Getting ahead of ‘harvest-now-decrypt-later’: Post-quantum cryptography planning
Opinion piece urges organizations to begin post-quantum cryptography migration now, citing harvest-now-decrypt-later risk and NIST deadlines.
CSO Online outlines why harvest-now-decrypt-later makes long-lived sensitive data a current risk even before quantum computers exist. It cites NIST IR 8547 timelines deprecating RSA-2048 and ECC P-256 by 2030 and removing them by 2035, finalized FIPS standards ML-KEM, ML-DSA, and SLH-DSA, upcoming FN-DSA (FIPS 206), NSA requirements for national security systems from 2027, and UK NCSC phased guidance through 2035. The author recommends cryptographic discovery, crypto-agility, and prioritizing long-confidentiality data and TLS endpoints.
- NIST IR 8547 deprecates RSA-2048 and ECC P-256 by 2030, removal by 2035
- ML-KEM, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA finalized; FN-DSA (FIPS 206) expected this year
- NSA requires quantum-resistant crypto for new national security acquisitions in 2027
- Migration demands cryptographic discovery, crypto-agility, and vendor roadmap coordination
- Prioritize long-retention data and public-facing TLS endpoints for early migration
- Countries
- United KingdomUnited States
From the original article
5 min read at csoonline.com
I’ve sat in enough boardroom conversations about quantum computing to notice a pattern. Someone raises it, someone else says “that’s ten years out,” and the topic gets tabled until next year’s budget cycle. The clock that matters isn’t the one measuring when a quantum computer arrives.
csoonline.com
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