Search: “side-channels”

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Injected and Leaked: Actively Inducing Side-Channel Leakage Using Electromagnetic Injection and Hardware Nonlinearity

Researchers introduce InjectEave, using electromagnetic injection and hardware nonlinearity to induce side-channel leakage and eavesdrop on headphone audio from 30 meters.

An arXiv paper shows electromagnetic injection can actively amplify side-channel leakage: nonlinear hardware such as amplifiers, ADCs, and power converters modulates secret electrical signals onto an injected EM carrier, upconverting low-frequency secrets into measurable EM emissions. By tuning injection frequency and amplitude, an adversary can shape the effective spectrum and entropy of the resulting leakage. The InjectEave attack demonstrated eavesdropping on wired and wireless headphone audio from up to 30 meters and in through-wall scenarios using accessible RF equipment, plus leakage of smart home device power consumption and analog sensor inputs. Case studies show closed-loop eavesdropping and manipulation of landline phone conversations, and the paper discusses mitigations.

arXiv cs.CR·Sep 4, 06:22 UTC · 12d agoResearch

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Chypothermia: Clock Freezing for Static Side-channel Attacks

Chypothermia attack uses cryogenic cooling to disable clock and voltage sensors, evading detection and blocking key zeroization on OpenTitan root of trust.

Chypothermia is a static side-channel attack that exposes chips to cryogenic temperatures, disrupting on-chip mixed-signal components to disable the clock sensor, clock generation circuit, and voltage sensors without electrical tampering. Combined with Chypnosis (IEEE S&P 2026), it halts the clock while evading temperature-based anomaly detection. It was implemented on multiple FPGA/SoC platforms and applied to the OpenTitan root of trust's alert handler, evading detection and preventing key zeroization. The authors also propose an FPGA-compatible self-heating sensor as a countermeasure.

arXiv cs.CR·Sep 10, 12:12 UTC · 6d agoResearch

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Decoy Direction Optimization: A Post-Hoc Defense Against LLM Abliteration

Researchers introduce Decoy Direction Optimization, a cheap weight-editing defense that blinds refusal-direction ablation attacks against open-weight LLM safety guardrails.

Refusal Feature Ablation bypasses safety guardrails in open-weight LLMs by projecting out a linear refusal direction, often with high attack success rates. Decoy Direction Optimization injects a high-magnitude nonlinear decoy into MLP neurons so attackers' contrastive estimators ablate a harmless orthogonal feature instead. Evaluated across six model families, DDO keeps ASR below 10% under standard RFA and on Llama-3-8B-Instruct reduces Heretic weight-level attack ASR from 88.7% to 18%. It costs 30 to 450 times less per configuration than trained defense baselines.

Hugging Face daily papers·Sep 13, 20:00 UTC · 3d agoAI safety & security

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VU#431093: TCG TPM 2.0 reference code found vulnerable to information leakage and timing side-channel attacks

CERT/CC discloses two TPM 2.0 reference code flaws allowing RSA key decryption and forged TPM attestations via crafted commands.

CERT/CC published VU#431093 covering two vulnerabilities in the TCG TPM 2.0 reference implementation: CVE-2026-6726 (information leakage via falsified TPM keys) and CVE-2026-6727 (timing side-channel in RSA OAEP decryption). An attacker with privileged access to a TPM command interface could send crafted TPM commands to decrypt ciphertexts for affected TPM-managed RSA keys, including the RSA Endorsement Key, or obtain credentials enabling forged TPM 2.0 attestations. Remediation is tracked in TCGVRT010 and TCGVRT0011.

CERT/CC Vulnerability Notes·Aug 11, 15:12 UTC · Aug 11, 2026VulnerabilityCVE-2026-6726CVE-2026-6727

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The Shared Clipboard Inside the Sandbox: Cross-Account Data Leakage in ChatGPT

Check Point discovers cross-account data leakage in ChatGPT: isolated code-execution containers communicate via shared JFrog Artifactory, enabling covert Gmail exfiltration.

