ZeroHour
Security Affairspublished ()ingested @securityaffairs

NSA, NCSC, and allies detailed TTPs associated with Chinese APT actors targeting critical infrastructure Orgs

Vulnerabilities mentionedAll →

CVEVulnerabilityCVSSEPSSFlagsAffectedExposurePublished
CVE-2018-0171
Unauthenticated RCE/DoS in Cisco IOS & IOS XE Smart Install

CVE-2018-0171 is a critical (CVSS 9.8) buffer-overflow vulnerability in the Smart Install feature of Cisco IOS and Cisco IOS XE, caused by improper validation of packet data (CWE-20, CWE-787). An unauthenticated, remote attacker can trigger it by simply sending a crafted Smart Install message to TCP port 4786 on an affected device, with no credentials or user interaction required. A successful exploit can cause a device reload, an indefinite loop that triggers a watchdog crash, or arbitrary code execution, giving the attacker full control of the switch or router. Any IOS or IOS XE device running the Smart Install service is affected — a configuration commonly present on Catalyst switches — and devices exposed to the internet on TCP 4786 are at direct risk. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild: the flaw is on CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, and both Russian (Static Tundra, FSB-linked) and Chinese (Salt Typhoon) state-sponsored actors have exploited it to compromise unpatched, often end-of-life, Cisco network devices at hundreds of organizations worldwide.

Do: Upgrade IOS/IOS XE to a fixed release per Cisco's advisory (Bug ID CSCvg76186); for end-of-life hardware that cannot be patched, plan replacement given active nation-state targeting of unpatched devices. If Smart Install is not in use, disable it with 'no vstack'; otherwise restrict TCP port 4786 with ACLs to trusted management hosts. Audit internet-facing switches and routers for Smart Install enabled and TCP 4786 exposed, and prioritize those devices for remediation.

9.899% KEV
  • Cisco IOS Devices running affected IOS releases with the Smart Install feature enabled (exact affected/fixed release ranges per Cisco advisory, Bug ID CSCvg76186; Smart I
  • Cisco IOS XE Devices running affected IOS XE releases with the Smart Install feature enabled (exact affected/fixed release ranges per Cisco advisory, Bug ID CSCvg76186)
mass≈250,000+ internet-exposed devices with TCP/4786 open, on top of a multi-million-device IOS/IOS XE installed base
CVE-2023-20198
Unauthenticated Privilege Escalation in Cisco IOS XE Web UI (Actively Exploited)

CVE-2023-20198 is a critical (CVSS 10.0) unauthenticated privilege escalation flaw in the web UI of Cisco IOS XE software, triggered by sending crafted network requests to the exposed web management interface. An attacker with no credentials can use the flaw to gain initial access and issue a privilege 15 command, creating a local user with normal login access; the attacker then chained CVE-2023-20273 (CVSS 7.2) to elevate that account to root and write an implant to the file system. Successful exploitation yields full administrative control of the device, including persistence via the planted implant, on Cisco IOS XE devices with the web UI enabled and reachable from the internet or untrusted networks, including Rockwell Automation Allen-Bradley Stratix 5200 and 5800 switches running IOS XE. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild: the flaw was added to CISA's KEV on 2023-10-16 with a BOD 23-02 directive, EPSS stands at 99.6% (100th percentile), and ongoing campaigns (including the 'BADCANDY' activity flagged by Australia's ASD and Cisco-related telecom intrusions attributed to Salt Typhoon) have been reported.

Do: Upgrade affected devices to the fixed releases listed in Cisco's advisory (use Cisco's Software Checker) and, as immediate mitigation, disable the web UI or restrict it to trusted networks/addresses only. Check for compromise by looking for unexpected local user accounts and the implant artifacts Cisco identified (unexpected cisco_tac_alarm.log and cisco_tac.log files in /tmp or /usr/binos/conf), and immediately report positive findings to CISA per BOD 23-02. Keep in mind that patching alone does not remove a root implant, so devices with evidence of compromise should be reimaged or otherwise cleaned per vendor instructions.

10.0100% KEV
  • Cisco IOS XE (Web UI feature)
  • Rockwell Automation Allen-Bradley Stratix 5200 firmware
  • Rockwell Automation Allen-Bradley Stratix 5800 firmware
large≈40,000–50,000 internet-exposed IOS XE devices at the time of disclosure (public scan data), within an IOS XE install base in the millions
CVE-2023-20273
Authenticated Command Injection (Root) in Cisco IOS XE Web UI

CVE-2023-20273 is an OS command injection flaw (CWE-78) in the web UI feature of Cisco IOS XE Software, caused by insufficient input validation. An authenticated, remote attacker triggers it by sending crafted input to the web UI, and a successful exploit injects commands that run on the underlying operating system with root privileges, yielding full device compromise (in the October 2023 mass-exploitation campaign it was typically chained with the unauthenticated CVE-2023-20198 to obtain initial access and install a persistent implant). Any Cisco IOS XE device with the web UI enabled and reachable from the internet or an untrusted network is affected; this data does not specify the affected release ranges, which are enumerated in Cisco's advisory. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild: CISA added the flaw to the KEV on 2023-10-23 with BOD 23-02 response actions, EPSS is ~90% (100th percentile), and IOS XE edge devices remain recurring targets of Chinese-nexus espionage campaigns (e.g., Salt Typhoon activity against telecoms).

