Metasploit Wrap Up: A Collection of What Can Only Be Called Eclectic Modules

File and Print Sharing service in Windows 95, Windows 98, and Windows Me does not properly check the password for a file share, which allows remote attackers to bypass share access controls by sending a 1-byte password that matches the first character of the real password, aka the "Share Level Password" vulnerability.

dizqueTV 1.5.3 contains a remote code execution vulnerability that allows attackers to inject arbitrary commands through the FFMPEG Executable Path settings. Attackers can modify the executable path with shell commands to read system files like /etc/passwd by exploiting improper input validation.

CVE-2026-0770 is an unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in Langflow, an open-source visual builder for LLM and AI agent workflows. The flaw, categorized as CWE-829 (inclusion of functionality from an untrusted control sphere), resides in how the exec_globals parameter supplied to the validate endpoint is handled, allowing code or resources from an untrusted control sphere to be included and executed. A remote attacker with no credentials can send a crafted request to that endpoint and execute arbitrary code in the context of root on the affected installation. Any deployment of an affected Langflow version is exposed, with internet-facing self-hosted or containerized instances at greatest risk. The issue was disclosed through Trend Micro's Zero Day Initiative (ZDI-CAN-27325) and was added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2026-07-21, confirming active in-the-wild exploitation; no public proof-of-concept is known.

Do: Apply the vendor's patched Langflow release and any prescribed mitigations per CISA guidance; because exploitation requires no authentication and executes as root, prioritize internet-exposed instances immediately (EPSS is high at 63.4%). Per BOD 26-04, if mitigations or updates are unavailable for a given deployment, discontinue use of the product. Review access logs for unexpected unauthenticated requests to the validate endpoint containing crafted exec_globals parameters, and restrict network exposure of Langflow instances until patched.

vLLM is an inference and serving engine for large language models (LLMs). From 0.8.3 to before 0.14.1, when an invalid image is sent to vLLM's multimodal endpoint, PIL throws an error. vLLM returns this error to the client, leaking a heap address. With this leak, we reduce ASLR from 4 billion guesses to ~8 guesses. This vulnerability can be chained a heap overflow with JPEG2000 decoder in OpenCV/FFmpeg to achieve remote code execution. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.14.1.

Local privilege escalation in snapd on Linux allows local attackers to get root privilege by re-creating snap's private /tmp directory when systemd-tmpfiles is configured to automatically clean up this directory. This issue affects Ubuntu 16.04 LTS, 18.04 LTS, 20.04 LTS, 22.04 LTS, and 24.04 LTS.

Ollama for Windows contains a Remote Code Execution vulnerability in its update mechanism due to improper handling of attacker‑controlled HTTP response headers. When downloading updates, the application constructs local file paths using values derived from HTTP headers without validation. These values are passed directly to filepath.Join, allowing path traversal sequences (../) to be resolved and enabling files to be written outside the intended update staging directory. An attacker who can influence update responses can exploit this flaw to write arbitrary executables to attacker‑chosen locations accessible to the current user, including the Windows Startup directory. This allows execution of arbitrary executables. Critically, when chained with CVE‑2026‑42248 (Missing Signature Verification for Updates), an attacker can deliver malicious payloads that are written to sensitive locations and executed automatically. Because Ollama for Windows performs silent automatic updates and executes staged binaries without user interaction, this results in automatic and persistent code execution without user awareness. Maintainers of this project were notified early about this vulnerability, but didn't respond with the details of vulnerability or vulnerable version range. Versions from 0.12.10 to 0.17.5 were tested and confirmed as vulnerable, other versions were not tested but might also be vulnerable.

CVE-2026-42271 is a command injection (CWE-77/CWE-78) in BerriAI LiteLLM's proxy server, a widely used AI gateway for calling LLM APIs. Two MCP preview endpoints (POST /mcp-rest/test/connection and POST /mcp-rest/test/tools/list) accept a full stdio server configuration, including command, args, and env fields, and spawn the supplied command as a subprocess on the proxy host; the endpoints are gated only by any valid proxy API key with no role check, so even low-privilege internal-user keys can trigger it. An attacker with any authenticated key gains arbitrary command execution with the privileges of the proxy process, and reporting indicates attackers are chaining the flaw into broader takeover of AI gateway servers, including reverse shells and crypto miners, in some cases via weak or default keys such as the example 'sk-1234' admin key. Any organization running LiteLLM versions 1.74.2 through before 1.83.7, including LiteLLM distributed with Red Hat OpenShift AI, is affected. The flaw was added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2026-06-08 and is under active attack, with a very high EPSS of 83.6% for exploitation within 30 days.

