Microsoft 365 device-code phishing hijacks accounts without breaking MFA
Original title: Hackers Exploit Microsoft 365 Device Code Authentication to Hijack Accounts and Bypass MFA
Hornetsecurity saw November 2026 payment lures that sent Microsoft tokens to the attacker’s client after users finished MFA.
Hornetsecurity’s Threat Intelligence Lab reported November 2026 campaigns that used payment-themed HTML and SVG attachments to push employees toward a genuine Microsoft sign-in. Fake SharePoint workspaces supplied a device code; after the user signed in and completed MFA, Microsoft issued tokens to the attacker’s client. Researchers did not describe a malware implant. Access then depends on the permissions granted to that client, which can include corporate email or files.
Unconfirmed: Hornetsecurity did not name the operators or say how many accounts were compromised.
- One sample used a period as the subject and a personalized ZIP name.
- A second lure used the ZIP SpwcinBillPaymentReports.zip and a fake document workspace.
- Defenders can filter Entra sign-in logs for the device code authentication protocol.
- Microsoft guidance is to block device code flow in Conditional Access where possible.
- Operators and the number of compromised accounts were not identified.
Impact: attacker-held tokens can expose corporate email or files
- 1.Filter Entra sign-in logs for device code authentication and compare them with email and network records.
- 2.Block device code flow in Conditional Access after testing legitimate use in Report-only mode.
- 3.If an employee entered an unsolicited code, revoke that account’s sign-in sessions and review activity.
- Vendors
- Microsoft
- Products
- Microsoft 365Microsoft Entra
- Organizations
- HornetsecurityFBI
Indicators of compromise
auto-extracted · verify before use · export allAll| Type | Indicator | Context |
|---|---|---|
| domain | krointechbillpaycheckingusalexingto.sbs | o Payment-advice variant: hosted redirect Domain 5txpm30dqe.krointechbillpaycheckingusalexingto[.]sbs Funds-transfer variant: HTML/SVG redirect destination Not |
| domain | promtateusachorloadscorp.sbs | 5426140 First sample: HTML/SVG redirector Domain ngjedt0xrv.promtateusachorloadscorp[.]sbs Second sample: fake document workspace SHA-256 d12b56f405 |
| domain | synerghylnksloads.cfd | (IoCs):- Type Indicator Campaign context Domain 9l2v3vupv5.synerghylnksloads[.]cfd First sample: verification gate, fake SharePoint workspac |
| sha256 | 81f35c4a218032f44f4681e3f409ee7e024506bffc4446f7a9e7b3ce2d0ee932 | ba5c0f7 Second sample: SpwcinBillPaymentReports.zip SHA-256 81f35c4a218032f44f4681e3f409ee7e024506bffc4446f7a9e7b3ce2d0ee932 Second sample: associated HTML lure Domain tgg5rqrdcb.syner |
| sha256 | bbf9f563371d6afc449c69546a4ec39e831ca18d3bf3764b7b4c27f525426140 | FCeikrUA First sample: decoded redirect destination SHA-256 bbf9f563371d6afc449c69546a4ec39e831ca18d3bf3764b7b4c27f525426140 First sample: HTML/SVG redirector Domain ngjedt0xrv.promtat |
| sha256 | d12b56f405af7fb5d80d828ccd5514e045eb9bfb3428bf77f20deca31ba5c0f7 | dscorp[.]sbs Second sample: fake document workspace SHA-256 d12b56f405af7fb5d80d828ccd5514e045eb9bfb3428bf77f20deca31ba5c0f7 Second sample: SpwcinBillPaymentReports.zip SHA-256 81f35c4 |
| url | https://9l2v3vupv5.synerghylnksloads.cfd/l/CqCFCeikrUA | n gate, fake SharePoint workspace and session endpoints URL hxxps://9l2v3vupv5.synerghylnksloads[.]cfd/l/CqCFCeikrUA First sample: decoded redirect destination SHA-256 bbf9f5 |
| url | https://base-hub-yw7q.p-xxorevv8.workers.dev/l/tanaeR_gygko | ads[.]cfd Joint-check variant: SVG redirect destination URL hxxps://base-hub-yw7q.p-xxorevv8.workers[.]dev/l/tanaeR_gygko Payment-advice variant: hosted redirect Domain 5txpm30dqe |
From the original article
4 min read at cybersecuritynews.com
Hackers are targeting Microsoft 365 accounts with fake payment notices and SharePoint documents that lead employees to a genuine Microsoft sign-in page. The November 2026 campaigns turn a routine task, such as checking whether an invoice was paid, into an authorization request that can give an attacker access to the employee’s account. The trick does […]
By Tushar Subhra Dutta · cybersecuritynews.com
A short excerpt; the article and its images belong to the publisher. Summary, key facts and assessment above are AI-written from the article and can be wrong.