CISA Warns Water Utilities: Find Your Exposed PLCs Before Attackers Do
CISA urged water utilities to secure internet-exposed PLCs after July 2026 attacks compromised over 100 US water and wastewater systems, suspected Iran-linked.
CISA's exposure-reduction guidance, published August 21, follows July 2026 attacks in which threat actors remotely accessed PLCs connected directly through cellular modems, changed device IP addresses and passwords, and in some cases disabled alarms and shutdown processes without notifying operators. Iran is the suspected actor, though officials stopped short of formal attribution. CISA recommends routing remote access through centrally managed secure gateways, phishing-resistant MFA, unique credentials, and external scanning of industrial protocols such as Modbus, EtherNet/IP, DNP3, BACnet and OPC UA.
ClearFake WebDAV infection chain delivers Amatera stealer, ZigCryptoStealer, and NetSupport Manager
Cisco Talos details ClearFake WebDAV chains delivering Amatera stealer to a Ukrainian government organization, with cryptocurrency and credential theft payloads.
Cisco Talos investigated DLL executions named 'verification.google' via WebDAV UNC paths at a Ukrainian government organization, tracking the actor as UAT-10820 and assessing with moderate confidence the activity is Russian and opportunistic rather than targeted. The infection chain uses ClearFake JavaScript injected via a Cloudflare Worker, EtherHiding storage on BNB Smart Chain contracts, and a ClickFix fake Google CAPTCHA prompt to deliver Amatera stealer. Secondary payloads differ by C2: one loader deploys ZigCryptoStealer with a Go reverse TCP proxy and a vulnerable driver that kills EDR, while the other installs an unauthorized NetSupport Manager with a Russia-based C2. Similar Amatera chains were separately documented by Malwarebytes and Blackpoint Cyber, but with no shared infrastructure.
THost9 Android RAT Pairs Packed Loader With ADB Worm
Dark Atlas details THost9, a packed Android RAT paired with an ADB worm that installs itself on devices with exposed Android Debug Bridge services.
Dark Atlas researchers described the Hagaseca cluster, whose THost9 packed loader hides executable code in an embedded asset decoded with single-byte XOR and gzip before loading a tc9.dex second stage. The second stage adds shell execution, file transfer, tunneling, reverse shells, downloadable modules and a self-propagating ADB worm that expands single addresses into 65,025-host scan ranges. Newer builds include anti-analysis checks for Frida, and incident reports connect THost9 and THost4 to Android phones and Redroid containers with exposed ADB from October 2024 through 2026.
Manic: The Android Malware That Exfiltrates Data Even When the Phone Is Offline
ThreatFabric identifies Manic, an Android banking fraud and spyware platform targeting Ukraine with offline Bluetooth/Wi-Fi Direct mesh exfiltration and device takeover.
ThreatFabric's Mobile Threat Intelligence team identified Manic, an Android malware active in the wild since at least February 2026 that combines banking fraud with surveillance and device-control capabilities. It monitors 169 Android apps including Ukrainian banks, government and eID services, messaging apps, crypto exchanges, and 2FA tools, using the Accessibility service as a classified UI keylogger and WebRTC for live screen viewing and remote control. A distinctive store-and-forward relay exfiltrates AES-GCM-encrypted data through nearby infected devices over Wi-Fi Direct, Bluetooth RFCOMM, or BLE GATT, supporting chains of up to four hops when direct C2 is unavailable. A July update added stronger anti-analysis, in-memory DEX loading, lock-secret phishing to extract device PINs, and hiding from the app launcher.
BambooToken malware controls Windows and Linux systems via MQTT
Lumen Black Lotus Labs exposes BambooToken, a China-aligned malware framework using MQTT C2 to backdoor Windows and Linux systems at roughly a dozen enterprises.
Lumen's Black Lotus Labs documented BambooToken, a previously unknown malware framework active since at least 2023 that adopted MQTT for command-and-control in 2024-2025 variants targeting Windows and Linux. Infection occurs via DLL side-loading through digitally signed Tendyron OnKey USB-token software or an impersonated Kingsoft Office installer; dead code suggests keylogging, clipboard theft, audio/webcam capture, and screenshot modules. Telemetry identified roughly a dozen compromised entities, mostly in Asia and South America, including a Hong Kong GitLab server and possibly users of the SpeedCN VPN service. Targeting patterns are consistent with China-aligned operations, though no attribution to a known cluster was made.
Mustang Panda Adds Signed Windows Rootkit to CoolClient Backdoor for Stealth
Kaspersky reports Mustang Panda's updated CoolClient backdoor now deploys a signed kernel-mode Windows rootkit, hitting government victims in Myanmar, Mongolia, Pakistan, and Russia.
