Search: “mcp”

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DomainAll Cyber AIWindow24h 3d 7d 30d AllIn the wild Important only Show duplicates

CategoryAll Vulnerability 137 AI safety & security 116 Policy & legal 52 Exploit / PoC 51 Malware 34 AI tools & infra 31 Model release 21 Ransomware 20 Industry 19 Threat actor 17 Tools 15 Data breach 14 Phishing & fraud 13 AI industry 11

SeverityAll critical 173 high 80 medium 162 low 42 info 112

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Meta now lets AI agents handle the boring parts of WhatsApp Business setup

Meta launched a WhatsApp Business Tools MCP server that lets AI agents like Claude or Cursor set up and manage WhatsApp Business messaging accounts.

Meta announced a WhatsApp Business Tools MCP server, a Model Context Protocol server that connects AI coding agents such as Claude, Cursor, Codex, or ChatGPT directly to the WhatsApp Business Platform. The agents can handle account creation, phone number verification, Cloud API registration, Terms of Service checks, messaging template creation/editing, and webhook testing. Meta's companion Social Technologies MCP can also discover API endpoints, search documentation, and troubleshoot errors. The launch extends Meta's existing MCP servers for ad management and app configuration monitoring.

TechCrunch · AI20:12 UTC · 2h agoAI tools & infra

iceener/files-stdio-mcp-server: sandbox escape in fs_search via a symlinked directory (recursive walker validates only the top level)

iceener/files-stdio-mcp-server allows a read-side sandbox escape: fs_search follows symlinked directories while the recursive walker validates confinement only at the top level.

A vulnerability report describes a read-side sandbox escape in iceener/files-stdio-mcp-server, an MCP server for text-based file access that explicitly promises 'Sandboxed filesystem access. Only these paths are available'. The fs_search tool can follow symlinked directories outside the allowed paths, and the recursive directory-listing walker used by fs_search (and by fs_read) validates confinement only at the top level. The same flaw affects fs_read's directory-listing walker. No CVE identifier was assigned in the provided report text.

oss-securitySep 10, 01:17 UTC · 5d agoVulnerability

When AI Agents Go Rogue: Agent Session Smuggling Attack in A2A Systems

Unit 42 unveils agent session smuggling, where a rogue AI agent hides covert instructions in established Agent2Agent (A2A) protocol sessions to manipulate victim agents.

Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 discovered agent session smuggling, a new attack technique in which a malicious AI agent exploits an established cross-agent session under the Agent2Agent (A2A) protocol to send covert instructions hidden among benign client requests and server responses. The technique leverages the implicit trust agents place in collaborating agents and the stateful, multi-turn nature of A2A sessions; the researchers stress it affects any stateful protocol, not an A2A flaw. Unlike one-shot data-based attacks, a rogue agent can converse, adapt and build false trust over multiple interactions. Proposed mitigations include human-in-the-loop enforcement, cryptographically signed AgentCards for remote agent verification, and context-grounding to detect injected instructions.

Palo Alto Unit 42Aug 17, 12:32 UTC · 29d agoAI safety & security1

Malicious MCP Servers Can Split Instructions to Make AI Coding Agents Exfiltrate Secrets

ASSET Research Group's GhostSplice technique splits malicious instructions across MCP channels, tricking AI coding agents into exfiltrating SSH keys, source code, and secrets.

ASSET Research Group disclosed GhostSplice, a prompt-injection technique in which a malicious Model Context Protocol (MCP) server splits an exfiltration instruction across a tool description and a tool result so no single fragment appears harmful. In the reference implementation, a benign-looking integrity_checker tool with fields alpha through delta is later paired with a project-scan result mapping those fields to .ssh/id_rsa, proprietary source, customers.csv, and .env. Tests across eleven API-tested models showed average compliance rising from 42% to 82% when instructions were split in two, with GPT-4o, Gemini 2.0 Flash, and Llama 3.3 70B going from 0% to 100%. The findings come from controlled lab tests, not a reported real-world intrusion, and no CVE identifiers had been assigned as of August 10, 2026.

The Hacker NewsAug 11, 10:24 UTC · Aug 11, 2026AI safety & security1

datasette-mcp 0.2

Simon Willison released datasette-mcp 0.2, changing MCP SQL results to object arrays for better small-model usability.

