Study compares Kyber, Dilithium and FALCON in simulated vehicle links
Original title: The use of post-quantum cryptography in the automotive context
Rural V2V and urban V2X runs also include an ECDSA/ECDH baseline measured in the same setup.
The study simulates post-quantum cryptography for automotive communication using OMNeT++, Veins, INET, and SUMO on two hardware platforms, citing Shor’s and Grover’s algorithms as the quantum threat. It compares ML-KEM/CRYSTALS-Kyber, ML-DSA/CRYSTALS-Dilithium, and FALCON in a rural vehicle-to-vehicle scenario and an urban vehicle-to-everything scenario with a roadside unit. Kyber had low key-encapsulation latency, Dilithium balanced signature cost, and FALCON was expensive to generate keys and sign but efficient to verify. ML-KEM and ML-DSA are finalized NIST standards; FALCON remains a selected candidate pending final standardization.
Unconfirmed: Findings are comparative simulation results, not measurements from production vehicles.
- Simulators were OMNeT++, Veins, INET, and SUMO.
- Scenarios were rural V2V and urban V2X with a roadside unit.
- FALCON had high key-generation and signing cost but efficient verification.
- An ECDSA/ECDH baseline from the same setup is reported for reference.
- Organizations
- NIST
From the original article
1 min read at arxiv.orgThis study comparatively evaluates post-quantum cryptography (PQC) in automotive communication scenarios, considering the threat posed by quantum algorithms such as Shor's and Grover's algorithms. The simulations use OMNeT++, Veins, INET, and SUMO on two hardware platforms and examine ML-KEM/CRYSTALS-Kyber, ML-DSA/CRYSTALS-Dilithium, and FALCON.
By Mariana do Carmo Barata Gonçalves · arxiv.org
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