737 Chrome VPN Extensions Caught Routing Traffic Through Proxies. Check If You Have One
Researchers found 737 Chrome VPN extensions, many impersonating brands like NordVPN, routing roughly 75,000 users' browser traffic through attacker-controlled SOCKS5 proxies.
Socket and researcher Kush Pandya identified 737 Chrome VPN and proxy extensions, published across at least 40 developer accounts with 75,486 installs, that route entire browser sessions through one provider's SOCKS5 proxies on port 1082. Of these, 274 impersonate 66 established brands including Proton VPN, NordVPN, Surfshark, ExpressVPN, and Cloudflare 1.1.1.1. The proxy bypass list only excludes loopback addresses, exposing visited destinations, source IPs, TLS SNI values, and plain-HTTP request bodies to the operator. 221 extensions have been removed from the Chrome Web Store while 516 remain listed as active.
DragonForce Hackers Abuse Microsoft Teams Relays to Hide Backdoor.Turn C2 Traffic
Symantec and Carbon Black found DragonForce-linked hackers using Backdoor.Turn, a Go RAT tunneling C2 through Microsoft Teams TURN relays via QUIC.
Broadcom's Symantec and Carbon Black documented Backdoor.Turn, a Go-based RAT associated with the DragonForce ransomware group, deployed at a major U.S. services firm where attackers remained on the network for one to two months. The backdoor obtains an anonymous Teams visitor token from Microsoft's Skype-backed identity services, uses a legitimate Microsoft TURN relay for connection setup, and runs a QUIC session to the attacker's C2 server, so defenders see only outbound traffic to legitimate Teams servers. Initial access is suspected to involve exploiting a SQL/MS-SQL vulnerability or an access broker, followed by a PowerShell-dropped ZIP, DLL side-loading, and BYOVD evasion using a Huawei driver; the RAT is injected into DbgView64.exe after DragonForce ransomware deployment for continued access. First publicly documented TURN abuse by the group, it leverages Praetorian's Ghost Calls technique and supports command execution, network scanning, LDAP/AD search, lateral movement, and browser credential theft.
TWINLOOT Abuses SharePoint and Teams to Steal Credentials and Move Across Networks
Ontinue disclosed TWINLOOT, a Python implant hiding C2 in SharePoint dead drops and Teams TURN relays, harvesting credentials and pivoting via reverse SOCKS5.
Ontinue's Cyber Defense Center identified TWINLOOT during a July 2026 campaign investigation: a modular, PyArmor-hardened Python implant (a 39 MB bootstrap-fat.pyc loader) whose entire C2 infrastructure lives inside trusted Microsoft services. Tasking flows through SharePoint Online file dead drops polled every 15 seconds via the Microsoft Graph API, while interactive operator access uses WebRTC DataChannels relayed by Microsoft Teams TURN servers; Graph traffic is driven by the victim's own headless Edge browser. The implant harvests Windows credentials with fake lock screens, offers a reverse SOCKS5 pivot for lateral movement to SMB, RDP, WinRM, and MSSQL, executes commands, and persists on hosts. Initial access is assessed to be Teams social engineering masquerading as IT support, prompting a PowerShell command to download the payload.
Cyclops Blink Evolves Into x86-64 Linux Implant With Packet Sniffing and Internal Network Scanning
Sophos uncovers a new x86-64 Cyclops Blink Linux implant with packet sniffing and internal network scanning on compromised Cisco FMC appliances.
Sophos identified a 64-bit Linux Cyclops Blink implant in August on compromised Cisco Firewall Management Center devices, persisting via SysV init scripts and masquerading as the process 'kworker01'. The modular malware runs five child processes for reconnaissance, file transfer, scanning, packet capture, and persistence, and beacons hourly over outbound TLS to hardcoded C2 89.34.96.56 on ports 43856 and 49172. The family was previously tied to Russian-linked Sandworm activity on WatchGuard appliances, though Sophos treats 2026 attribution cautiously. The packet-capture module applies configurable filters to retain credentials, cookies, and authentication tokens from raw Ethernet traffic.
19 Chrome and Edge Extensions Found With Wallet-Stealing and Crypto
Socket found 19 malicious Chrome and Edge extensions, active since February 2024, stealing wallet seed phrases and credentials and draining crypto from about 80,000 users.
Socket researcher Karlo Zanki documented a cluster of 18 Chrome and one Edge extensions with wallet secret stealing and cryptocurrency draining capabilities, tracked as campaign Superior and possibly active since February 2024. The actor created 14 extensions and bought five legitimate ones, later pushing malicious updates; the largest, Enable Right Click & Copy, has roughly 80,000 installs across both browsers. The extensions maintain WebSocket C2 connections with endpoint rotation, strip CSP headers, and load 16 modules including multi-chain wallet drainers, hardware-wallet seed-phrase harvesters, credential grabbers, and ClickFix-style lures.
Iranian Hackers Use Telegram-Controlled Malware to Spy on Dissidents and Journalists
FBI, NCSC, and AIVD detail Iran MOIS spyware CHOSEN BRICK/HEAVYGRAM, Telegram-controlled Windows malware spying on dissidents since 2023.
A September 15 joint advisory from the FBI, UK NCSC, and Dutch AIVD attributes the Windows spyware HEAVYGRAM (NCSC name CHOSEN BRICK) to Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security, with the campaign dating to autumn 2023 and targeting dissidents, journalists, and activists in the UK, US, Netherlands, and worldwide. Delivered via messages impersonating known contacts or tech support, the malware assigns each victim a dedicated Telegram bot for command-and-control and exfiltration, and can take screenshots, record microphone audio, steal Telegram/WhatsApp data, saved passwords, and emails, download more malware, and wipe the computer. Persistence uses a registry Run key (SMQDService or winappx) plus Microsoft Defender exclusions, with stolen data exiting via Telegram and cloud storage services like Vultr and Storj. The US Justice Department seized four pro-Iranian leak sites in March that had published stolen victim data.
Sandworm-Linked Cyclops Blink Returns With Network Scanning and Packet-Sniffing Capabilities
Sophos uncovers a 64-bit Cyclops Blink variant on hacked Cisco FMC appliances, adding internal network scanning and selective packet capture; linked to Sandworm.
Sophos CTU analyzed a new 64-bit x86-64 Cyclops Blink implant (timezone_check) deployed on Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center appliances compromised via CVE-2026-20079 authentication bypass and CVE-2026-20316 low-privileged login. The activity is assessed with high confidence as Russian-nexus, with a moderate-confidence link to Sandworm (IRON VIKING, also tracked as Seashell Blizzard). The implant runs a parent controller plus five worker modules, masquerades as [kworker/0:1], persists via SysV init scripts at /lib/tz/timezone_check, and beacons to hard-coded C2 89.34.96.56 over a custom TLS protocol on ports 43856 and 49172. New module 0x11 scans internal IPv4 networks for SSH, SMB, LDAP, VMware, HTTP/HTTPS and VPN services, while module 0x12 performs filtered packet capture that can expose cleartext credentials, cookies and tokens.