Datasette-mcp 0.2 changes the execute_sql 'rows' output from an array of arrays to an array of objects, helping weaker models avoid losing track of positional column mappings. The plugin now depends on mcp>=2.1.1. This is the first non-alpha release, and the author reports using it extensively.

Simon WillisonSep 1, 15:30 UTC · 14d agoAI tools & infra

Survey of filesystem MCP servers: how the "sandboxed filesystem" boundary is enforced (one breach, four defended-by-design)

Survey finds one filesystem MCP server vulnerable to a symlink-based sandbox escape while four others are defended by design.

A survey of five filesystem MCP servers assessed how each enforces its path-confinement boundary against symlink escapes in recursive directory walkers. The iceener/files-stdio-mcp-server is vulnerable to a read-side sandbox escape. The other four are defended by design or make no confinement claim. The author describes the vulnerability class as small but real.

oss-securitySep 10, 01:14 UTC · 5d agoVulnerability

Securing Claude Code: The New Compliance API, Local Visibility, and Identity Governance

Anthropic's new Compliance API endpoints expose Claude Code local session transcripts, highlighting governance gaps for endpoint AI agents.

Anthropic added local session transcript endpoints to its Compliance API on August 11, 2026, giving security teams visibility into prompts, bash commands, file operations, and MCP commands run by Claude Code harnesses on endpoints. The article argues local harnesses break the classic shared-responsibility model, citing Token Security data that 68.6% of discovered AI agents run on endpoints, and a Cloud Security Alliance survey of 418 IT and security professionals in which 82% found an unknown agent within the past year. It outlines three governance layers: Anthropic managed settings as a policy baseline, the Compliance API for cloud-visible transcripts, and endpoint telemetry to connect agent activity to identity, credentials, and permissions.

The Hacker NewsAug 31, 11:31 UTC · 15d agoAI safety & security1

How MCP Servers Can Expose Enterprise Secrets

MCP servers holding AI agent credentials risk secret exposure via plaintext configs, credential sprawl, prompt injection, and over-permissioning; mitigations include centralization and least privilege.

The article examines how Model Context Protocol servers, which hold API keys, tokens, and service-account credentials for AI agents, can leak enterprise secrets. Documented exposure paths include plaintext credentials in config files, ungoverned credential sprawl, prompt injection, over-permissioning, and untrusted third-party servers. It cites CVE-2025-6514 in mcp-remote (400,000+ downloads), where a malicious server triggered OS command injection leading to remote code execution. Recommended mitigations include centralized secret stores, short-lived auto-rotated credentials, least privilege, and human approval for sensitive actions.

The Hacker NewsAug 17, 11:58 UTC · 29d agoAI safety & security CVE-2025-6514

Agent Harness vs Agent Framework vs MCP: Which Layer Owns the Loop, State, Tools, Permissions, and Recovery

Architecture explainer separates agent harnesses, frameworks, and MCP by which layer owns the loop, state, permissions, and recovery.

The article distinguishes agent harnesses (OpenAI Codex, Claude Agent SDK), which own the execution loop, sandbox, permission model, and recovery; frameworks (LangGraph, OpenAI Agents SDK, Microsoft Agent Framework), which supply composable primitives; and MCP, a stateless JSON-RPC wire protocol governed by the Linux Foundation's Agentic AI Foundation since December 2025. An ownership matrix maps the execution loop, state, tool transport, permissions, recovery, sandboxing, and multi-agent orchestration to each layer. The 2026-07-28 MCP specification made the protocol fully stateless, retiring the initialize handshake and session headers.

MarkTechPostSep 14, 21:54 UTC · 1d agoAI research1

OpenAI Agents API

OpenAI's Agents API documentation describes a managed Codex harness offering sandboxed agents, MCP connectivity, subagents, and US-only data residency.

The Agents API lets applications run durable agent sessions while OpenAI manages orchestration, context compaction, and recovery on the Codex harness. Agents can execute code, edit files, and connect to MCP servers in OpenAI-hosted or self-hosted sandboxes. Example applications include an incident response agent, Slack bot, data analyst, and GitHub issue investigator. Billing follows model, tool, and container rates; the examples use model gpt-6-astra.