Kaspersky identified a new CoolClient variant attributed to HoneyMyte (Mustang Panda) that installs a digitally signed Windows kernel driver, msagent.sys, to hide and protect malicious processes, files, registry keys, and C2 network information. CoolClient is consistently deployed as a secondary backdoor after PlugX, with confirmed victims including government entities in Myanmar, Mongolia, Pakistan, and Russia. In a Myanmar campaign, PlugX was used to deploy CoolClient via a renamed Sangfor executable for DLL side-loading, a scheduled task for persistence, and RPC-based process creation with PPID spoofing. The driver, signed with a 2013 certificate issued to Nanjing Ranyi Technology, implements 33 IOCTL handlers, process hiding via unlinking, a filesystem minifilter, and registry callbacks.
Hackers Disable Endpoint Protection and Deploy Sliver Across Compromised Windows Domain
The Hunter's Ledger tracked campaign UTA-2026-024 using Sliver C2, Domain Admin account creation, and Ethereum-based C2 rotation to compromise a US organization's Windows domain.
The Hunter's Ledger tracked an intrusion at one unnamed US organization as UTA-2026-024, staged from exposed server 193.233.202.17 with a Sliver beacon. Operators created a non-expiring Domain Admin account, enabled RDP with NLA disabled, dumped SAM, SYSTEM and SECURITY hives plus LSASS memory, and disabled eight endpoint protection services. A Node.js implant resolved its C2 server from an Ethereum smart contract that rotated domains five times in five months, while SYSTEM scheduled tasks with backdated dates and DNS allowlist manipulation provided persistence. The infrastructure ties to a confirmed ransomware incident, but no encryptor deployment was proven in this intrusion.
In most cities, nobody owns the whole network
Former Waco CIO argues cellular-connected water controllers sit outside scanned networks, and accountability plus operating-budget funding—not technology—block segmentation.
Writing as Waco, Texas's former CIO, the author describes July water-sector intrusions that CISA linked to over 100 compromised systems, typically controllers on public cellular links absent from asset lists. The FBI and EPA reported incidents at utilities in at least seven states since July 27, and a Clayton County, Georgia pump station failure triggered a boil-water advisory. He argues accountability and funding—using mechanisms like the Texas Water Development Board's new cybersecurity scoring criteria—are the binding constraints, citing Waco's 43-day segmentation of five treatment plants with operating funds.
BigBear 2.0 Evilginx2 Phishing Campaign Bypasses Microsoft 365 MFA With Session Cookie Theft
CloudSEK identified BigBear 2.0, an Evilginx2-based AiTM phishing operation stealing Microsoft 365 MFA session cookies, hitting 461 organizations across 40-plus countries.
The campaign proxies Microsoft sign-in pages to capture credentials and authenticated session cookies, enabling session replay into email, Teams, SharePoint, OneDrive, and connected SSO applications. CloudSEK's June 2026 discovery found 5,137 stolen records, 1,032 passwords, and 4,148 session cookies tied to 3,331 victim IPs, linked to operator 'General Boss' across 42 VPS nodes. The operation targeted IT services and managed service providers, used country-matched residential proxies, and involved at least five affiliates.
Fake Conferences, OAuth and WhatsApp: Inside Russia’s New Espionage Tactics
Google tracks three Russia-linked espionage clusters abusing OAuth, app passwords, and device code phishing against Western researchers and diplomats.
Google's Threat Intelligence Group documented three suspected Russia-linked clusters, UNC6293, UNC7005, and UNC5976, abusing legitimate authentication flows. UNC6293, a likely APT29/ICE RELIC sub-cluster, impersonates US State Department officials in app password and OAuth phishing targeting fewer than five victims at a time. UNC7005, tracked by Microsoft as STORM-2945, spoofs the GLOBSEC conference, runs device code phishing against Microsoft and WhatsApp accounts, and deploys VIDAR and AtomicStealer infostealers. Targets include researchers, academics, diplomats, think-tank analysts, and defense personnel in Europe and the United States.
Stately Taurus Activity in Southeast Asia Links to Bookworm Malware
Unit 42 links Stately Taurus APT activity in ASEAN region and Myanmar to the decade-old Bookworm malware family via infrastructure overlaps.
Unit 42 connected Stately Taurus (aka Mustang Panda) espionage activity targeting ASEAN-affiliated organizations and Myanmar to the Bookworm malware family, first published in 2015. Earlier attacks delivered the PubLoad stager via DLL sideloading, with a PubLoad variant communicating with C2 at 123.253.32[.]15 while mimicking Windows Update URLs. Three previously unreported loader samples from 2021-2022 used UUID-decoded shellcode loaded via heap allocation and API callbacks, ultimately decrypting and loading Bookworm DLLs. A ToneShell backdoor variant shared debug paths with Bookworm loaders, and the January 2024 CSIRT CTI post corroborated the Myanmar attacks.