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Tajin Group: Guarantee Marketplace Vendor Involved in Phishing and Chinese Money Laundering Group
Recorded Future details Tajin Group, a Chinese-speaking vendor on Telegram guarantee marketplaces running phishing, carding, and money laundering operations targeting Chinese banks.
Insikt Group analyzed Tajin Group, a Chinese-speaking threat actor operating on Telegram-based guarantee marketplaces Dabai Guarantee and, since May 2026, Xinbi Guarantee. The group conducts phishing, payment card theft, and money laundering targeting mainland Chinese citizens and banks, testing stolen cards from twelve countries on platforms like CCAvenue and Geidea. Operators bought and sold at least 100 Telegram usernames and anonymous virtual numbers via Fragment Market to strengthen OPSEC, linking multiple usernames to single Telegram accounts. Recorded Future warns Tajin Group's TTPs are likely to be replicated by other vendors on Chinese-language guarantee marketplaces at global scale.
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Likelihood-free inference with nuisance parameters through normalizing flows
Researchers decompose normalizing flows to derive near-pivotal statistics for likelihood-free inference with nuisance parameters, recovering the t-test and beating Welch limits.
A new paper decomposes neural-network normalizing flows to uncover pivotal statistics in the presence of nuisance parameters using only a sample generator from the distribution of interest. The statistic is near-pivotal in the sense of minimum average KL-divergence of its p-values and can incorporate prior knowledge of group invariances such as translation and scale. Experiments show it recovers the one-sample t-test almost exactly, outperforms the Welch test on worst-case size over a constrained variance-ratio range, and delivers higher power and much faster runtime than profile likelihood-ratio techniques on small-to-moderate samples.
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TWINLOOT Abuses SharePoint and Teams to Steal Credentials and Move Across Networks
Ontinue disclosed TWINLOOT, a Python implant hiding C2 in SharePoint dead drops and Teams TURN relays, harvesting credentials and pivoting via reverse SOCKS5.
Ontinue's Cyber Defense Center identified TWINLOOT during a July 2026 campaign investigation: a modular, PyArmor-hardened Python implant (a 39 MB bootstrap-fat.pyc loader) whose entire C2 infrastructure lives inside trusted Microsoft services. Tasking flows through SharePoint Online file dead drops polled every 15 seconds via the Microsoft Graph API, while interactive operator access uses WebRTC DataChannels relayed by Microsoft Teams TURN servers; Graph traffic is driven by the victim's own headless Edge browser. The implant harvests Windows credentials with fake lock screens, offers a reverse SOCKS5 pivot for lateral movement to SMB, RDP, WinRM, and MSSQL, executes commands, and persists on hosts. Initial access is assessed to be Teams social engineering masquerading as IT support, prompting a PowerShell command to download the payload.
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The modern attack chain: Rethinking Google Workspace security in the age of AI
Analysis of Vercel and Composio breaches shows stolen OAuth tokens, not phishing email, now open Google Workspace attacks — a path authorized AI agents follow.
The author analyzes the Vercel and Composio breaches as the same OAuth-first attack chain run twice: a stolen OAuth token, obtained via a compromised supplier, becomes the entry point rather than email. These tokens survive password resets, are hard to observe, and let attackers read Gmail and Drive data, take over accounts, and pivot laterally using stored credentials and password-reset magic links. The piece warns that authorized AI agents with overbroad OAuth grants can unintentionally traverse the same path — accessing inboxes, reading sensitive content, and exfiltrating data downstream — without any malicious actor or compromised credential.
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Mapping out your unknown: A threat hunter’s guide to GitHub
Datadog Security Labs publishes a threat-hunting guide with audit-log queries to detect GitHub token theft, device code phishing, and source code exfiltration.
Datadog's threat-hunting guide covers GitHub audit log queries for detecting compromised accounts, stolen personal access tokens, and malicious OAuth app authorizations. Attackers typically obtain credentials through phishing, credential stuffing, leaked secrets, or device code phishing, then map private repositories, exfiltrate source code, and pivot into connected cloud and CI/CD environments. The guide maps detections to MITRE techniques like T1078 and T1528 and documents GitHub logging quirks affecting attribution, token metadata, and visibility fields.