Hacker News · securityupdated Sep 11, 08:11 UTC · 4d agofirst Sep 10, 19:43 UTC · 5d agoAI tools & infra 4 sources HN 20↑ · 16 comments1

Marimo Notebook Flaw Could Run MCP Commands Before Cells Execute in Edit Mode

Marimo notebook flaw CVE-2026-75149 (CVSS 8.7) allows attacker-supplied MCP commands to run as local subprocesses before any cell executes in edit mode.

Marimo addressed CVE-2026-75149, a high-severity code injection flaw allowing attacker-supplied Model Context Protocol (MCP) commands to execute as local subprocesses when a crafted notebook is opened in edit mode, before any cell runs. The issue affects versions prior to 0.23.15, carries CVSS v4 of 8.7 and CVSS v3.1 of 8.8, and requires user interaction but no authentication. Marimo fixed it in version 0.23.15 (released July 23, 2026) via a PEP 723 hardening patch that treats notebook metadata as attacker-controlled and strips ai, mcp, completion, secrets, and server configuration sections. VulnCheck's CNA also disclosed CVE-2026-67618 (CVSS 7.1), involving an attacker-controlled AI base_url that exfiltrates operator API keys, and earlier CVE-2023-39987, a missing auth on /terminal/ws endpoint allowing full PTY shell access.

The Hacker NewsAug 25, 12:43 UTC · 21d agoVulnerability CVE-2026-75149 CVE-2026-67618 CVE-2026-39987

Infostealers Target Claude, Cursor, Codex and Other AI Agents to Steal Credentials and Sensitive Data

Gen Digital researchers report infostealer families Amatera, Remus and CallbackBeaver now harvest Claude, Cursor and Codex agent data, including tokens and MCP configs.

Gen Digital researchers found commodity infostealers extending their collection rules to local AI coding agent data from Claude, Cursor, Codex, Cline, Continue and OpenCode on Windows and macOS. Amatera targets Cline and Continue, Remus targets Claude, Cursor and OpenCode, and CallbackBeaver added Claude and Cursor with more than 5,000 samples observed in 30 days; Djinn Stealer hits Claude, Codex, Gemini, Cline, OpenCode and Kilo on macOS. Stolen data includes access and refresh tokens, prompt histories, conversation databases and MCP configurations holding API keys, potentially exposing connected source-control, cloud and ticketing systems. Remus is assessed as a Lumma Stealer variant using EtherHiding C2 resolution via Ethereum smart contracts.

GBHackersupdated Sep 10, 10:36 UTC · 5d agofirst Sep 9, 07:05 UTC · 6d agoMalware in the wild 4 sources1

One in four MCP servers opens AI agent security to code execution risk

Noma Security whitepaper finds most popular AI Skills and many MCP servers carry high-risk capabilities, with state changes most prevalent.

Noma Security analyzed hundreds of popular MCP servers and Skills across eight risk categories, finding most widely used Skills carry at least one risky characteristic and a typical enterprise runs well over a hundred high-risk agent tools, with arbitrary code execution common across MCP servers. The most prevalent risk is the ability to change state or data, and named toxic combinations include ContextCrush data leakage, ForcedLeak via poisoned Salesforce CRM records, DockerDash supply-chain compromise, the Replit production database deletion, and the hijacked Amazon Q VS Code extension. Building on OWASP LLM06:2025, the paper proposes the No Excessive CAP framework of capabilities, autonomy, and permissions, recommending allowlisting, MCP version pinning, approval gates on irreversible actions, and user-scoped expiring credentials.

Help Net SecurityAug 24, 04:21 UTC · 22d agoAI safety & security

AIR raises $50M to help companies vet the skills and add-ons AI agents use

AI security startup AIR exits stealth with $50M across two seed rounds to continuously vet skills, plugins, and MCP servers used by enterprise AI agents.

AIR, founded by Unit 8200 veterans Yair Saban and Niv Hoffman, raised $10 million led by Sequoia and $40 million led by Greenoaks to secure the emerging AI agent software supply chain. Its platform discovers agents in enterprise environments, intercepts their actions, and continuously vets skills, add-ons, and MCP servers against a maintained whitelist, filtering out about 27% of found add-ons. The company claims over 20 customers, roughly a quarter large enterprises, with strong demand in financial services and pharma, and competes with Noma Security, Zenity, Astrix Security, and Operant AI.

TechCrunch · SecuritySep 1, 15:45 UTC · 14d agoAI industry

RMM Tools for MSPs: Features, Risks & How to Stay Secure

Threat actors continue abusing MSP remote monitoring and management tools to reach downstream customers, four years after the Kaseya supply chain attack.