Do: Upgrade LiteLLM to version 1.83.7 or later immediately (federal agencies must act per CISA KEV/BOD 22-01), and apply Red Hat's advisory updates if running OpenShift AI. Until patched, restrict or rotate proxy API keys — especially low-privilege internal-user and any default/example keys such as 'sk-1234' — and limit network access to the /mcp-rest/test/* endpoints. Review proxy hosts for indicators of compromise such as unexpected spawned subprocesses, reverse shells, or crypto miners, and rotate credentials that may have been captured via compromised environments.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: skbuff: propagate shared-frag marker through frag-transfer helpers Two frag-transfer helpers (__pskb_copy_fclone() and skb_shift()) fail to propagate the SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG bit in skb_shinfo()->flags when moving frags from source to destination. __pskb_copy_fclone() defers the rest of the shinfo metadata to skb_copy_header() after copying frag descriptors, but that helper only carries over gso_{size,segs, type} and never touches skb_shinfo()->flags; skb_shift() moves frag descriptors directly and leaves flags untouched. As a result, the destination skb keeps a reference to the same externally-owned or page-cache-backed pages while reporting skb_has_shared_frag() as false. The mismatch is harmful in any in-place writer that uses skb_has_shared_frag() to decide whether shared pages must be detoured through skb_cow_data(). ESP input is one such writer (esp4.c, esp6.c), and a single nft 'dup to ' rule -- or any other nf_dup_ipv4() / xt_TEE caller -- is enough to land a pskb_copy()'d skb in esp_input() with the marker stripped, letting an unprivileged user write into the page cache of a root-owned read-only file via authencesn-ESN stray writes. Set SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG on the destination whenever frag descriptors were actually moved from the source. skb_copy() and skb_copy_expand() share skb_copy_header() too but linearize all paged data into freshly allocated head storage and emerge with nr_frags == 0, so skb_has_shared_frag() returns false on its own; they need no change. The same omission exists in skb_gro_receive() and skb_gro_receive_list(). The former moves the incoming skb's frag descriptors into the accumulator's last sub-skb via two paths (a direct frag-move loop and the head_frag + memcpy path); the latter chains the incoming skb whole onto p's frag_list. Downstream skb_segment() reads only skb_shinfo(p)->flags, and skb_segment_list() reuses each sub-skb's shinfo as the nskb -- both p and lp must carry the marker. The same omission also exists in tcp_clone_payload(), which builds an MTU probe skb by moving frag descriptors from skbs on sk_write_queue into a freshly allocated nskb. The helper falls into the same family and warrants the same fix for consistency; no TCP TX-side in-place writer is currently known to reach a user page through this gap, but a future consumer depending on the marker would regress silently. The same omission exists in skb_segment(): the per-iteration flag merge takes only head_skb's flag, and the inner switch that rebinds frag_skb to list_skb on head_skb-frags exhaustion does not fold the new frag_skb's flag into nskb. Fold frag_skb's flag at both sites so segments drawing frags from frag_list members carry the marker.

CVE-2026-86218 is a static code injection flaw (CWE-96) in N-able's N-central on-premises remote monitoring and management (RMM) platform, carrying a maximum CVSS 4.0 score of 10.0. An unauthenticated, remote attacker triggers it by sending crafted network input to the N-central server that is improperly neutralized and persisted into application-managed code, which the server then executes — no privileges (PR:N) or user interaction (UI:N) are required. Successful exploitation yields full server compromise with high impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability, and because N-central acts as the management hub for downstream customer endpoints, compromise can expose the entire managed estate. Any organization running an affected N-central release (before 2026.3.1.14) — primarily MSPs and corporate IT departments using N-able RMM — is affected. The flaw is confirmed exploited in the wild: N-able patched it as a zero-day, CISA added it to the KEV catalog on 2026-09-08, and it is the fourth N-central hotfix in five weeks, though no public PoC is known and ransomware use is unknown.

Do: Upgrade N-central to 2026.3.1.14 or later (or apply N-able's hotfix) immediately, as the flaw is in CISA's KEV catalog and BOD 26-04 timelines apply to federal stakeholders. Until patched, remove direct internet exposure of the N-central server (restrict to VPN/management networks via firewall allowlists) since no authentication is needed for exploitation. Because in-the-wild exploitation is confirmed, review internet-facing N-central servers for indicators of compromise such as unexpected processes, unusual child processes of the web service, and new or suspicious accounts.