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Targeted operation against Ukraine exploited 7-year

Vulnerabilities mentionedAll →

CVEVulnerabilityCVSSEPSSFlagsAffectedExposurePublished
CVE-2017-0199
Remote Code Execution in Microsoft Office and WordPad via crafted document files

CVE-2017-0199 is a remote code execution vulnerability in Microsoft Office and WordPad that stems from improper parsing of specially crafted files. Attackers trigger it by getting a user to open a malicious document, after which attacker-controlled code executes with the privileges of the logged-in user. Anyone running the affected Microsoft Office or WordPad software is exposed, and CISA notes the flaw has been leveraged in ransomware campaigns; no CVSS score is available in the source data. The flaw was added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2021-11-03, and EPSS assigns a 99.9% probability of exploitation within 30 days (100th percentile), indicating active, ongoing exploitation.

Do: Apply Microsoft's security updates for Office and Windows per vendor instructions, as required by CISA's KEV catalog; the flaw was publicly reported as fixed in Microsoft's April 2017 security updates. Until patched, treat unsolicited Office documents and email attachments as high-risk, since exploitation requires a user to open a crafted file. Verify that all Office and WordPad installations across the estate—especially endpoints that handle untrusted documents—have received the update.

7.8100% KEV ransomware PoC ×6
  • Microsoft Office
  • Microsoft WordPad
masshundreds of millions of Office installations worldwide (exact count unknown)
CVE-2017-8570
Remote Code Execution in Microsoft Office via Malicious PPSX Files (CVE-2017-8570)

CVE-2017-8570 is a remote code execution vulnerability in Microsoft Office caused by improper handling of embedded OLE objects (composite monikers) in memory, and it is tracked separately from the related CVE-2017-0243. An attacker triggers it by embedding a crafted moniker object in a document, most commonly a PowerPoint .ppsx slide-show file, and persuading a user to open it; the CVSS vector confirms user interaction is required. Successful exploitation lets the attacker run arbitrary code with the victim's privileges, enabling malware delivery, data theft, and follow-on activity. Any user or organization running affected Office builds that open untrusted documents is in scope, and public reporting ties the bug to high-volume maldoc toolkits (e.g., EtterSilent, ThreadKit) and targeted attacks, including one against Ukrainian organizations. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild: CISA added it to the KEV catalog on 2022-02-25, EPSS puts the 30-day exploitation probability at 89.9% (100th percentile), and public PoCs exist.

Do: Apply Microsoft's June 2017 (or later) security updates to all Office installations and audit the estate for outdated builds, since CISA KEV and EPSS data show this bug is still exploited years after the patch. As an interim mitigation, block or sandbox .ppsx (PowerPoint Show) email attachments, which are the primary delivery vector, and warn users about Office files triggering embedded object content. Prioritize remediation per CISA's KEV required action: apply updates per vendor instructions.

7.890% KEV PoC ×2
  • Microsoft Office
masshundreds of millions of users potentially affected (Office install base exceeds 1 billion; practical exposure limited to systems not updated since mid-2017)

Indicators of compromiseAll →

TypeIndicatorContext
domainpetapixel.funitary personnel. But the domain names weavesilk[.]space and petapixel[.]fun are disguised as an obscure generative art site (http://w
domainweavesilk.spacerame.617766616773726468746672726a6834.html,” was hosted on “weavesilk[.]space,” protected by CloudFlare. Despite this, the true hosting
md5617766616773726468746672726a6834for CVE-2017-0199 . The remote script, named “widget_iframe.617766616773726468746672726a6834.html,” was hosted on “weavesilk[.]space,” protected by Clou
Full article395 words · extracted from securityaffairs.com · click to collapse

A hacking campaign targeted Ukraine exploiting a seven-year-old vulnerability in Microsoft Office to deliver Cobalt Strike.

Security experts at Deep Instinct Threat Lab have uncovered a targeted campaign against Ukraine, exploiting a Microsoft Office vulnerability dating back almost seven years to deploy Cobalt Strike on compromised systems.

The researchers found a malicious PPSX (PowerPoint Slideshow signal-2023-12-20-160512.ppsx) file uploaded from Ukraine to VirusTotal at the end of 2023.

The file, although labeled as shared through the Signal app, might not have been originally sent via the application. It’s a PPSX file, seemingly an outdated US Army manual for tank mine clearing blades (MCB).

The PPSX file contains a remote link to an external OLE object. The researchers pointed out that the use of the “script:” prefix demonstrates the exploitation of the vulnerability CVE-2017-8570, a bypass for CVE-2017-0199. The remote script, named “widget_iframe.617766616773726468746672726a6834.html,” was hosted on “weavesilk[.]space,” protected by CloudFlare. Despite this, the true hosting behind the domain was identified as a Russian VPS provider. The scriptlet contents are heavily obfuscated.

The second stage dropper is an HTML file containing JavaScript code executed via Windows cscript.exe. The script sets up persistence, decode, and save the embedded payload to disk disguised as Cisco AnyConnect VPN file.

The payload includes a dynamic-link library (vpn.sessings) that injects the post-exploitation tool Cobalt Strike Beacon into memory and awaits commands from the C2 server. Threat actors used a cracked version of Cobalt Strike.

The DLL also implements features to evade detection and avoid analysis by security experts.

The Deep Instinct Threat Lab could not attribute the attacks to a known threat actor. Evidence collected by the experts demonstrates the sample originated from Ukraine, a Russian VPS provider hosted the second stage, and the Cobalt beacon C&C was registered in Warsaw, Poland.

“The lure contained military-related content, suggesting it was targeting military personnel. But the domain names weavesilk[.]space and petapixel[.]fun are disguised as an obscure generative art site (http://weavesilk.com) and a popular photography site (https://petapixel.com). These are unrelated, and it’s a bit puzzling why an attacker would use these specifically to fool military personnel.” concludes the report. “As of the day of discovery, the loader was undetectable by most engines, while Deep Instinct prevented it on day 0.”

The report includes Indicators of Compromise (IoCs).

Pierluigi Paganini

Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon

(SecurityAffairs – hacking, Ukraine)



Text extracted automatically; images, tables and formatting may be missing. Original: https://securityaffairs.com/162420/hacking/ukraine-campaign-old-ms-office-bug.html