Check Point Research found a covert bidirectional channel between ChatGPT code-execution containers belonging to different accounts, which were supposed to be isolated from each other and the public internet. Both could reach the same internal JFrog Artifactory instance used for package delivery, whose exposed Item Management API allowed a 'shared clipboard' between containers. In a proof of concept, a hidden instruction in a shared conversation made ChatGPT retrieve email data from the victim's connected Gmail account and send it to the attacker's account while the victim received a normal answer. The same channel could exfiltrate conversation history and session files; OpenAI recently described a similar isolation weakness in its postmortem of the Hugging Face incident.

Check Point Research·Sep 8, 13:00 UTC · 8d agoAI safety & security1

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USN-8776-1: python-cryptography vulnerabilities

Ubuntu patches python-cryptography flaws including a PKCS#7 timing side-channel (CVE-2026-69247) that could allow key recovery.

Ubuntu Security Notice USN-8776-1 fixes multiple vulnerabilities in python-cryptography. CVE-2026-69247 describes distinguishable PKCS#7 decryption outcomes with observable timing differences that a remote attacker could exploit to recover encryption keys; it affects Ubuntu 26.04 LTS. CVE-2023-23931, affecting only Ubuntu 18.04 LTS, involves incorrect handling of objects with immutable buffers during cipher operations, causing corrupted output, and a third issue reported by Jack Lloyd is also addressed.

Ubuntu Security Notices·20:12 UTC · 2h agoAdvisory 15 sourcesCVE-2023-23931CVE-2026-69247

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What Did I Just Say? Self-Listening for Full-Duplex Speech Models

Researchers propose Self-Listening, a full-duplex speech approach feeding realized model speech back as input to improve interruption recovery.

Full-duplex spoken language models can listen and speak simultaneously, but asynchronous text generation, speech synthesis, and playback cause mismatches between what a model believes it said and what the user heard. The paper defines the resulting recovery problem as anchor interruption and proposes Self-Listening, which interleaves user speech, model text, and played speech as input streams. The authors also release AnchorSpeech, a benchmark with homogeneous training and test splits tracking which ordered response items were actually spoken. Experiments show self-listening models achieve better anchoring performance than full-duplex baselines.

Hugging Face daily papers·Sep 3, 20:00 UTC · 13d agoAI research

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In Other News: InjectEave Attack, SIM Swapper Sentenced, Glasswing Findings Review

SecurityWeek weekly roundup covers exploited WordPress Super Forms flaw CVE-2026-14894, a $10M bounty on an Iranian cyber official, InjectEave attacks, and more.

SecurityWeek's weekly roundup aggregates short items across the threat landscape, including Microsoft's report of invisible Unicode tag characters used in financial phishing lures at up to 2.37 million messages per day, and active exploitation of critical WordPress Super Forms plugin flaw CVE-2026-14894 to deploy PHP webshells. Policy items include a $10 million US bounty for IRGC-CEC Cyber Operations Command lead Amir Yaryab, a 16-month prison sentence for ex-AT&T employee Kenneth Carter over SIM swaps with nearly $600,000 in intended losses, and the US arraignment of Russian Sergei Anatolyevich Filimonov over credential harvesting. Technical items include InjectEave electromagnetic side-channel attacks tested on 11 devices, an FBI warning on OAuth consent phishing, and VulnCheck's finding that only 202 of 26,153 Anthropic Project Glasswing findings were fixed.

SecurityWeek·Sep 11, 14:19 UTC · 5d agoIndustry in the wildCVE-2026-148942

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How Does mHC Use Its Residual Streams? Selective Routing and Near-Identity Mixing

Analysis of DeepSeek-V4-Flash shows four-stream mHC residual blocks use only about two streams effectively, with late-layer mixing providing little benefit.

