Payment lures steal Microsoft 365 OAuth tokens via device-code phishing
Original title: Hackers Use Legitimate Microsoft Login Pages to Steal OAuth Tokens and Hijack Microsoft 365 Accounts
Hornetsecurity says victims approve device-code sign-ins on real Microsoft pages, so MFA can succeed while tokens go to the attacker.
Hornetsecurity reported on November 19 that payment-themed campaigns are tricking Microsoft 365 users into approving sign-ins they did not start. HTML and SVG attachments inside ZIP files lead through fake SharePoint-style pages to genuine Microsoft login pages, where an approved device-code request issues OAuth tokens to an attacker-controlled client. Microsoft separately described the same authorization risk in a November 17 GitHub Copilot CLI simulation but said it did not observe those outcomes in the wild.
Unconfirmed: Campaign details come from Hornetsecurity; Microsoft did not report the related GitHub Copilot CLI outcomes in the wild.
- One lure used a period as the subject and an HTML/SVG file in a payment-advice ZIP.
- A second sample used SpwcinBillPaymentReports.zip and a mismatched Irving Oil disclaimer.
- The second lure host was ngjedt0xrv.promtateusachorloadscorp.sbs.
- Microsoft recommends blocking the device-code flow in Conditional Access after report-only review.
- Hornetsecurity published defanged domains and SHA-256 hashes for hunting.
Impact: OAuth tokens grant Microsoft 365 access within approved permissions
| Product | Affected |
|---|---|
| Microsoft 365 | — |
- 1.Inspect HTML and SVG files inside archives rather than trusting attachment names.
- 2.Filter Entra sign-in logs for successful device-code authentications lacking a business reason.
- 3.Block device-code flow in Conditional Access after inventorying legitimate use.
- Vendors
- Microsoft
- Products
- Microsoft 365Microsoft Entra
- Organizations
- Hornetsecurity
Indicators of compromise
auto-extracted · verify before use · export allAll| Type | Indicator | Context |
|---|---|---|
| domain | promtateusachorloadscorp.sbs | t 365 users . The browser capture shows the host ngjedt0xrv.promtateusachorloadscorp[.]sbs in the address bar. The joint-check phishing email presen |
| domain | synerghylnksloads.cfd | requested access. IOCs Type Value Context Domain 9l2v3vupv5.synerghylnksloads[.]cfd First sample: verification gate, fake SharePoint page and |
| sha256 | bbf9f563371d6afc449c69546a4ec39e831ca18d3bf3764b7b4c27f525426140 | FCeikrUA First sample: decoded redirect destination. SHA256 bbf9f563371d6afc449c69546a4ec39e831ca18d3bf3764b7b4c27f525426140 First sample: HTML/SVG redirector. Domain ngjedt0xrv.promta |
| url | https://9l2v3vupv5.synerghylnksloads.cfd/l/CqCFCeikrUA | ation gate, fake SharePoint page and session endpoints. URL hxxps://9l2v3vupv5.synerghylnksloads[.]cfd/l/CqCFCeikrUA First sample: decoded redirect destination. SHA256 bbf9f5 |
From the original article
3 min read at gbhackers.com
Attackers are using genuine Microsoft sign-in pages to hijack Microsoft 365 accounts without collecting passwords on counterfeit login forms. Once a victim approves the request, Microsoft issues OAuth tokens to the attacker-controlled client, granting access within the permissions authorized. One email arrived with a single period as its subject and almost no visible body.
By Mayura Kathir · gbhackers.com
A short excerpt; the article and its images belong to the publisher. Summary, key facts and assessment above are AI-written from the article and can be wrong.