PIA-Bench: Towards Automated Privacy Impact Assessment with Large Language Models
Researchers release PIA-Bench, the first open benchmark evaluating how accurately LLMs can automate privacy impact assessments using 73 curated federal PIAs.
PIA-Bench is the first open benchmark for evaluating large language models on real-world privacy impact assessments (PIAs). The authors audited 499 expert-authored PIAs published by US federal agencies and curated 73 structured PIAs comprising 451 privacy risk items and 831 mitigation items. Off-the-shelf LLMs were found to produce meaningful assessments while identifying clear avenues for improvement. The paper calls for domain-specific LLM agent workflows, accountable LLM infrastructure, and new quality standards for PIAs.
An Evidence-First Multi-LLM Framework for Auditable Critical-Infrastructure Dependency Modeling
Evidence-first multi-LLM framework builds auditable critical-infrastructure dependency graphs while preserving provenance and unresolved cases.
The framework constructs Infrastructure Knowledge Bases and Infrastructure Dependency Graphs from heterogeneous infrastructure documentation using multiple open-weight LLMs that independently extract candidate entities and dependencies from normalized evidence. It separates evidence verification, ontology grounding, entity resolution, dependency alignment, validation, fusion, and human review, projecting the validated IKB deterministically into the IDG without new LLM-generated knowledge. Evaluation across nine infrastructure projects shows entity recovery achieves substantially higher recall than full dependency recovery, and cross-model overlap is much lower for dependencies than entities, indicating models often produce non-overlapping candidate assertions rather than stable consensus.
The AI Malware Maturity Gap
Recorded Future introduces AIM3, a five-level maturity model for AI malware, showing current attacker AI use is mostly AI-assisted rather than autonomous.
Recorded Future proposes AIM3, a five-level model defining AI malware from LLM-translated to LLM-embedded, spanning experimentation to fully autonomous agentic campaigns. Public examples remain early-stage: PROMPTFLUX uses Google Gemini to rewrite its VBScript dropper (Level 1), while Lamehug/PROMPTSTEAL, attributed to APT28, invokes the HuggingFace API to generate reconnaissance commands (Level 3). The authors argue most current AI malware augments existing tradecraft rather than enabling one-click autonomous attacks.
InceptionRAG: Stealthy Poisoning Attack Against Retrieval-Augmented Generation
InceptionRAG fragments malicious payloads into dormant passages that trigger LLMs to self-deduce misinformation via multi-hop reasoning, bypassing existing RAG poisoning defenses.
Researchers introduce InceptionRAG, a stealthy corpus poisoning attack against retrieval-augmented generation that splits a malicious payload into a chain of individually harmless dormant passages. When retrieved together, the passages induce LLMs to self-deduce target misinformation through multi-hop reasoning, achieving over 80% attack success rate across three datasets and three LLMs under rigorous adversarial constraints. A zeroth-order suffix optimization (ZOSO) method automates authoritative suffix generation in black-box settings. The authors also propose HODOR, a document isolation defense that decouples adversarial logical dependencies.
Cost-Aware Hierarchical Multi-Agent Ransomware Detection and Family Attribution
Researchers propose a hierarchical multi-agent system that cuts ransomware analysis cost by 44% while reaching 96.57% detection accuracy.
An arXiv paper (2609.04820) presents a Cost-Aware Hierarchical Multi-Agent System (HMAS) for adaptive ransomware detection and family attribution. Specialized agents run static analysis first, with dynamic and memory modalities invoked only when confidence is insufficient or specialists disagree; a Meta Orchestrator balances accuracy against computational cost via a cost model, and a locally deployed LLM verifies difficult cases. The system achieved 96.57% accuracy, 0.96 F1-score, and 0.99 ROC-AUC for binary detection, and 0.90 macro-F1 for multiclass family attribution. Average analysis cost dropped 43.97% versus exhaustive analysis, with 56.05% of cases resolved using static evidence alone.