The study examines the four-stream residual pathway of DeepSeek-V4-Flash, finding typical attention or FFN sites effectively use about two streams and that residual mixing is modest, occurring primarily in early layers. Replacing late mixers with identity increases C4 perplexity by only 1.9% while replacing early mixers raises it by 41%. Retaining the three largest routing weights per token increases perplexity by at most 2.7%, showing the model uses only part of the flexibility afforded by the four-stream design.

arXiv cs.AI / cs.LG / cs.CL·Sep 4, 16:02 UTC · 12d agoAI research

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From Hypervisor to Container: Cloud Security Vulnerabilities, Defense Mechanisms, and Open Challenges

Survey of 120+ cloud security papers (2008-2025) reviews hypervisor and container isolation attacks, scoring defenses with the ADPO framework and CIA impact scale.

This survey reviews over 120 security publications from 2008 to 2025 on breaches of cloud isolation boundaries via virtual machines and containers. Threats examined include VM escape, VM hopping, CPU cache side-channels, container breakouts, vulnerable container images, and DDoS attacks. The authors introduce ADPO, a 0-3 scoring framework rating defenses on accuracy, deployment ease, performance impact, and operational overhead, plus a 1-5 CIA severity mapping for attack impact.

arXiv cs.CR·Sep 15, 05:57 UTC · 1d agoResearch

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How Fragile Is Safety Alignment at Frontier Scale? A Single-Direction Attack on a 320B MoE

Researchers show directional ablation breaks refusal in GLM-5.3-Flash, a 320B-parameter MoE, cutting refusal by 41–89 points across seven benchmarks.

The study extends directional ablation, a white-box attack that removes an aligned LLM's refusal behavior, from dense models up to ~70B parameters to GLM-5.3-Flash, a 320B-parameter mixture-of-experts model with 288 routed experts, four-wide hyper-connection residual, and block-FP8 quantization. Editing attention, dense, and routed-expert writers jointly removes 0.776 of refusal, with 74% of the effect existing only under the joint intervention; the conventional module-name-based recipe reaches only 0.066 and fails silently on MoE architectures. The attack yields 41–89 percentage-point reductions in refusal across seven harmful benchmarks with no detected capability change, and a category-concentrated refusal residue survives all edits at ranks 1 to 12.

arXiv cs.CR·Sep 9, 06:48 UTC · 7d agoAI safety & security

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Risky Bulletin: The EU publishes its upcoming cybersecurity standards

ETSI releases 17 draft cybersecurity standards vendors must meet when the EU Cyber Resilience Act takes effect in December 2027.

The European Telecommunications Standards Institute published 17 interim draft standards covering operating systems, routers, firewalls, VPNs, SIEMs, browsers, password managers, smart home devices, toys and wearables. They mandate basic security features such as post-sale updates, shipped SBOMs, modern cryptography and secure-by-default settings; public comments run until November, with final versions expected in December, one year before CRA compliance begins in December 2027. The newsletter also reports Irregular taking responsibility for AI test-environment escapes involving Anthropic and Meta frontier models, a breach at France's tax agency exposing 678,000+ citizens' data claimed by hacker ZeroBytes, and Kazakhstan eGov data covering 15 million citizens listed for sale on an underground forum. Additional briefs cover a $3.2 million Harmony Protocol theft crashing the ONE token 40%, Columbus Police still restoring systems two years after ransomware, DDoS attacks on Threema's provider, and Ukraine's GUR claiming a cyberattack on Wildberries.

Risky Business News·Aug 17, 05:03 UTC · Aug 17, 2026Policy & legal2

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Safety for Whom? Boundary-Aware Self-Distillation for Controlled LLM Safety Refusal

A self-distillation safety framework tunes narrow-boundary refusals in Qwen3-8B, raising target-domain refusal to 84.75% while cutting over-refusal from 15.20% to 5.20%.

