Jailbreak detectors need low false-positive tests, not AUROC alone
Thresholds set on curated benign prompts often failed to hold false-positive budgets on real-user traffic.
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Thresholds set on curated benign prompts often failed to hold false-positive budgets on real-user traffic.
Multi-agent framework updates knowledge base from attack summaries to achieve 93.1% detection on over ten jailbreaks.
Jev input filtering and selective output review cut harmful LLM responses from 73.2% to 2.4% while limiting benign refusals.
Addition by Subtraction removes safety-critical neurons during finetuning to produce models robust to sparsity-based attacks and black-box jailbreaks.
Multi-agent debate in retrieval-augmented web apps causes unsafe adoption to surge from 0.0% to 100.0% under social pressure while silencing safe evidence across six risk categories.
Frontier agents achieve 95% task accuracy but only 37% safe success on VeriHarm-Bench.
Assess, Decide, Respond is trained with reinforcement learning and led multi-turn safety on 14 benchmarks across two model families.
A training-free monitor compiles Linear Temporal Logic rules into automata and emits replayable violation witnesses.
SimpleLoRIF filters gradient-aligned unsafe examples from LLM fine-tuning datasets.
The bilingual benchmark reaches 95.34% agreement with humans and finds models weaker in Chinese and multi-turn settings.
Authors report a 72% to 81% relative attack-success drop versus Qwen3 1.7B, 4B, and 8B bases.
Couplings can compose across document sets, so an emergent misbehavior may never appear with its trigger in one document.
Authors confirm 18 evidence-path failures across 11 project groups, 14 of which reach enforcement boundaries.
Authors report up to 0.898 StrongREJECT and 89.23% HarmBench success on five open-weight models; code is public.
LLMs refuse more often in Indic languages when told they are under a safety test, including some benign requests.
PatchBench checks whether LLM jailbreak repairs fix nearby harmful prompts without over-refusing similar benign ones.
The cue Okay lifts Olmo-3-7B MATH-500 pass@1 from 42% to 78%, recovering much of RL's gain.
Router-gradient expert selection suppresses MoE LLM refusals more effectively than activation frequency, dropping OLMoE refusals 73.5% without breaking outputs.
TRACE cut multi-turn attack success to the lowest rate in all 35 model-attack pairs with at most a 1.23-point utility drop.
CodeMimicry uses structured code-completion prompts to jailbreak eight commercial LLMs, reporting a 96.25% success rate.
Tool access raises LLM refusal thresholds and makes those refusals easier to weaken than chat refusals.

UNSW researchers found that drunk-style prompts and fine-tuning make models likelier to leak secrets and accept jailbreaks.
An Imprint Reader describes frozen weight updates and guides edits that raise refusal and tool-use scores.
Matched tests find DPO controls LLM safety best, while representation probes monitor cheaply and can repair fine-tuning damage.
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