Do: Upgrade affected devices to a fixed IOS XE release per Cisco's advisory; as an interim mitigation, disable the HTTP/HTTPS server (ip http server / ip https server) or restrict Web UI access to trusted hosts only. Per BOD 23-02, hunt for compromise on any exposed device — check for unexpected level-15 local accounts and the implant.lua backdoor in flash memory — and immediately report positive findings to CISA.

7.290% KEV
  • Cisco IOS XE Software (Web UI feature)
mass≈100,000+ internet-exposed IOS XE devices (public scans observed ~40,000+ compromised within days of disclosure)
CVE-2024-21887
+1 in the same advisory: …46805
Command Injection RCE in Ivanti Connect Secure and Policy Secure

Ivanti Connect Secure (formerly Pulse Connect Secure) and Ivanti Policy Secure appliances contain a command injection flaw (CWE-77) in their web components, triggered when an authenticated administrator sends crafted requests to the appliance. The bug can be chained with the separate authentication bypass CVE-2023-46805, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to achieve the same result. Successful exploitation lets an attacker execute arbitrary commands and code on the appliance, providing a foothold into the networks behind the VPN or network access control gateway. Any organization running these appliances, typically enterprises and government agencies often deployed directly on the internet perimeter, is affected. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild: the flaw was added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2024-01-10 with known ransomware use and EPSS assigns a 100% probability of exploitation within 30 days, although no public proof-of-concept is available.

Do: Apply Ivanti's mitigations or patched builds immediately per vendor instructions, addressing the chained authentication bypass CVE-2023-46805 at the same time, and discontinue or restrict use of any appliance for which mitigations are unavailable, especially if it is internet-facing. Because exploitation with ransomware use is known, assume compromise is possible: review appliance web logs for suspicious requests and run Ivanti's integrity-checking guidance to verify appliance images before and after remediation. Where feasible, restrict direct internet exposure of the appliance web interface and monitor for further vendor advisories.

9.1
group max
100% KEV ransomware PoC
  • Ivanti Connect Secure (ICS, formerly Pulse Connect Secure)
  • Ivanti Policy Secure
largetens of thousands of appliances (roughly 20,000-30,000 internet-exposed ICS gateways at disclosure; total deployed base likely higher)
CVE-2024-3400
Unauthenticated Root Command Injection in Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS GlobalProtect

Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS contains a command injection flaw (CWE-77, with improper input validation per CWE-20) in its GlobalProtect feature, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary operating-system commands with root privileges on the affected firewall. The flaw is triggered through the GlobalProtect interface, which in most deployments is reachable from untrusted networks, so no valid user credentials or prior access are required. Successful exploitation yields full root control of the firewall, the most powerful position in a network perimeter, enabling traffic interception, configuration tampering, and use as a foothold for further compromise. All PAN-OS firewalls running affected releases with the GlobalProtect feature are exposed; CISA added the issue to the KEV catalog on 2024-04-12 with ransomware use noted, and EPSS puts the 30-day exploitation probability at 100% (100th percentile). No public proof-of-concept is recorded in the source data, but confirmed in-the-wild exploitation makes patching urgent.

Do: Apply the PAN-OS patches released in Palo Alto Networks' bulletin according to its published patch schedule, prioritizing internet-facing firewalls. Until patched, enable the vendor's Threat Prevention signatures as required by CISA KEV, restrict exposure of the GlobalProtect interface to trusted sources where possible, and review logs and device configuration for signs of compromise given confirmed exploitation with known ransomware use.

10.0100% KEV ransomware PoC ×2
  • Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS
large≈10,000–100,000 internet-exposed PAN-OS firewalls with GlobalProtect enabled
Full article812 words · extracted from securityaffairs.com · click to collapse

NSA and allies warn that Chinese APT actors, including Salt Typhoon, are targeting critical infrastructure worldwide.

The U.S. National Security Agency (NSA), the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), and allies warn Chinese APT actors, linked to Salt Typhoon, are targeting global telecom, government, transport, lodging, and military sectors.

“The National Security Agency (NSA) and other U.S. and foreign organizations are releasing a joint Cybersecurity Advisory to expose advanced persistent threat (APT) actors sponsored by the Chinese government targeting telecommunications, government, transportation, lodging, and military infrastructure networks globally and outline appropriate mitigation guidance.” reads the report published by NSA. “The malicious activity outlined in the advisory partially overlaps with cybersecurity industry reporting on Chinese state-sponsored threat actors referred to by names such as Salt Typhoon.”

A joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) (“Countering Chinese State-Sponsored Actors Compromise of Networks Worldwide to Feed Global Espionage System,”) published by the intelligence and cybersecurity agencies has linked these malicious activities to multiple China-based entities, including Sichuan Juxinhe Network Technology Co. Ltd., Beijing Huanyu Tianqiong Information Technology Co., Ltd., and Sichuan Zhixin Ruijie Network Technology Co., Ltd.. These Chinese tech firms provide cyber products and services to China’s Ministry of State Security and People’s Liberation Army.

The “Countering Chinese State-Sponsored Actors Compromise of Networks Worldwide to Feed Global Espionage System,” provides details on tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) associated with these nation-state actors.

“This activity partially overlaps with cyber threat actor reporting by the cybersecurity industry — commonly referred to as Salt Typhoon, OPERATOR PANDA, RedMike,
UNC5807, and GhostEmperor, among others.”

Chinese APT actors gain initial access by exploiting known CVEs and weak configurations, not using zero-day exploits. They adapt tactics as new flaws emerge and mitigations are applied, likely expanding to devices like Fortinet, Juniper, Microsoft Exchange, Nokia, Sierra Wireless, and SonicWall. Defenders are urged to prioritize patching historically exploited CVEs, especially on exposed network edge devices.

Some of the exploited vulnerabilities are:

  • CVE-2024-21887 – Ivanti Connect Secure and Ivanti Policy Secure web-component command injection vulnerability, commonly chained after CVE-2023-46805 (authentication bypass).
  • CVE-2024-3400 – Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS GlobalProtect arbitrary file creation leading to OS command injection. The CVE allows for unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) on firewalls when GlobalProtect is enabled on specific versions/configurations.
  • CVE-2023-20273 – Cisco Internetworking Operating System (IOS) XE software web management user interface post-authentication command injection/privilege escalation (commonly chained with CVE-2023-20198 for initial access to achieve code execution as root).
  • CVE-2023-20198 – Cisco IOS XE web user interface authentication bypass vulnerability.
  • CVE-2018-0171 – Cisco IOS and IOS XE smart install remote code execution vulnerability

The nation-state actors use VPSs and compromised routers to target telecoms and ISPs, often exploiting edge devices, even those outside primary targets, to pivot into networks. They abuse trusted interconnections, alter routing, enable traffic mirroring, and set up GRE/IPsec tunnels. Large-scale exploitation across many IPs is common, with repeated access attempts. The government experts state that initial access methods remain unclear; they urge organizations to report compromise details to improve defenses.

The Chinese APTs maintain persistence by modifying ACLs to bypass security, opening standard/non-standard ports for remote access, and enabling/abusing SSH or HTTP/HTTPS services. They execute commands via SNMP, use stolen credentials, Tcl scripts, and configure GRE/IPsec tunnels to establish covert communication channels. On Cisco devices, they exploit Linux Guest Shell containers to stage tools, run Python, and move laterally undetected. They also use pivoting tools like STOWAWAY for C2 and data exfiltration

Chinese APT actors conduct lateral movement by exploiting authentication protocols (TACACS+, RADIUS), SNMP, and SSH to pivot across network devices. They collect configs, routing data (BGP, MPLS), subscriber/customer records, and capture network traffic (PCAP) to harvest credentials—often via Cisco’s Embedded Packet Capture or by redirecting TACACS+ to actor-controlled servers. They create new accounts, reuse/brute-force weak credentials, run privileged SNMP/SSH/HTTP commands, update routing tables, and configure tunnels. To stay hidden, they disable or clear logs, revert configs, and even use Cisco Guest Shell containers to stage tools and avoid detection.

Chinese APT actors exploit peering connections, direct inter-network links without intermediaries, to exfiltrate data, often bypassing policy controls. They use multiple command and control channels to mask data theft within high-traffic areas like proxies and NAT pools. Encrypted tunnels such as IPsec and GRE conceal command and exfiltration activities, complicating detection and mitigation efforts.

“The authoring agencies encourage network defenders of critical infrastructure organizations, especially telecommunications organizations, to perform threat hunting, and, when appropriate, incident response activities.” concludes the advisory. “If malicious activity is suspected or confirmed, organizations should consider all mandatory reporting requirements to relevant agencies and regulators under applicable laws and regulations, and any additional voluntary reporting to appropriate agencies, such as cybersecurity or law enforcement agencies who can provide incident response guidance and assistance with mitigation.”

Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon

Pierluigi Paganini

(SecurityAffairs – hacking, Chinese APT actors)



Text extracted automatically; images, tables and formatting may be missing. Original: https://securityaffairs.com/181650/intelligence/nsa-ncsc-and-allies-detailed-ttps-associated-with-chinese-apt-actors-targeting-critical-infrastructure-orgs.html