The paper formulates narrow-boundary safety, where deployments need refusals within specific topics rather than whole subjects, and proposes an offline self-generated framework with controlled topic generation, escalating retries, and harmful-benign boundary pairs. On political persuasion with Qwen3-8B, the method raised target-domain refusal from 9.47% to 84.75% and cut the mean unsafe-response rate across three broader benchmarks from 26.26% to 0.14%. Verified target-model responses reduced over-refusal from 15.20% to 5.20%, and boundary-pair data cut comply-side over-refusal on held-out pairs from 32.94% to 4.16%. Results show data composition controls the safety-usability trade-off and alignment should be evaluated on both sides of the refusal boundary.

Hugging Face daily papers·Sep 2, 20:00 UTC · 14d agoAI safety & security1

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OpenAI, Anthropic, Google API Flaw Let Weaker AI Models Decode Stronger Models' Reasoning

Researchers show encrypted reasoning blocks in OpenAI, Anthropic, and Google APIs can be replayed to recover hidden reasoning and secrets like API keys.

Researchers demonstrated that encrypted reasoning objects from OpenAI, Anthropic, and Google reasoning APIs could be replayed across sessions, users, and models, letting weaker same-family models act as decoders of hidden reasoning. Across 6,708 public agent trajectories they decoded 315,320 thinking blocks and found 704 privacy artifacts from real user sessions, including 62 API keys, 33 passwords, 24 access tokens, and seven private keys. The replayable blocks also enabled invisible prompt-injection proof-of-concepts; the main extraction attack is no longer reproducible as of August 2026 following mitigations, though no vendor has publicly acknowledged the flaw.

The Hacker News·Aug 12, 11:47 UTC · Aug 12, 2026AI safety & security1

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The Attention Triangle in Audio-Video Models

Researchers analyze the 'attention triangle' in audio-video diffusion models, showing bias-driven cross-attention routing causes semantic leakage and proposing inference-time interventions that improve grounding.

A study probes the three cross-attention edges linking text, audio, and video streams in audio-video diffusion models. It finds the audio-video edge is bidirectional and shaped by parameter-encoded biases, so prompts in tension with learned priors can be overridden, producing visually canonical but incorrect outputs. Attention-derived signals are used as diagnostics and to guide inference-time interventions that improve cross-modal semantic grounding while preserving generation quality.

Hugging Face daily papers·Sep 2, 20:00 UTC · 14d agoAI research

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Diffusion TV: Experiencing Diffusion Models through Tangible, Embodied Interaction

Researchers present Diffusion TV, a CRT-based installation where antenna manipulation lets audiences physically experience diffusion model denoising.

Diffusion TV is an interactive installation built around a modified CRT television where turning the antenna controls the clarity of AI-generated images and sounds, mirroring the denoising process of diffusion models. Three channels present AI-generated animals from the past, present, and future within a temporal and ecological narrative. The authors frame the work as an embodied, non-verbal alternative to explainable AI that highlights intermediate generative states rather than final outputs.

arXiv cs.AI / cs.LG / cs.CL·Sep 4, 17:51 UTC · 12d agoAI research

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ChatGPT Sandbox Flaw Lets Attackers Steal Gmail Data Across Accounts via Hidden Channel

Check Point found a cross-account covert channel in ChatGPT sandboxes via shared JFrog Artifactory metadata, enabling session hijacking and Gmail data theft. Now fixed.

Check Point discovered that ChatGPT code-execution containers across different accounts could all reach the same internal JFrog Artifactory instance, whose Item Properties API was readable and writable by all accounts, creating a covert cross-account communication channel. Attackers could plant hidden instructions via pasted prompts, shared chat links, or custom GPTs, then trigger tasks in a victim's session to exfiltrate connected-app data such as Gmail, using ChatGPT's default 'Important actions' setting that permits reads without confirmation. OpenAI confirmed and decommissioned the shared Artifactory instance, closing the channel before publication.