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Your Critical Vulnerabilities Might Not Be Your Biggest Risk
Autonomous penetration testing advocates prioritize exploitable attack paths over raw vulnerability severity for continuous security validation.
The article argues that scanner severity scores lack context: a critical flaw behind strong segmentation may be low priority, while a medium flaw on internet-facing systems can provide a foothold chained toward sensitive data. It positions autonomous penetration testing and attack path validation as the execution layer for continuous security validation, replacing point-in-time assessments. The piece is vendor-authored thought leadership rather than incident or vulnerability news.
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Hackers Deploy New SloppyRAT via ClickFix to Enable Ransomware Lateral Movement
Zscaler discovered SloppyRAT, a ClickFix-delivered RAT that gives ransomware operators reconnaissance, remote execution, and SOCKS proxy pivoting for lateral movement.
Zscaler identified SloppyRAT in June 2026, linked to a ransomware-related threat actor. The infection chain starts with a ClickFix lure abusing finger.exe over TCP port 79, then uses curl.exe, IronPython, CastleLoader, and CastleRAT before reflectively loading SloppyRAT as a DLL in memory. The RAT supports HTTPS command-and-control, system inventory, file operations, Defender tampering, and a reverse SOCKS proxy, with evasion features including runtime code encryption, indirect syscalls, certificate pinning, and a possible EtherHiding blockchain fallback. Its persistence code is buggy and the malware appears under development, but the pre-encryption foothold gives defenders a window to stop intrusions.
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Critical N-able N-central Vulnerability and Active Exploitation
N-able N-central pre-auth RCE zero-day CVE-2026-86218 (CVSS 10.0) is exploited in the wild; on-prem admins must upgrade to 2026.3 HF4.
N-able disclosed a third N-central vulnerability, CVE-2026-86218, a pre-authentication RCE rated CVSS 10.0, and released hotfix 2026.3 HF4 superseding build 2026.3.1.13. Huntress reproduced an exploit chain involving an authentication bypass (CVE-2026-86206/CVE-2026-86207) after a fully patched customer's N-central production server was compromised on September 4. Attackers appended strings like .invalid to account names and probed the /remoteControlAction.do?method=getPierDetails endpoint; Huntress worked with Cloudflare to disable adversary tunnel infrastructure. Hosted N-central instances are already patched; on-prem administrators must upgrade immediately.
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Release Notes: Faster TI Investigations, Fresh Threat Research, and 650+ Threat Coverage Updates
ANY.RUN August release adds TI Lookup connections view, 81 behavior signatures, 16 YARA rules, 559 Suricata rules, and three new threat intelligence reports.
ANY.RUN released August product updates expanding its Threat Intelligence Lookup with a Connections block for pivoting between related observables (domains, IPs, URLs), JSON export for retrohunting and SIEM/NDR integration, and hidden whitelisted data by default. Detection coverage grew with 81 new behavior signatures, 16 YARA rules, and 559 Suricata rules covering malware execution, phishing, and C2 traffic. Three new Threat Intelligence Reports cover a US-focused RMM phishing campaign across 46 countries, the Mirage2FA phishing-as-a-service targeting Microsoft 365 (1,249 sandbox sessions, 9,332 potential compromise events), and a threat brief on OVERLORD RAT, CRPX0, and TRIBACK loader.
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Upatre Continued to Evolve with new Anti
Unit 42 analyzes an undocumented Upatre downloader variant with VM detection via process hashing, packed code, disabled Windows defenses and Namecoin .bit C2 domains.
Unit 42 analyzed an Upatre downloader variant compiled in December 2016 that went largely undetected by automated systems, featuring heavy code flow obscuration, on-demand decryption of network communications, and novel virtual machine detection. The sample enumerates running processes, computes CRC32 hashes XORed with a hard-coded key, and sleeps if analysis-related processes such as vmtoolsd.exe or python.exe are found. It masquerades with Google Chrome icons, disables Windows Defender, Firewall and other security services, injects code into msiexec.exe, and resolves .bit Namecoin domains like bookreader[.]bit via hardcoded OpenNIC DNS servers over TCP.
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