Hybrid ML-KEM proposed for Wi-Fi OWE and FILS key setup
Original title: Post-Quantum Migration of Wi-Fi Key Establishment: A Hybrid ML-KEM Design for OWE and FILS, Validated on OWE with hostapd
On OWE, hostapd and wpa_supplicant matched keys, with added time under half a millisecond.
The paper replaces Diffie-Hellman in Wi-Fi OWE and FILS with a hybrid of elliptic-curve agreement and ML-KEM, deriving the master key from both secrets. The exchange reuses existing frames and adds no round trip; a station can refuse association without the post-quantum exchange. A hostapd and wpa_supplicant prototype matched keys on every measured OWE connection, and the two smaller parameter sets fit one frame under a 1500-byte threshold. FILS measurements and capability binding are not in the prototype.
Unconfirmed: FILS behavior is a design carry-over; measurements were obtained only on OWE.
- The hybrid uses classical elliptic curves alongside ML-KEM (FIPS 203).
- Added connection time and computation stayed below half a millisecond.
- The intermediate ML-KEM parameter set is described as the best size-security balance.
- Capability binding is specified but not implemented.
- FILS frame-budget measurements are left for later work.
From the original article
1 min read at arxiv.orgThe key agreements that protect a Wi-Fi connection rely on Diffie-Hellman, which a sufficiently capable quantum computer would break; an adversary can therefore record an association today and decrypt its traffic years later. Key establishment is thus the part of IEEE 802. 11 that has to be migrated first.
By Jesús R. Abascal · arxiv.org
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