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Payment lures steal Microsoft 365 OAuth tokens via device-code phishing

Original title: Hackers Use Legitimate Microsoft Login Pages to Steal OAuth Tokens and Hijack Microsoft 365 Accounts

GBHackersby Mayura Kathir ()3 min read2
Part of a story covered by 2 sourcesPayment lures trick Microsoft 365 users into device-code token theftMerged summary & timeline
AI summary · x-ai/grok-4.7Summaries by Vani AI

Hornetsecurity says victims approve device-code sign-ins on real Microsoft pages, so MFA can succeed while tokens go to the attacker.

Hornetsecurity reported on November 19 that payment-themed campaigns are tricking Microsoft 365 users into approving sign-ins they did not start. HTML and SVG attachments inside ZIP files lead through fake SharePoint-style pages to genuine Microsoft login pages, where an approved device-code request issues OAuth tokens to an attacker-controlled client. Microsoft separately described the same authorization risk in a November 17 GitHub Copilot CLI simulation but said it did not observe those outcomes in the wild.

Unconfirmed: Campaign details come from Hornetsecurity; Microsoft did not report the related GitHub Copilot CLI outcomes in the wild.

Key facts
  • One lure used a period as the subject and an HTML/SVG file in a payment-advice ZIP.
  • A second sample used SpwcinBillPaymentReports.zip and a mismatched Irving Oil disclaimer.
  • The second lure host was ngjedt0xrv.promtateusachorloadscorp.sbs.
  • Microsoft recommends blocking the device-code flow in Conditional Access after report-only review.
  • Hornetsecurity published defanged domains and SHA-256 hashes for hunting.
Security assessment · AI, from the article

Impact: OAuth tokens grant Microsoft 365 access within approved permissions

ProductAffected
Microsoft 365—
What to do
  1. 1.Inspect HTML and SVG files inside archives rather than trusting attachment names.
  2. 2.Filter Entra sign-in logs for successful device-code authentications lacking a business reason.
  3. 3.Block device-code flow in Conditional Access after inventorying legitimate use.
Analyze this story with Vani AIImpact, who is affected and what defenders should do, in a new chat

Indicators of compromise

auto-extracted · verify before use · export allAll
TypeIndicatorContext
domainpromtateusachorloadscorp.sbst 365 users . The browser capture shows the host ngjedt0xrv.promtateusachorloadscorp[.]sbs in the address bar. The joint-check phishing email presen
domainsynerghylnksloads.cfdrequested access. IOCs Type Value Context Domain 9l2v3vupv5.synerghylnksloads[.]cfd First sample: verification gate, fake SharePoint page and
sha256bbf9f563371d6afc449c69546a4ec39e831ca18d3bf3764b7b4c27f525426140FCeikrUA First sample: decoded redirect destination. SHA256 bbf9f563371d6afc449c69546a4ec39e831ca18d3bf3764b7b4c27f525426140 First sample: HTML/SVG redirector. Domain ngjedt0xrv.promta
urlhttps://9l2v3vupv5.synerghylnksloads.cfd/l/CqCFCeikrUAation gate, fake SharePoint page and session endpoints. URL hxxps://9l2v3vupv5.synerghylnksloads[.]cfd/l/CqCFCeikrUA First sample: decoded redirect destination. SHA256 bbf9f5

From the original article

3 min read at gbhackers.com

Attackers are using genuine Microsoft sign-in pages to hijack Microsoft 365 accounts without collecting passwords on counterfeit login forms. Once a victim approves the request, Microsoft issues OAuth tokens to the attacker-controlled client, granting access within the permissions authorized. One email arrived with a single period as its subject and almost no visible body.

GBHackers

By Mayura Kathir · gbhackers.com

Read the full article at GBHackers

A short excerpt; the article and its images belong to the publisher. Summary, key facts and assessment above are AI-written from the article and can be wrong.