Paper proves no finite rulebook can certify every safe program
Watching can catch every prohibition violation, but no safe program can be cleared for good.
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Watching can catch every prohibition violation, but no safe program can be cleared for good.
Revoking injectable tools at the first untrusted read is proved relatively secure on finite runs.
A collapse theorem says physical separation makes protected executions match the fault-free run for every finite prefix.
LeanGraphSearch retrieves supporting Lean lemmas via dependency graphs and lifts theorem-proving pass rates.
Theory paper prices source-task calls that cut verification cost, with Lean-checked bounds and a transformer test.
Hierarchical TeSSLa and MonPoly monitors detect cross-device edge-IoT attacks while sending only compact verdicts upstream.
A verifier loop computes the weakest key, value, and channel assumptions a protocol needs to meet a goal.
Researchers classify neural-network security checks as co-NP-complete or harder, including backdoors and parameter faults.
LLMs produce useful cryptographic-protocol lemmas but average only 38.82% proof-tree coverage.
Researchers formally model the Terrapin SSH attack and show which AEAD modes remain secure.
Paper proposes recursive invariants, a transaction-level logic and typed DSL, to enforce multi-step UTXO workflow rules without shared mutable state.
Researchers introduce a unified probabilistic explainability framework using sparse anchored linear models that outperforms LIME and MAPLE on relevance error.

Fields Medalist Jacob Tsimerman founds the Mathematical AI Safety Institute (MAISI) to pursue provable AI safety guarantees, launching January 2027.
Researchers formally define smart-contract frontrunning resistance, showing 55% of 393 audited vulnerabilities escape state-of-the-art detection, and find two undisclosed Ethereum flaws.
LL-Verifier combines LLMs with logic model checking to automatically discover logic flaws, uncovering vulnerabilities in 27 IoT access-control protocols.
Dan Luu's eval finds coding-agent testing instructions (TDD, formal methods, PBT, skills) mostly fail to beat defaults on Zstd implementation correctness.
Researchers introduce CONTINUITY, a framework of assume-guarantee contracts that preserves LLM agent security context across components, verified across 2,560 attack instances.
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