Unit 42 tracks Com-linked vishing clusters behind data theft and extortion
Original title: Dialing for Data: Inside the Com’s High-Profile Heists
New clusters Vortex and Cinder proxy MFA logins, enroll rogue devices, then demand payment over Teams and Tor.
Unit 42 says Com-affiliated actors, including Bling Libra (ShinyHunters) and several activity clusters, have used vishing since August 2026 to steal data and extort organizations. Targets are mainly in financial services, healthcare and legal services in the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia. New clusters CL-CRI-1264 (Vortex) and CL-CRI-1274 (Cinder) use adversary-in-the-middle login proxies, then exfiltrate Microsoft 365, OneDrive or SharePoint data and message staff through Teams or email.
Unconfirmed: Cluster names, aliases and overlaps with UNC6671 are Unit 42 attributions, not independently confirmed victim statements.
- Vortex, seen in September 2026, mainly hit healthcare, pharmaceutical and medical organizations.
- Attackers reused one MFA device named Pixel 10a across compromised accounts.
- Cinder replayed a Duo “keep me signed in” token via python-requests/2.34.2 and Microsoft Graph.
- A CL-CRI-1192 case found a sideloaded extension named Google Chrome, manifest 1.6.111, from oskeysetup.com.
- Google tracks overlapping activity as UNC6671.
Impact: Stolen corporate data followed by extortion demands
- 1.Treat unexpected IT-support calls that send staff to login sites as malicious.
- 2.Check Microsoft 365 for unauthorized MFA devices and bulk Graph or mailbox access.
- 3.Block sideloaded browser extensions, including one named Google Chrome from oskeysetup.com.
Indicators of compromise
auto-extracted · verify before use · export allAll| Type | Indicator | Context |
|---|---|---|
| domain | authenroll.com | enable , start , add , install , manage , connect , assign authenroll[.]com installpasskey[.]com Internal and Support Infrastructure |
| domain | installpasskey.com | add , install , manage , connect , assign authenroll[.]com installpasskey[.]com Internal and Support Infrastructure Keywords it , support |
| domain | itkeyportal.com | apps , options , help , my , account myaccountoptions[.]com itkeyportal[.]com Redirection Lure Redirections via Cloudflare Pages connec |
| domain | mfapasskeysetup.com | key , oskey , secure settingsportal[.]com ssosettings[.]com mfapasskeysetup[.]com System and Account Operations Keywords enroll , activate |
| domain | mfaregister.com | ns that impersonate target organizations, such as {company}.mfaregister[.]com . We actively track this infrastructure, conduct threat h |
| domain | myaccountoptions.com | , portal , internal , apps , options , help , my , account myaccountoptions[.]com itkeyportal[.]com Redirection Lure Redirections via Cloud |
| domain | oskeyregister.com | chniques to target victims. For example, Microsoft reported oskeyregister[.]com in its research into passkey-themed social engineering. B |
| domain | oskeysetup.com | re. It was downloaded from an attacker-controlled server at oskeysetup[.]com and required the victim to manually sideload it using Dev |
| domain | settingsportal.com | ta , auth , signin , passkey , token , key , oskey , secure settingsportal[.]com ssosettings[.]com mfapasskeysetup[.]com System and Accoun |
| domain | ssosettings.com | passkey , token , key , oskey , secure settingsportal[.]com ssosettings[.]com mfapasskeysetup[.]com System and Account Operations Keywo |
From the original article
12 min read at unit42.paloaltonetworks.com
Our analysis of Com affiliate vishing attacks, cloud data theft and extortion campaigns targeting healthcare and finance, with actionable defense guidance. The post Dialing for Data: Inside the Com’s High-Profile Heists appeared first on Unit 42.
By Unit 42 · unit42.paloaltonetworks.com
A short excerpt; the article and its images belong to the publisher. Summary, key facts and assessment above are AI-written from the article and can be wrong.