Do Electromagnetic Side-Channel Attacks Threaten Electronic Polling Stations? Scenarios and Recommendations
Researchers assess TEMPEST attacks on Brazil's electronic voting machines and recommend polling-station mitigations.
The paper examines whether electromagnetic side-channel, or TEMPEST, attacks can reconstruct screen content and threaten ballot secrecy on Brazil's electronic voting machine, the UEB. Attack scenarios draw on public information about the electoral system and a recent electoral-court case concerning an attempt to violate ballot secrecy. Software-defined radio experiments indicate that effectiveness depends strongly on weak oversight and public unawareness of the threat. The authors recommend awareness guidelines for voters, poll workers, and party representatives.
- Assesses TEMPEST reconstruction of video emanations from Brazil's UEB.
- Motivated by an electoral-court case on ballot-secrecy violations.
- SDR experiments tie effectiveness to weak polling-station oversight.
- Proposes awareness guidance for voters, workers, and party representatives.
- Products
- UEB
- Organizations
- Brazilian electoral court
- Countries
- Brazil
From the original article
1 min read at arxiv.orgThis paper investigates the threat to ballot secrecy in the Brazilian electronic voting machine (UEB) posed by electromagnetic side-channel attacks, also known as TEMPEST attacks. In these attacks, screen content can be reconstructed remotely by intercepting electromagnetic emanations associated with the target device's video signal.
By Lucas Brito · arxiv.org
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