Cyber Security News·Sep 8, 15:20 UTC · 8d agoAI safety & security1

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Free streaming boxes may be routing criminal traffic through your home

Researchers found SuperBox streaming boxes and the CyberFlix TV app enroll home connections into the Popanet residential proxy network, routing criminal traffic.

Researchers found that SuperBox devices and the CyberFlix TV app, distributed through SuperBox's custom app store, contain Popanet proxy functionality that registers the device with servers controlled by the proxy operator, enrolling household connections into residential proxy networks. The reported configuration weakens Android safeguards with exposed ADB access, root-level privileges without authentication, and removal of app-install protections. Plume's research warns these proxy networks can also function as malware-delivery platforms, and the FBI notes foreign entities use residential proxies to conceal activity such as credential stuffing and account abuse. Malwarebytes advises disconnecting and replacing affected SuperBox/CyberFlix devices rather than factory-resetting them.

Malwarebytes Labs·Sep 4, 09:20 UTC · 12d agoMalware in the wild

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Rethinking Heterogeneous System Disaggregation for Subquadratic Attention

SQD disaggregates LLM inference by quadratic versus subquadratic attention layers, improving energy efficiency up to 56% on heterogeneous systems versus GPU-only baselines.

SQD (SubQuadratic Disaggregation) splits decode not by operator type but by quadratic versus subquadratic attention, matching their distinct arithmetic intensity and memory footprints. For sparse attention LLMs it separates top-k selection (requiring full KV indexing) from top-k attention plus FFN; for linear and sliding-window models it separates dense attention layers from subquadratic layers plus FFN. On an adjusted 8xB200 heterogeneous proxy, tokens-per-joule improves 53% on GLM 5.2, 31% on Nemotron 3 Ultra, and 56% on Gemma 4 31B. A Rubin plus LPX analytical model shows 1.2x-1.5x tighter achievable latencies and up to 3.6x higher throughput versus attention-FFN disaggregation.

arXiv cs.AI / cs.LG / cs.CL·Sep 11, 17:55 UTC · 5d agoAI research

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Identity Abuse Through Trusted Communication Channels

Unit 42 explains how attackers abuse trusted enterprise communication and collaboration channels for identity phishing and credential theft, and outlines defenses.

Palo Alto Unit 42 details how attackers exploit enterprise collaboration and communication tools as trusted channels for identity phishing and credential theft. The writeup describes abuse of presumed-trusted messaging paths and outlines defense strategies. It is guidance rather than a report of a specific incident.

Palo Alto Unit 42·Aug 20, 10:00 UTC · 27d agoPhishing & fraud

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CodeTD: Topology of Attention Detects Hallucinations in Code LLMs

CodeTD detects hallucinations in code LLMs before execution by analyzing topological patterns of attention maps, outperforming recent baselines.

CodeTD applies topological data analysis (TDA) to code LLM attention maps to quantify prompt-generation mismatch as a pre-execution correctness signal. Experiments cover HumanEval, MBPP, BigCodeBench, and MultiPL-E across 5 programming languages and 10 code LLMs up to 34B parameters. The method outperforms recent baselines and transfers between coding benchmarks, helping catch code that fails the task or embeds security vulnerabilities.

arXiv cs.AI / cs.LG / cs.CL·Sep 7, 17:26 UTC · 9d agoAI research1

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Continue, Adapt, or Yield: In-Turn Adaptation to Overlapping Speech in Full-Duplex Agents

Duplex Cue evaluation shows PersonaPlex full-duplex agents adapt in-turn to listener contributions in only 34.8% of collaborative cases versus 68.2% for humans.