Huntress examines how RMM platforms remain a favored gateway for attackers targeting managed service providers and their clients. A recent incident demonstrates that adversaries still successfully pivot from MSP RMM tooling into downstream customer environments. The piece also covers RMM features, associated risks, and hardening guidance for providers.

HuntressSep 1, 04:00 UTC · 14d agoThreat actor in the wild

Fortinet expands AI security portfolio with Virtue AI acquisition

Fortinet acquired Virtue AI to add agent red-teaming, MCP scanning and runtime guardrails to its AI security portfolio.

Fortinet acquired Virtue AI to extend its Security for AI strategy beyond FortiAIGate, which protects LLMs from prompt injection, data leakage and model poisoning. Virtue AI brings automated agentic red-teaming across 50+ sandboxed environments and 14 domains, agent discovery and governance including MCP tool scanning, continuous AI validation, and real-time guardrails across text, images, video, audio and code. Financial terms were not disclosed and the consideration is immaterial to Fortinet; Gartner projects the AI security market to grow from $2.8B in 2026 to $16.4B by 2030.

Help Net SecurityAug 17, 00:00 UTC · 29d agoIndustry

How Cloudflare detects MCP traffic and helps secure it

Cloudflare Gateway now detects Model Context Protocol traffic via protocol-level heuristics to expose shadow MCP usage and enforce approved-server access.

Cloudflare Gateway identifies Model Context Protocol (MCP) requests using protocol-level heuristics. Security teams can use the signal to discover shadow MCP traffic on managed networks, enforce Portal-only access for approved MCP servers, and block direct connections. The updates extend standard gateway and zero-trust controls to AI agent traffic.

Cloudflare BlogAug 14, 13:12 UTC · Aug 14, 2026Tools

Introducing ChatGPT for Financial Services

OpenAI launches ChatGPT for Financial Services, pairing built-in market data with GPT-6 Astra for banking research workflows.

OpenAI introduced ChatGPT for Financial Services, a tailored ChatGPT Work experience shaped by design partners Morgan Stanley and Evercore, targeting investment banking and equity research. It bundles premium data from Daloopa, PitchBook, LSEG News, and Crunchbase hosted on OpenAI infrastructure with granular citations, optimized MCP connectors for S&P Global and FactSet, and 50+ connectors, plus planned entitlement integrations with S&P Capital IQ, LSEG, MSCI, Dow Jones Factiva, and Moody's. It runs GPT-6 Astra, which OpenAI claims is state of the art in information retrieval, financial reasoning, and artifact generation, and includes enterprise controls such as SAML SSO, SCIM, role-based access, and no default training on firm data.

OpenAI Newsupdated Sep 10, 18:25 UTC · 5d agofirst Sep 10, 07:00 UTC · 5d agoAI industry 2 sources

ToolHive: The open-source way to run any MCP server securely

Stacklok's open-source ToolHive runs Model Context Protocol servers in isolated containers with per-request identity enforcement, audit logging and a signed registry.

ToolHive, shipped under Apache 2.0, containersizes MCP servers locally via Docker or Podman or in clusters through a Kubernetes operator, applying permissions, network filtering, and secrets management. The platform includes a Registry Server implementing the official MCP Registry API with signing and provenance verification, a Virtual MCP Server gateway with OIDC/OAuth single sign-on and OpenTelemetry traces, and a desktop Portal for one-click installs. The browser-based cloud UI is retired, so the desktop app and CLI are the supported rollout paths.

Help Net SecuritySep 7, 00:00 UTC · 8d agoAI tools & infra1

CISA Adds Seven Exploited Flaws as Attackers Deploy Reverse Shells and Crypto Miners

CISA added seven actively exploited vulnerabilities to its KEV catalog, including SonicWall SMA 1000 SSRF CVE-2026-83548, amid campaigns deploying reverse shells and crypto miners.

