Study compares eight ways to carry large PQC KEMs in IKEv2
Original title: Embedding Large PQC KEMs in IKEv2
Across 126,500 handshakes, no design fully offsets key size, and Classic McEliece fails under hard loss.
Researchers screened IETF proposals for fitting large post-quantum KEM public keys into IKEv2, whose initial exchange cannot be fragmented, and added three designs of their own, including QUIKE and QUIKE with a composite key exchange. They found two specification gaps in existing acknowledgment drafts and implemented all eight approaches on one open-source codebase. Tests with ML-KEM, FrodoKEM, and Classic McEliece covered 1,296 configurations. No mechanism fully offsets key size; Classic McEliece either congests the link or averages nearly two minutes per handshake under challenging conditions.
- Measurements total 126,500 handshakes in 1,296 configurations.
- KEMs tested are ML-KEM, FrodoKEM, and Classic McEliece.
- QUIKE-composite is reported as the best overall performer.
- Standardized extensions need more optimization; QUIC transport can be leaner.
- Organizations
- IETF
From the original article
1 min read at arxiv.orgPost-quantum key encapsulation mechanisms carry public keys far larger than the established VPN handshake protocol IKEv2 was designed for. At the same time, its initial exchange comprising the public keys cannot be fragmented. In response, the IETF discusses a range of protocol adjustments, yet these proposals have never been compared in terms of their performance and stability under identical conditions.
By Daniel Herzinger · arxiv.org
A short excerpt; the article and its images belong to the publisher. Summary, key facts and assessment above are AI-written from the article and can be wrong.