ceremony can be recovered in seconds.
A short oss-security reply says the CA incident should raise priority for replacing certifi with truststore.
The release vendors pip and requires python-discovery 1.6.1 or newer.
Chrome is set to drop emSign ECC Root CA – G3 on the morning of October 27; Mozilla has already removed it.
Derived keys for eight intermediates can mint certificates for any domain; Okta reports no exploitation.
Derived keys for eight intermediates can mint certificates for any domain; Okta reports no exploitation.
The reply says distribution ca-certificates should be the default, with certifi used as a dependency only when necessary.
The forwarded note only cites a Python discussion statement and a comment, without describing the certificate impact.
Stuart Henderson lists three Internet2 InCommon intermediates plus eMudhra intermediates under emSign ECC Root CA - G3.
Eight intermediate keys were trivial values; browsers blocked them, and the firm says nothing was breached.
Researcher recovered private keys of eight intermediate CAs that were below 256 bits, leading to root distrust and business exit.
Eight intermediate CA keys were tiny integers, including 4; the firm says none issued end-entity certificates.
Eight intermediate keys were integers below 256, one of them 4; major browsers blocked the certificates within days.
Mozilla and Google blocked eight weak intermediate keys on October 17; those CAs issued no end-entity certificates, while about 30,000 others need migration.
The company says affected CAs were revoked within 14 hours, with no end-entity certificates and no data breach.
A BSE filing says the firm will focus on enterprise solutions and trust services other than SSL/TLS.
Fixed builds are 22.23.4, 24.22.1, and 26.12.1; a public proof of concept did not achieve code execution on a standard build.
One signing key was the number 4, letting attackers forge certificates and impersonate sites.
Go 1.27.3 and 1.26.10 distrust eight weak intermediates as CVE-2026-111943; Talos reports no malicious use yet.
The excerpt is site navigation; it does not describe how the keys were weak, what was exposed, or any fix.
Eight intermediates from an April 2025 ceremony used keys under 256; browsers blocked them, and about 30,000 customer certificates need replacement.
Eight April 2025 intermediates, also cross-signed by Sectigo, used P-384 private keys of one byte.
Eight April 2025 intermediates used near all-zero keys; browsers blocked them between October 17 and October 20.
Keys were trivially recoverable from public certificates; Google saw no chaining TLS certificates in CT logs before blocking.
All eight P-384 private keys were integers below 256 and could be recovered from public certificate data.
Eight April 2025 intermediates used private keys smaller than 256; no abuse is evidenced, but many trust stores needed updates.
Mozilla, Chrome and Apple are distrusting eight intermediates after keys such as 4, 56 and 115 were recovered in under a second.
Cloudflare says it has not seen exploitation on its services and has shipped client and tunnel updates.
Six keys issued website TLS certificates and two were for code signing; fraudulent issuance is unconfirmed.
The private keys were the integers 4, 56, 66, 115, 155, 156, 230 and 237, versus a normal P-384 key.
Alan Coopersmith says restrictions on Mozilla bug 2083449 were removed on October 20.
Eight intermediates chaining to major browser roots were blocked; attacks on users are not confirmed.
Whether Edge, Internet Explorer, cURL, and other private root stores still trust eMudhra is unconfirmed.
Chrome and Firefox blocked the TLS intermediates within hours of an October 17 report, and no website certificate chaining to them was in Certificate Transparency beforehand.
Systems that do not receive CRL updates are told to disable emSign ECC Root CA - G3 and the Comodo AAA Services root.
The notice reached the distros list a day before this oss-security forward and points to a Mozilla security post.
OneCRL reached standard Firefox users in under three hours; 158.0.1 and two ESR builds cover the rest.
Rebuilt Go programs reject chains through the keys, with no disable switch, and older unsupported releases get no fix.
Entities are extracted by the model from each article. First seen , last mentioned . Watching keeps it in this browser only (no account); the watchlist page and dashboard alerts use it.
Today 2.1K readers · 2.6K views · 390 reads · all time 108K views