CISA's KEV additions cover flaws in SonicWall SMA 1000 (CVE-2026-83548, CVE-2026-83549), Sangoma Switchvox (CVE-2026-9586), JFrog Artifactory (CVE-2026-82329), Kludex Starlette (CVE-2026-48710), Kestra OSS (CVE-2026-49869) and Berri LiteLLM's MCP endpoint (CVE-2026-59822). SonicWall confirmed active exploitation of the SMA 1000 flaws, while Microsoft and Wiz reported attackers chaining LiteLLM flaws CVE-2026-42271 and CVE-2026-48710 to fingerprint hosts, steal provider API keys and deploy XMRig miners on AI infrastructure. Wiz linked exploitation of the LiteLLM chain to the Qilin ransomware group, and Microsoft detailed a Kestra compromise chain ending in cryptocurrency mining and data harvesting via exposed RAGFlow flaws.

The Hacker NewsSep 3, 05:19 UTC · 12d agoExploit / PoC in the wildCVE-2026-83548 CVE-2026-83549 CVE-2026-9586+10 CVEs1

Hackers Use Autonomous AI Agents to Harvest Thousands of Credentials in Under 6 Hours

Google Cloud documents a financially motivated actor using autonomous AI agents on a compromised cloud tenant to harvest 23,800+ credentials in under six hours.

Google Cloud reports that an attacker compromised a victim's cloud environment and deployed a multi-agent framework driven by preconfigured Markdown playbooks to autonomously handle vulnerability scanning, credential collection, error troubleshooting, and IP rotation. An exposed command-and-control server hosted the 'Recon' framework with a live dashboard managing over 23,800 harvested secrets, including cloud and AI-service API keys. The report also ties DUSTMAKER to UNC6780/TeamPCP, targeting AI development tools and CI/CD systems via trojanized MCP packages such as tiktoken_mcp. Google has disabled linked assets and updated protections after the actors' operational security failures.

Cyber Security News09:28 UTC · 13h agoThreat actor in the wild

Akuity gives AI agents operational context to safely ship software

Akuity launches Agentic Control Plane and MCP Server to govern AI agent actions inside production software delivery pipelines.

Akuity introduced an Agentic Control Plane and MCP Server that lets AI agents such as Claude, Codex, and Cursor access deployment and cluster context under existing identity, permission, and audit controls. MLB reported the product identified over 100 degraded applications within hours. Akuity positions it against open-source MCP servers granting raw access with no identity inheritance or policy layer.

Help Net Security08:37 UTC · 14h agoAI tools & infra

Opaque recurrence, and other AI terms that you should probably know

TechCrunch updates its plain-English glossary defining common AI terms from AGI and agents to chain-of-thought reasoning.

TechCrunch maintains a regularly updated glossary of AI terminology, defining terms such as AGI, AI agents, API endpoints, chain of thought, coding agents, compute, deep learning, and diffusion. It highlights 'opaque recurrence', the reasoning technique in OpenAI's new Astra model that has drawn attention from AI safety researchers. The piece is an educational living document rather than new research or a product announcement.

TechCrunch · AISep 7, 19:24 UTC · 8d agoAI industry

[remote] mcp-server-kubernetes 3.8.x - Argument Injection

Argument injection in mcp-server-kubernetes 3.8.x MCP server could allow AI clients to execute unintended Kubernetes operations.

Exploit-DB entry 52638 documents an argument injection vulnerability in mcp-server-kubernetes version 3.8.x, a Model Context Protocol server that lets AI assistants interact with Kubernetes clusters. Crafted input can inject additional arguments into commands executed by the server, potentially enabling unauthorized operations or command execution against the cluster. This highlights growing security concerns around MCP servers bridging LLM agents and infrastructure.

Exploit-DBAug 11, 00:00 UTC · Aug 11, 2026Exploit / PoC

Exaforce extends its AI security tool to monitor more than just Claude

Exaforce AI Security extends beyond Claude to monitor OpenAI, Gemini, and Copilot agents using existing SOC telemetry, no new endpoint agents.

Exaforce expanded its June Claude Compliance API integration into Exaforce AI Security, adding monitoring for OpenAI, Gemini, Microsoft Copilot, and OAuth-connected AI apps. The tool inventories AI agents by correlating EDR, cloud, SaaS, and model-provider logs without new gateways or endpoint agents, and can respond by revoking sessions, deactivating API keys, isolating devices, or killing agent processes via existing controls. Analysts note the agentless approach lowers friction but lacks runtime inspection and inline blocking offered by competitors such as Palo Alto Prisma AIRS, SentinelOne Prompt AI Agent Security, and CrowdStrike Falcon Guardian. A March 2026 Cloud Security Alliance survey found 68% of organizations cannot distinguish human from AI-agent activity and 74% report AI agents receive excessive access.

