ZeroHour
CyberScooppublished ()ingested @gregotto

Malware linked to Salt Typhoon used to hack telcos around the world

Vulnerabilities mentionedAll →

CVEVulnerabilityCVSSEPSSFlagsAffectedExposurePublished
CVE-2021-26855
+3 in the same advisory: …27065 …26857 …26858
Unauthenticated SSRF/RCE in Microsoft Exchange Server (ProxyLogon)

CVE-2021-26855 is a server-side request forgery flaw (CWE-918) in Microsoft Exchange Server that allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to send specially crafted HTTP requests and have the Exchange server process them as itself, disclosing sensitive session information. When chained with sibling Exchange flaws (the 'ProxyLogon' chain), it yields authentication bypass and arbitrary file write, escalating to full remote code execution with SYSTEM-level privileges on the on-premises Exchange server. Any organization running an affected on-premises Exchange server reachable over HTTP/HTTPS (typically outbound webmail) is exposed; Exchange Online was not affected. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild at large scale: the flaw was mass-exploited beginning in early 2021 (notably by the HAFNIUM group), is on the CISA KEV with documented ransomware use, and has a maximum EPSS score of 100% (100th percentile), despite no public PoC listing.

Do: Apply the vendor's March 2021 Exchange security updates (or later cumulative updates) immediately, per the CISA required action; until patched, limit Exchange (ECP/OWA) exposure to the internet via firewall/VPN rules. Hunt for compromise: review IIS logs for unrecognized authenticated activity against FrontEnd HttpProxy endpoints, and check for malicious files or webshells under inetpub\wwwroot\aspnet_client, given the known ransomware use.

9.1
group max
100% KEV ransomware PoC ×4
  • Microsoft Exchange Server On-premises Exchange Server editions supported in the vendor's March 2021 guidance (Exchange Server 2013, 2016, and 2019), prior to the March 2021 security upda
masshundreds of thousands of on-premises deployments; tens of thousands of internet-exposed Exchange servers
CVE-2022-3236
Unauthenticated Code Injection RCE in Sophos Firewall (User Portal/Webadmin)

CVE-2022-3236 is a critical (CVSS 9.8) code injection flaw (CWE-94) in the User Portal and Webadmin interfaces of Sophos Firewall version v19.0 MR1 and older. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can send crafted input to an exposed User Portal or Webadmin service, and the network-reachable, no-privilege, no-user-interaction nature of the flaw makes it trivially triggerable once those interfaces are reachable. Successful exploitation results in arbitrary code execution on the firewall appliance, with high impact to confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Any organization running Sophos Firewall v19.0 MR1 or older is affected, including end-of-life appliances for which the vendor issued a dedicated hotfix. The flaw is confirmed exploited in the wild: it was abused as a zero-day before the patch, added to CISA KEV on 2022-09-23, carries a 98.9% EPSS, and news reports indicate it was still being exploited against EOL firewalls well after disclosure.

Do: Upgrade Sophos Firewall to version 19.5 or later per vendor instructions (the fix shipped in the 19.5 release line), and apply the vendor hotfix to end-of-life appliances that cannot upgrade. Restrict internet exposure of the User Portal (TCP 443) and Webadmin (TCP 4444) to trusted management IPs via WAN access rules, and review appliance logs for signs of exploitation. As this CVE is in CISA KEV, federal agencies and other defenders with KEV-driven patch mandates should confirm the update is applied.

9.899% KEV
  • Sophos Firewall (User Portal and Webadmin) v19.0 MR1 and older
masshundreds of thousands of deployed Sophos Firewall appliances; tens of thousands of User Portal/Webadmin instances internet-exposed per public scans
CVE-2024-21887
+1 in the same advisory: …46805
Command Injection RCE in Ivanti Connect Secure and Policy Secure

Ivanti Connect Secure (formerly Pulse Connect Secure) and Ivanti Policy Secure appliances contain a command injection flaw (CWE-77) in their web components, triggered when an authenticated administrator sends crafted requests to the appliance. The bug can be chained with the separate authentication bypass CVE-2023-46805, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to achieve the same result. Successful exploitation lets an attacker execute arbitrary commands and code on the appliance, providing a foothold into the networks behind the VPN or network access control gateway. Any organization running these appliances, typically enterprises and government agencies often deployed directly on the internet perimeter, is affected. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild: the flaw was added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2024-01-10 with known ransomware use and EPSS assigns a 100% probability of exploitation within 30 days, although no public proof-of-concept is available.

Do: Apply Ivanti's mitigations or patched builds immediately per vendor instructions, addressing the chained authentication bypass CVE-2023-46805 at the same time, and discontinue or restrict use of any appliance for which mitigations are unavailable, especially if it is internet-facing. Because exploitation with ransomware use is known, assume compromise is possible: review appliance web logs for suspicious requests and run Ivanti's integrity-checking guidance to verify appliance images before and after remediation. Where feasible, restrict direct internet exposure of the appliance web interface and monitor for further vendor advisories.