The paper introduces Duplex Cue, an evaluation of in-turn adaptation in full-duplex voice agents that separates listener intent (backchannel, collaboration, interruption) from speaker behavior (continue, adapt, yield). Using 208 scorable pairs from 300 human-confirmed cues in unscripted English conversations, it compares recorded human responses with PersonaPlex continuations generated while replaying listener audio. Humans adapt within the turn in 68.2% of collaborative pairs versus 34.8% for PersonaPlex, which otherwise continues unchanged (42.4%) or yields (22.7%).

arXiv cs.AI / cs.LG / cs.CL·Sep 11, 17:46 UTC · 5d agoAI research

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ChatGPT flaw lets attackers pull Gmail data across accounts via a hidden channel

Check Point found a ChatGPT flaw letting attackers read victims' Gmail and connected-app data via hidden cross-session instructions; OpenAI patched it.

Check Point Research discovered a covert cross-account command channel in ChatGPT's code execution environment, where containers meant to be isolated shared metadata through an internal service based on JFrog Artifactory. In a proof of concept, a victim's session was tricked into retrieving Gmail email data and relaying it to an attacker-controlled session during an ordinary-looking interaction, with reach extending to any connected apps the session was authorized for, including Google Drive, Microsoft Teams, and GitHub. OpenAI fixed the issue and decommissioned the internal service; the same shared infrastructure was also involved in the separately disclosed Hugging Face compromise, though via different techniques.

CSO Online·Sep 9, 11:48 UTC · 7d agoAI safety & security

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To keep the AI hacking genie bottled up, try one-way networks

Intuition Machines CEO proposes data diodes and one-way networks to physically prevent frontier AI models from escaping training sandboxes, citing the OpenAI Hugging Face incident.

Eli-Shaoul Khedouri, CEO of Intuition Machines, argues that sandboxes, permissions, and VMs are insufficient to contain frontier models, pointing to OpenAI's hack of Hugging Face as evidence. He proposes high assurance architectures modeled on classified SCIF environments: one-way optical data diodes for training inputs and telemetry, a sel4-verified receiver, immutable snapshots of registries like PyPI, GitHub, and npm, and mocked web services. He estimates under five percent overhead per gigawatt for such clusters, but notes frontier labs have not adopted them, largely because of competitive speed rather than cost.

The Register · Security·Sep 3, 06:33 UTC · 13d agoAI safety & security

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Pre-Whitening and BCJR Posterior Distillation for Bi-LSTM Detection in Faster-than-Nyquist Signaling

Study shows nested-window Bi-LSTM architectures do not improve faster-than-Nyquist detection; pre-whitening plus BCJR distillation cuts bit error rates.

Across roughly 260 controlled trainings, processing nested intersymbol-interference windows in separate recurrent branches never significantly beat a plain Bi-LSTM at matched parameter budgets. The authors attribute the limitation to the observation model rather than architecture, and instead pre-whiten inputs and distill BCJR soft posteriors into the network. With 3.4% more parameters, the method reaches 1.05x the BCJR bit error rate at compression factor 0.8 and 1.89x at 0.7, improving to 1.47x with a wider whitened window.

arXiv cs.AI / cs.LG / cs.CL·Sep 7, 17:07 UTC · 9d agoAI research

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Do Input-Level Defenses Transfer to Observation-Level Attacks on VideoLLMs?

A systematic study shows input-level adversarial defenses provide inconsistent, often near-zero protection against observation-level attacks on video LLMs.

Researchers introduce DefTEval, a controlled framework testing eleven input-level defenses against five attack types across five video LLMs. Harmful-content detection rates are frequently near zero, and defenses fail even when attacks embed harmful signals in every sampled frame. Token compression discards localized safety features and modality fusion down-weights weakened visual signals, with defense outcomes dominated by model architecture rather than the defense method.

arXiv cs.CR·Sep 8, 06:59 UTC · 8d agoAI safety & security

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HYDRA: Quantifying Botnet Resource Thresholds for Efficient Link-Flooding Attacks on LEO Satellite Networks

HYDRA models link-flooding attacks on LEO satellite constellations as botnet minimization, matching prior disruption with 34% fewer bots and 23% less traffic.

