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Automotive Hardware Attacks: An Architect's Guide to TARA

arXiv cs.CRby Jakub Breier ()1 min read4 · 2 reads
AI summary · grok-4.7Summaries by Vani AI

ISO/SAE 21434 TARA underrates physical hardware attacks; authors add a hardware-aware feasibility method.

The paper argues ISO/SAE 21434 threat analysis and risk assessment treats implementation-level hardware attacks inconsistently: two of three exemplified feasibility methods rate every physical-access path very low by construction, while the third can assign any of four ratings. The authors add a hardware-aware TARA covering side-channel analysis, fault injection, and debug or test-interface abuse, with a lifecycle attacker model, path dominance, and an H0-H2 relevance gate. On a reference gateway and ten published automotive attacks, seven used a debug, programming, boot, diagnostic, or update mechanism, and only four attacked a cryptographic computation.

Key facts
  • Two ISO/SAE 21434 methods rate every physical path very low.
  • Extension covers side channels, fault injection, and debug abuse.
  • H0-H2 gate decides when hardware resistance must be demonstrated.
  • Seven of ten studied attacks used debug or update mechanisms.
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From the original article

1 min read at arxiv.org

Threat analysis and risk assessment (TARA) according to ISO/SAE 21434 treats implementation-level hardware attacks inconsistently.

arXiv cs.CR

By Jakub Breier · arxiv.org

Read the full article at arXiv cs.CR

A short excerpt; the article and its images belong to the publisher. Summary, key facts and assessment above are AI-written from the article and can be wrong.