9.1
group max
100% KEV ransomware PoC
  • Ivanti Connect Secure (ICS, formerly Pulse Connect Secure)
  • Ivanti Policy Secure
largetens of thousands of appliances (roughly 20,000-30,000 internet-exposed ICS gateways at disclosure; total deployed base likely higher)
CVE-2023-48788
Unauthenticated SQL Injection in Fortinet FortiClient EMS

Fortinet FortiClient EMS — the central management server for FortiClient endpoint deployments — contains a SQL injection flaw (CWE-89) in versions 7.0.1 through 7.0.10 and 7.2.0 through 7.2.2. The CVSS 3.1 vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N) shows it can be triggered remotely with no credentials and no user interaction: an unauthenticated attacker sends specially crafted packets to the vulnerable management server and can execute unauthorized code or commands. Successful exploitation effectively yields remote code execution on the EMS server and access to its database, enabling follow-on actions such as credential theft, abuse of endpoint management functions, and ransomware deployment. Any organization running the affected EMS versions is exposed, especially where the management server is reachable from the internet. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild: CISA added the bug to the KEV catalog on 2024-03-25 with known ransomware use, and EPSS assigns a ~98.4% probability of exploitation within 30 days (100th percentile).

Do: Upgrade FortiClient EMS to the fixed releases per Fortinet's advisory for this CVE (7.2.3 and 7.0.11 or later, i.e., beyond the 7.2.2 and 7.0.10 affected ranges); the CISA KEV required action is to apply vendor mitigations or discontinue use if mitigations are unavailable. Until patched, limit exposure of the EMS web interface to untrusted networks and hunt for signs of compromise — anomalous requests to the management console, unexpected database or admin activity, and follow-on ransomware behavior — since exploitation with known ransomware use is confirmed.

9.898% KEV ransomware
  • fortinet FortiClient Enterprise Management Server (EMS) 7.2.0 through 7.2.2 and 7.0.1 through 7.0.10
largetens of thousands of EMS deployments worldwide, with a smaller subset (likely thousands) internet-exposed
Full article778 words · extracted from cyberscoop.com · click to collapse
Skip to main content

Get our latest cybersecurity news first on Google.

Click here!

A report from Trend Micro details the highly sophisticated ways Salt Typhoon carries out its operations.

Listen to this article

0:00

Learn more.

(Getty Images)

Those with firsthand knowledge of Salt Typhoon’s hack of several U.S. telecommunications companies have called the group’s actions some of the most sophisticated cyber-espionage efforts they have ever seen. A prominent security vendor may have unearthed some malware that shows why. 

Trend Micro released a report Monday that gives details on the tactics, techniques and procedures used by Salt Typhoon, which the company referred to as one of “the most aggressive Chinese advanced persistent threat (APT) groups” currently in operation. 

While the company explicitly states that it does not have any evidence the malware detailed in the report was used in the telecom hacks, Trend Micro researchers write that several pieces of malware used by the group have been used to infiltrate other telecommunications companies and government entities around the world. Tracked as “Earth Estries,” Trend Micro says this group, which is also known as FamousSparrow, GhostEmperor, and UNC2286, has used the malware in the U.S., Asia-Pacific, Middle East, and South Africa.

The report focuses on how the group gains access, what malware is deployed, and how it stays hidden on infiltrated systems. The group capitalizes on several known vulnerabilities, including:

From there, Trend Micro says the group likes to use legitimate tools like Windows Management Instrumentation Command (WMIC.exe) or PsExec to penetrate further into networks. 

Once inside, the group uses malware described as “backdoors,” which Trend Micro refers to as GhostSpider, SnappyBee, and Masol RAT. Each of these tools exhibits a high level of sophistication, enabling the group to stay hidden within compromised networks. GhostSpider in particular is a multi-modular backdoor designed to deploy various components for specific functions, enhancing its adaptability and making it harder to detect.

The company also details the group’s intricate command and control infrastructure, which Trend Micro says is managed by different specialized teams. This setup allows the group to carry out different tasks, is crucial to allowing them to run several missions at once, and provides additional resilience. 

The ability to remain in networks has been a key point in why government officials are increasingly concerned about the intrusion on U.S. telecom networks. Sen. Mark Warner, D-Va., told the Washington Post last week that the hack is “the worst telecom hack in our nation’s history – by far” and the attackers are still in the systems. 

While these TTPs can be considered highly sophisticated, the threat group isn’t creating all of its malware from scratch. Trend Micro says the group takes advantage of malware-as-a-service (MaaS) platforms to enhance their strategies, using these services to deploy a variety of malicious tools while saving time and resources. This approach allows them to focus on planning and executing sophisticated attacks while leveraging the latest malware technology.

The espionage campaign reportedly targeted the phones of top members of the Donald Trump campaign — including the president-elect himself — and top U.S. officials. While few details have been made public, a slate of congressional panels have been briefed on the campaign’s details. 

You can read the full report on Trend Micro’s research blog

Latest Podcasts

Text extracted automatically; images, tables and formatting may be missing. Original: https://cyberscoop.com/salt-typhoon-us-telecom-hack-earth-estries-trend-micro-report/