CSO Online13:00 UTC · 10h agoTools

Brinqa acquires PlexTrac to bring validated remediation to exposure management

Brinqa acquired PlexTrac to add pentest-driven validation of remediation, claiming the largest standalone unified exposure management vendor with 3,000+ customers.

Brinqa acquired PlexTrac to add offensive-security-driven validation that remediation actually worked, aiming to close the continuous threat exposure management loop from prioritization through verified fixes. Brinqa says the combination makes it the largest standalone vendor in unified exposure management, serving more than 3,000 customers across 57 countries, with PlexTrac continuing as a standalone product. Brinqa cited 164% year-over-year new-bookings growth in 2025 and inclusion in Gartner's inaugural Magic Quadrant for Exposure Assessment Platforms.

Help Net SecurityAug 19, 00:00 UTC · 27d agoIndustry

AVP-Inspect: Coordinated Cyber-Physical Testing for Privacy Analysis of COTS Apple Vision Pro Applications

AVP-Inspect automated testing finds 58% of 324 Apple Vision Pro apps show privacy violations, with over 60% of network traffic flows undisclosed.

Researchers built AVP-Inspect, a dynamic analysis framework combining custom hardware device control, 3D UI exploration, and a unified privacy taxonomy for Apple Vision Pro. Testing 324 App Store apps for 20 minutes each found 188 (58.0%) with at least one privacy violation. More than 60% of observed network traffic flows were not properly disclosed, extending prior XR privacy work beyond Android-based devices such as Meta Quest.

arXiv cs.CRSep 8, 01:24 UTC · 7d agoResearch

The Coding-Agent Trap: When a "Free" LLM Endpoint Is the Adversary, (Mon, Aug 31st)

A SANS honeypot caught a real coding-agent session routed to a rogue "free" LLM endpoint, exposing a Windows user's transcript and tool outputs.

A SANS analyst describes how an internet-exposed inference honeypot was discovered, relabeled with sought-after model names like DeepSeek, and enrolled in infrastructure serving "free" LLM backends. On 2026-08-30 an opencode terminal coding agent sent an 88-message, 224 KB transcript 210 times in 91 seconds via a China Unicom relay, exposing directory listings, tool outputs and read file portions. The analyst frames tool-enabled agents treating model endpoints as trusted control planes as a novel risk — a "rogue model endpoint" that could request tool executions on the user's machine.

SANS Internet Storm CenterAug 31, 20:00 UTC · 15d agoAI safety & security1

PLC-DPO: Posterior Label Correction in Noisy and Ambiguous Preference Optimization

PLC-DPO corrects noisy preference labels during DPO by routing each pair as clean, flip, or tie using calibrated policy-reference margins.

PLC-DPO addresses reversed, weak, or ambiguous preference labels in Direct Preference Optimization by using the calibrated policy-reference margin as online evidence to route each pair's training signal as clean, flip, or tie. This actively corrects supervision direction and strength rather than only filtering suspicious examples. Across 57 dataset-model-benchmark cells, PLC-DPO achieves the best mean win rate of 60.5 versus 55.5 for the next-best method. Injected-noise and tie stress tests plus human disagreement analysis show the routing stays stable and distinguishes flipped from weakly directional pairs.

Hugging Face daily papersAug 30, 20:00 UTC · 16d agoAI research

The AI Supply Chain Has a Security Problem, and Much of It Is Sitting on the Open Internet

Researchers counted 36,769 publicly reachable self-hosted AI endpoints, only about 2% behind HTTP authentication, exposing Ollama, vLLM, and Flowise to abuse.

A Mysterium VPN study found 36,769 self-hosted AI endpoints reachable through internet scanning, with only 2.02% returning an HTTP authentication challenge. Open WebUI accounted for 18,529 reachable instances, Ollama for 6,935 fingerprinted hosts, and 5,223 agent-builder and workflow platforms were exposed, often holding API keys, database credentials, and other secrets. The report highlights LLMjacking risk from exposed Ollama APIs, a critical Flowise bug (CVE-2026-40933), leaked n8n tokens, and prior SentinelOne/Censys research finding roughly 175,000 exposed Ollama hosts in 130 countries.