HYDRA formulates link-flooding attack variants against LEO constellations such as Starlink and Kuiper as botnet minimization problems, quantifying the smallest bot subset and traffic allocation needed to disrupt communications between targeted geographic areas. Under matched stealth constraints it matches the ICARUS attack's disruption using 34% fewer bots and 23% less aggregate traffic, sustaining over 97% attack success as topology evolves. The framework also evaluates five mitigations, including routing diversification, ingress policing, distance-based constraints, source throttling, and botnet attrition.

arXiv cs.CR·Sep 14, 15:00 UTC · 2d agoResearch

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Privacy Failure in Split-LLM Training, The Returned Gradient Nullifies the Decoys

Researchers show split-LLM training leaks privacy via zero-valued gradients on decoy rows, exposing which activations are real despite passing forward-channel checks.

A systems-security case study of a two-node split-LLM training setup found that the returned output gradient from an Untrusted Cloud Node is exactly zero for decoy rows, revealing which rows are real. Across nine seeds, zero patterns identified real rows in 4,096 of 4,096 frames per run, and an attack on frame contents recovered 0.65 to 1.50 percentage points of extra tokens over a baseline. Both datasets passed forward-channel privacy and quality checks but failed once the returned gradient was included. Row-wise gradient clipping and noise closed the leak for roughly 0.01 nats of held-out cross-entropy, though five unmeasured attack classes remain.

Hugging Face daily papers·Sep 2, 20:00 UTC · 14d agoAI safety & security

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ChatGPT Flaw Let a Planted Prompt Send a Victim's Gmail Data to Another Account

Check Point showed a planted prompt could make ChatGPT silently exfiltrate Gmail data via a hidden cross-container channel; OpenAI took the service offline.

Check Point Research demonstrated that a single planted instruction in a ChatGPT conversation could make the model silently exfiltrate Gmail data, chat history, and files to an attacker's account while replying normally to the user. The covert channel abused read/write properties on files in an internal JFrog Artifactory instance shared by ChatGPT code-execution containers across accounts, turning package metadata into shared storage. Injection vectors included pasted prompts, shared conversations, and custom GPT builder instructions; default connected-app permissions allowed Gmail reads without user approval. OpenAI confirmed the internal service was taken offline after disclosure; this is Check Point's second reported ChatGPT covert channel after a DNS-based one fixed in February.

The Hacker News·Sep 8, 14:19 UTC · 8d agoAI safety & security

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OpenAI's Artifactory opened covert data-stealing channel alongside Hugging Face attack

Check Point disclosed a covert cross-account channel in OpenAI's internal JFrog Artifactory that let one ChatGPT session exfiltrate another user's connected-app data.

Check Point Research found that OpenAI's internal JFrog Artifactory instance exposed an item management feature allowing one ChatGPT container to attach hidden, Base64-encoded tasks that another user's session would execute with the victim's privileges, such as pulling Gmail emails and exfiltrating them invisibly. Reader credentials granted both read and write access, enabling cross-account task injection. The flaw was reported in late June, and OpenAI had already decommissioned the Artifactory instance following the related Hugging Face intrusion, closing the channel.

The Register · Security·Sep 8, 21:12 UTC · 8d agoAI safety & security

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Perturbation Probing: A New Diagnostic for the Fragility of LLM Safety

Unit 42 research shows LLM safety refusals concentrate in a thin neural layer, motivating external, multi-layered AI security controls.

Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 introduces Perturbation Probing, a diagnostic technique for measuring the fragility of LLM safety mechanisms. The research finds that safety refusal behavior is localized within a thin neural layer, implying small perturbations can undermine built-in refusals. The authors argue this motivates external, multi-layered security defenses on top of model-internal safety training.

Palo Alto Unit 42·Aug 28, 22:00 UTC · 19d agoAI safety & security

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Modified ScreenConnect Clients Used in Worm-Like Campaign

Huntress warns of worm-like attacks using modified ScreenConnect clients to spread VBScript payloads; ConnectWise issued an advisory.

