A critical WatchGuard Fireware flaw could allow unauthenticated code execution
Vulnerabilities mentionedAll →
| CVE | Vulnerability | CVSS | EPSS | Flags | Affected | Exposure | Published |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2025-9242 | Out-of-Bounds Write in WatchGuard Fireware OS iked Enables Unauthenticated RCE WatchGuard Fireware OS contains an out-of-bounds write (CWE-787) in the iked process that a remote, unauthenticated attacker can trigger to execute arbitrary code on the appliance. The flaw is reachable via the mobile user VPN with IKEv2 and via branch office VPNs using IKEv2 to a dynamic gateway peer; devices whose IKEv2 configurations were deleted may remain vulnerable if a branch office VPN to a static gateway peer is still configured. Successful exploitation yields full system compromise, reflected in the CVSS v4.0 base score of 9.3 (network vector, no privileges or user interaction, high impact on confidentiality, integrity and availability). WatchGuard Firebox appliances with IKEv2 VPN services are affected, with public reporting citing roughly 54,000 internet-exposed Fireboxes; the issue was added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2025-11-12, a public proof-of-concept exploit exists, and headlines indicate use in ransomware attacks (KEV ransomware field is listed as unknown). EPSS assigns a 91.3% probability of exploitation within 30 days (100th percentile), so remediation urgency is high. Do: Apply the patched Fireware OS release per WatchGuard's security advisory immediately (exact fixed version numbers are not provided in the source data); the KEV listing makes BOD 22-01 remediation timelines mandatory for U.S. federal agencies. As an interim mitigation, restrict or disable IKEv2 VPN exposure — mobile user VPN with IKEv2 and branch office VPN IKEv2, including residual static-peer BOVPN configurations on devices that previously had IKEv2 configured — to trusted sources only. Administrators should audit configuration history to identify Fireboxes with prior IKEv2 mobile VPN or dynamic-peer BOVPN setups, since these may remain vulnerable even after the configs were deleted. | 9.3 | 91% | KEV PoC |
| large≈54,000 internet-exposed Fireboxes (public scan figure cited in coverage) |
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A critical WatchGuard Fireware vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2025-9242, could allow unauthenticated code execution.
Researchers revealed details of a critical vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2025-9242 (CVSS score of 9.3), in WatchGuard Fireware. An unauthenticated attacker can exploit the flaw to execute arbitrary code. The vulnerability is an out-of-bounds write issue that affects Fireware OS versions 11.10.2–11.12.4_Update1, 12.0–12.11.3, and 2025.1.
“An Out-of-bounds Write vulnerability in WatchGuard Fireware OS may allow a remote unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code. This vulnerability affects both the Mobile User VPN with IKEv2 and the Branch Office VPN using IKEv2 when configured with a dynamic gateway peer.” reads the advisory. “This vulnerability affects Fireware OS 11.10.2 up to and including 11.12.4_Update1, 12.0 up to and including 12.11.3 and 2025.1.”
The vendor states that a WatchGuard Fireware OS iked process flaw allows remote unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary code via an out-of-bounds write vulnerability. The vulnerability impacts Firebox devices using IKEv2 for mobile user or branch office VPNs with dynamic gateways. The company pointed out that even if those VPNs were deleted, devices remain at risk if a branch office VPN to a static gateway is still configured.
“An Out-of-bounds Write vulnerability in the WatchGuard Fireware OS iked process may allow a remote unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code. This vulnerability affects both the mobile user VPN with IKEv2 and the branch office VPN using IKEv2 when configured with a dynamic gateway peer.” reads the advisory. “If the Firebox was previously configured with the mobile user VPN with IKEv2 or a branch office VPN using IKEv2 to a dynamic gateway peer, and both of those configurations have since been deleted, that Firebox may still be vulnerable if a branch office VPN to a static gateway peer is still configured.”
The vulnerability impacts the following versions:
| Vulnerable Version | Resolved Version |
|---|---|
| 2025.1 | 2025.1.1 |
| 12.x | 12.11.4 |
| 12.5.x (T15 & T35 models) | 12.5.13 |
| 12.3.1 (FIPS-certified release) | 12.3.1_Update3 (B722811) |
| 11.x | End of Life |
The flaw lets unauthenticated attackers execute arbitrary code on a perimeter appliance by targeting the IKEv2 VPN service, an Internet-exposed entry point, making the bug reachable before authentication, as per watchTowr researchers.
This vulnerability ticks all the boxes ransomware actors crave: remote code execution on a perimeter device, exposure via a public-facing VPN service, and pre-auth exploitability, making it a high-priority target for exploitation and urgent to patch.
“WatchGuard enables more than 250,000 small and midsize enterprises from around the globe to protect their most important assets, including over 10 million endpoints.” warns watchTowr that published a technical analysis of the issue.
WatchGuard researcher McCaulay Hudson links the bug to ike2_ProcessPayload_CERT in ike2_payload_cert.c, where a client identification is copied into a 520-byte stack buffer without length checks during IKE_SA_AUTH, enabling overflow before certificate validation.
WatchTowr shows an exploit gaining RIP control and using mprotect() to spawn a Python TCP shell despite NX, then escalates to a full Linux shell by remounting read/write, downloading BusyBox and symlinking /bin/sh.
Researchers urge customers to address the issue as soon as possible.
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