Security AffairsSep 11, 17:27 UTC · 4d agoAI safety & security CVE-2026-409331

Bring Licensed Threat Intelligence into Every Conversation with SOCRadar and ChatGPT

SOCRadar launched a Threat Intelligence MCP app connecting ChatGPT to its licensed threat intelligence via OAuth-authenticated MCP server.

SOCRadar announced a Threat Intelligence MCP app that connects ChatGPT to the SOCRadar MCP server over OAuth. The integration exposes the vendor's licensed intelligence models directly in ChatGPT conversations. The announcement is a vendor product launch with no incident or vulnerability content.

SOCRadarSep 7, 10:28 UTC · 8d agoTools

Authorization Architectures for Tool-Using AI Agents

Review paper proposes an authorization reference architecture for tool-using AI agents, identifying runtime enforcement and delegation bounds as unresolved gaps.

This review examines authorization models for tool-using AI agents that invoke APIs, databases, browsers, and protocols like MCP, arguing every consequential agent action must be traceable to a human principal, bounded by delegation, and contestable. It introduces a principal hierarchy spanning human user, operator/deployer, orchestrator agent, sub-agent, and tool endpoint, and analyzes five layers including credential lifecycle, delegation propagation, runtime enforcement, prompt injection as authorization bypass, and auditability. Drawing on 89 primary sources from 2023-2026, it proposes seven structural requirements, a four-layer reference architecture, and three deployable configurations.

arXiv cs.CRSep 14, 17:21 UTC · 1d agoAI safety & security

K-Bench: a clinically calibrated benchmark for evaluating large language models in high-risk mental health conversations

Clinician-calibrated K-Bench evaluates 125 LLM configurations on 200 high-risk mental health vignettes, exposing wide variation in suicide and violence risk handling.

K-Bench is a clinician-calibrated, protected benchmark evaluating 125 model configurations from 33 base models across 14 providers on 200 multi-turn vignettes covering suicide, self-harm, domestic violence, substance misuse and no-risk presentations. A frozen GPT-4o judge achieved 94.2% exact agreement with clinician consensus across 6,751 eligible comparisons from 151 clinician-rated transcripts. Leading models combined supportive conversation with combined-risk scores above 95, while risk exploration varied substantially among weaker configurations; therapeutic prompting helped weaker models and elevated reasoning produced no average improvement. A continuously updated public leaderboard is hosted at k-bench.ai with protected test materials.

arXiv cs.AI / cs.LG / cs.CLSep 14, 16:49 UTC · 1d agoAI safety & security

AI Coding Tools Now a Prime Target for Threat Actors, Google Warns

Google Threat Intelligence Group warns threat actors increasingly target AI coding tools and proprietary AI data, with UNC6780's Dustmaker enabling large-scale supply chain compromises.

Google Threat Intelligence Group's September 8 report says AI-assisted coding tools have become prime targets, contributing to large-scale software supply chain compromises in 2025 and early 2026. Financially motivated group UNC6780 used its Dustmaker credential stealer to extract tokens from GitHub Actions runner memory and compromise packages across PyPI, npm, and Docker Hub, then sold harvested AI tool credentials to other criminals. Chinese nation-state actor UNC6508 conducted espionage against proprietary AI research at North American academic, medical, and military institutions, while extortion gangs stole models, prompts, and source code in Q2 2026. GTIG also documented agentic attacker experimentation, including an autonomous multi-agent credential harvesting campaign built in under six hours and a 'Recon' C2 framework managing over 23,800 harvested secrets.

Infosecurity MagazineSep 8, 12:02 UTC · 7d agoThreat actor in the wild 2 sources1

MicroHasTEE: Bare-Metal Haskell for Type-Level Peripheral Ownership on Armv8-M

MicroHasTEE expresses TrustZone secure and non-secure firmware as one typed Haskell program, catching peripheral-ownership inconsistencies at compile time.

MicroHasTEE is a multiparty Haskell framework that models both TrustZone firmware images as participants in a single typed program, using type-level capability ledgers to track peripheral acquisition, configuration, transfer, and finalization. MicroHs compiles the shared program twice to produce separate bare-metal Secure and Non-secure firmware images. The framework rejects inconsistent resource use, post-configuration attribution changes, wrong-domain callbacks, and calls to unregistered Secure services. A door-lock case study on an STM32U5 Nucleo board produced images of 232.7 KiB and 228.4 KiB of flash with roughly 220 KiB of SRAM per domain.

arXiv cs.CRSep 11, 08:34 UTC · 4d agoResearch1

Risky Bulletin: Academics find source code overlaps between Geedge and China's Great Firewall

Academics linked Chinese vendor Geedge Networks' Tiangou Secure Gateway source code to one of the Great Firewall's three traffic filtering capabilities.