Campaigns starting in late August use social engineering, including Quick Assist abuse, to install rogue ScreenConnect clients that spawn wscript.exe and deploy four VBScript files for reconnaissance, staging, and PowerShell execution. The attackers persist via User Run Keys, attempt UAC bypass, install UltraViewer, and propagate the VBScript chain to other connected ScreenConnect endpoints. ConnectWise published an advisory about a file transfer behavior issue affecting cloud and on-premises ScreenConnect, with a CVE identifier and fix expected within a week; it recommends disabling file transfer meanwhile.

SecurityWeek·Sep 7, 11:45 UTC · 9d agoExploit / PoC in the wild

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Notes on gotchas while migrating 35kb preprompts from Opus to self-hosted Ollama

Opinion piece urges migrating 35KB preprompts from Anthropic/OpenAI to self-hosted Ollama, citing session privacy risks and safety filters blocking security research.

The author documents gotchas migrating 35KB preprompts from Claude Opus to self-hosted Ollama, motivated by fears that frontier providers train on user sessions, citing the OpenAI Navier-Stokes controversy. The piece argues inference providers cannot audit their own retention or training pipelines and that only self-hosted hardware offers verifiable privacy. It also criticizes frontier safety filters for refusing vulnerability research tasks and calls for models that support exploitability testing in CI/CD pipelines.

Hacker News · AI·Sep 14, 13:59 UTC · 2d agoAI industryHN 41↑ · 13 comments1

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gr-PHYSEC: Real-time Channel-based Key Generation for Physical Layer Secure Wireless Communications

gr-PHYSEC GNU Radio module derives symmetric encryption keys from wireless channel randomness using a neural network, validated on robotic platforms with ADALM-Pluto SDRs.

The paper introduces gr-PHYSEC, a GNU Radio out-of-tree module for real-time physical-layer key generation that derives symmetric keys from the wireless channel's inherent randomness instead of pre-shared secrets. A trained neural network extracts channel features between trusted parties during probe exchanges; features are quantized into binary keys, reconciled via Reed-Solomon encoding, and secured with SHA-512 hashing before direct use for encryption. Real-world experiments at the FAU CAAI connected robotics testbed using ADALM Pluto software-defined radios and NVIDIA Jetson Orin demonstrated low key disagreement rates and NIST-verified randomness. Source code is publicly available on GitHub.

arXiv cs.CR·Sep 14, 21:37 UTC · 2d agoResearch

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A Deep Generative Model for Synthesizing Labeled Wireless Signals

Researchers propose IIns-GAN, a GAN that synthesizes realistic labeled ultra-wideband wireless signals, cutting dataset costs for wireless sensing training.

The paper introduces Inter-Instance Generative Adversarial Networks (IIns-GAN), a deep generative method that synthesizes realistic wireless signals with position-related labels to avoid costly real-world measurement and labeling. Unlike environment-model-based synthesis, the generated signals adapt to different environment scenarios and support training tasks such as distance estimation and environment identification. Experiments on public Ultra-Wideband (UWB) datasets show the synthetic signals closely mirror real measurements and improve model training performance.

arXiv cs.AI / cs.LG / cs.CL·Sep 4, 17:44 UTC · 12d agoAI research

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Breaking the 1.58-bit Barrier for Ternary LLMsnew

An arXiv paper claims a method that breaks the 1.58-bit barrier for ternary large language models.

The arXiv preprint 2609.16338, titled 'Breaking the 1.58-bit Barrier for Ternary LLMs,' presents research on ternary-weight large language models, which use roughly 1.58 bits per weight. The source text contained only the title and Hacker News engagement data (56 points, no comments), so further technical details are not available.

Hacker News · AI·20:59 UTC · 1h agoAI researchHN 56↑ · 0 comments

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