eMudhra to exit global TLS after weak intermediate keys
October 23: Schneier says eMudhra was unavailable, the cause is unknown, and misuse needs an active network position.
eMudhra says it will leave global TLS after eight intermediates were found with 3–8 bits of key entropy.
India-based eMudhra Limited said it will withdraw from global SSL/TLS after researchers found eight intermediate certificates whose NIST P-384 private keys held about 3 to 8 bits of entropy instead of roughly 384. Ars Technica reports the keys were 4, 56, 66, 115, 155, 156, 230 and 237, the strongest had at most 256 possibilities, and forged certificates could be trusted by major browsers and many mail servers. Chairman V. Srinivasan cited compliance costs, about 1 percent of revenue, and free providers. Schneier on Security says eMudhra was not available for comment and the cause is not established, conflicting with Ars Technica’s account of the withdrawal. Misuse would require an active network-path position, especially against VPN or local-network traffic.
- Eight private keys were 4, 56, 66, 115, 155, 156, 230 and 237.
- Strongest defective key had at most 256 possibilities, Ars Technica reports.
- Normal NIST P-384 keys should hold about 384 bits of entropy.
- Srinivasan cited compliance costs and roughly 1 percent of revenue.
- Certificate transparency logs showed the certificates only after issuance.
- Schneier says the weak-key cause is not established.
Timeline
dated events in the reporting · oldest first- Oct 22, 2026Ars reports eMudhra will leave global TLS. · Ars Technica
- Oct 23, 2026Schneier posts that eMudhra was unavailable for comment. · Schneier on Security
What each outlet adds
beyond the shared facts- Ars TechnicaReports the withdrawal, chairman’s reasons, and browser trust risk.
- Schneier on SecurityNo comment available, unknown cause, and active interception required.
- Vendors
- eMudhra Limited
- Products
- TLS certificates
- Countries
- India
Coverage
oldest first · one row per article · UTCeMudhra exits global TLS business after weak certificate keys
Eight intermediates used 3- to 8-bit private keys that could be cracked in milliseconds to mint trusted certificates.
eMudhra issued TLS certificates with private keys of 3 to 8 bits
Eight P-384 keys held only a handful of bits of entropy, so a network attacker could impersonate the certificate holder.