US researchers presenting at USENIX Security reconstructed Geedge Networks' Tiangou Secure Gateway firmware from over 100,000 leaked files, including Git repositories with commit history, and matched its filtering behavior to sections of China's Great Firewall. They found only 1 of 3 characterized DNS injectors matched Geedge code, noted the system relies on memory-unsafe C components and copied third-party code, and said its bugs could aid future circumvention tools. Geedge also exports censorship tools to Kazakhstan, Ethiopia, Pakistan, and Myanmar. The newsletter additionally rounds up multiple breaches.

Risky Business NewsAug 21, 02:55 UTC · 25d agoResearch2

MathKernel: An evidence-aware multi-engine mathematics kernel and MCP server

MathKernel is an open-source, evidence-aware multi-engine mathematics kernel that exposes verification workflows to AI agents via an MCP server.

MathKernel, published on GitHub, is a mathematics kernel that combines multiple computation engines with evidence-aware outputs. It ships as an MCP server, enabling AI agents and coding assistants to perform and verify calculations. The project drew moderate attention on Hacker News.

Hacker News · securitySep 7, 00:21 UTC · 8d agoAI tools & infra HN 36↑ · 5 comments

CUA-Universe: A Scalable and Dynamic Environment for Hybrid GUI+CLI Agents

Researchers introduce CUA-Universe, a pipeline turning real desktop software into hybrid GUI+CLI agent environments, lifting a 9B model's OSWorld success rate.

CUA-Universe is an environment-to-data pipeline that converts real desktop applications into hybrid GUI+CLI environments, scaling to 16 applications via App-Forge, Task-Weave, and Path-Steer. Training on its harvested trajectories shifted a 9B model toward effective GUI+CLI orchestration, yielding +39.3 points on CUA-Verse, +16.8 points success rate on OSWorld, and +7.84 points on OSWorld-MCP while cutting steps and tokens by up to 57% and 60%. The work addresses the scarcity of scalable hybrid environments for computer-use agents.

arXiv cs.AI / cs.LG / cs.CLSep 4, 17:26 UTC · 11d agoAI research1

Best Practices for Good Endpoint Hardening | Huntress

Huntress outlines endpoint hardening best practices, citing exposed RDP, RMM tool abuse, and ClickFix social engineering as common SMB intrusion paths.

Huntress published defensive guidance on endpoint hardening for small and mid-sized businesses, drawing on observations from its SOC. The post describes common intrusion vectors: internet-exposed RDP brute-forced by automated scanners, phishing emails delivering attacker-controlled remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools, with Huntress reporting a 277% spike in RMM abuse in 2025, and ClickFix attacks using fake CAPTCHA pages that trick users into running malicious commands. Recommended controls include scanning for exposed RDP, SSH, and VPN interfaces, removing unneeded local admin rights, enabling Windows Defender tamper protection, disabling SMBv1, and standardizing on one approved remote access tool, guided by CIS and NIST frameworks.

HuntressSep 10, 15:00 UTC · 5d agoAdvisory

[AINews] 10% worse, 100x cheaper, 10000x faster: Why Simulation is taking over

Latent Space argues AI training pipeline stages—rewards, data, teachers, curricula, environments—are flipping from human-made to model-made simulation.

Latent Space's AINews essay traces how each component of AI training has turned synthetic since 2022: reward models (InstructGPT, RLAIF), synthetic pretraining data (Microsoft Phi, NVIDIA Nemotron-4 340B), model teachers (Alpaca, DeepSeek-R1 distillation), and self-generated curricula (Self-Rewarding Language Models, SPIN). In 2026 it highlights Karpathy's autoresearch loop—700 experiments yielding 20 kept improvements, cutting GPT-2 training time from 2.02 to 1.80 hours—and Z.ai's GLM-5.3 fully synthetic RL environment, judging, and verification stack. It frames these shifts as 'simulation': 10% worse but 100x cheaper and 10,000x faster than human equivalents.

Latent SpaceAug 22, 07:36 UTC · 24d agoAI industry