Post-quantum cryptography adoption and the national security implications
Opinion analysis argues quantum computing favors nation-state espionage, leaving lagging post-quantum adoption at critical infrastructure exposed to harvest-now-decrypt-later attacks.
A CSO Online opinion piece argues that the extreme cost and infrastructure requirements of quantum computers will concentrate cryptographically relevant quantum capability among nation-states and a few corporations, favoring espionage and economic espionage over criminal monetization. It highlights harvest-now-decrypt-later risk to long-lived secrets, expert warnings such as Filippo Valsorda's, and diverging CRQC timelines with Google suggesting possibly 2029. The piece predicts governments, banks, and targeted sectors will adopt PQC first while utilities, small hospitals, and local government lag, widening exploitable gaps in critical infrastructure reminiscent of Salt Typhoon-style access.
- Google sees CRQC risk as early as 2029; RSA more conservative
- Harvest-now-decrypt-later threatens long-lived secrets like IP
- Utilities, small hospitals, local government least able to adopt PQC
- Tags
- critical-infrastructurecryptographynation-statepost-quantum-cryptographyquantum-computingrisk-management
- Vendors
- Threat actors
- Salt Typhoon
- Organizations
- Google Quantum AIAnthropicRSA
- AI models
- Anthropic Mythos
From the original article
6 min read at csoonline.com
Quantum computers have advanced significantly in capability and compute power in the last several years and are turning theoretical vulnerabilities in modern cryptography into real-world threats. The shift to post-quantum cryptography (PQC) needs to start now, but several challenges need to be overcome. One is: How do you convince people of the urgency that this not-quite-ready new technology represents?
csoonline.com
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