Maverick: Private and Verifiable LLM Inference Made Practical via Matrix-Vector Multiplication Delegation
Maverick protocol delivers private and verifiable LLM inference via matrix-vector multiplication delegation, achieving up to 45x throughput gains over local inference on Qwen3-4B.
Maverick introduces an information-theoretically sound protocol for delegating matrix-vector multiplication with transparent preprocessing, efficient batch verification, and virtually no server overhead, combined with LPN-based pseudorandom masking for input privacy. It addresses privacy and correctness concerns when users delegate open-weight LLM inference to third-party providers. An end-to-end prototype evaluated on Qwen3-4B achieved throughput gains over local inference of up to 45x with precomputed privacy masks and 44x for verification-only workloads, with a CPU server using up to 128 threads.
Towards Tackling Application Logic Flaws through Autonomous Formal-Logic Modeling and Automated Reasoning
LL-Verifier combines LLMs with logic model checking to automatically discover logic flaws, uncovering vulnerabilities in 27 IoT access-control protocols.
Researchers present LL-Verifier, a framework that uses LLMs to autonomously convert natural-language protocol descriptions and security goals into formal logic models in a new logic language built on Maude, then applies logic model checking for exhaustive verification. The framework targets application-logic flaws that are tied to business semantics and hard to scale with manual analysis. Evaluation on 27 access-control protocols of widely used IoT devices uncovered a range of sophisticated logic vulnerabilities with security and privacy implications.
PrivEscalate: Measuring and Augmenting the Threat of LLM-Automated Linux Privilege Escalation
Researchers release PrivEscalate, a 531-scenario benchmark showing LLM agents' Linux privilege-escalation success varies by vulnerability class, plus PrivEscAgent, a domain-specialized agent that boosts success.
The paper introduces PrivEscalate, an open-source benchmark of 531 Dockerized Linux privilege-escalation scenarios spanning 14 sub-categories, plus 329 parameterized variants measuring sensitivity to environmental distractors. Evaluating six LLMs across three agent architectures shows capability is heterogeneous across vulnerability classes, sensitive to perturbation, and architecture-dependent. The authors also present PrivEscAgent, a wrapper adding deterministic enumeration, category matching, and step planning that outperforms prior privesc-agent baselines without modifying the underlying LLM. The benchmark is released to support LLM agent evaluation, defensive tool validation, and red-team training.
I Am No One: Style-Aware Paraphrasing for Text Anonymization
Prompt-driven style-aware paraphrasing with LLMs cuts authorship attribution F1 by 60-70% while preserving content quality.
The paper proposes a style-aware, prompt-driven anonymization approach using pretrained LLMs to build compact stylistic profiles from minimal samples and rewrite text to suppress identifiable style markers while preserving meaning. It addresses stylometric re-identification risks in anonymized text, including ASR transcripts of meetings and call-center calls where leakage persists after acoustic anonymization. Across blog and review datasets, the approach reduces authorship attribution F1 by 60-70%, substantially outperforming both DP-based and non-DP baselines while maintaining readability.
Why The Vulnerability Backlog Is About To Get Worse
Recorded Future analysis says AI-driven vulnerability discovery and faster weaponization will grow the triage backlog while shrinking defenders' response windows.
Disclosed vulnerabilities rose from roughly 21,000 in 2021 to nearly 50,000 in 2025, while Recorded Future assessed only 446 as actively exploited in 2025. VulnCheck found nearly 29% of 2025 KEV entries were exploited on or before CVE publication. The authors argue AI-assisted discovery and automated exploit development will multiply credible reports, cut disclosure-to-exploit time toward minutes, and force re-evaluation of medium-severity flaws as exploit-chain components.
Towards Scalable and Cost-Efficient Vulnerability Detection: A Study on Automatic Query Generation
A study finds LLM-synthesized CodeQL queries improve average F1-score by 82% over baseline queries, offering scalable vulnerability detection versus direct LLM scanning.
Researchers conducted an empirical study evaluating whether LLMs can synthesize executable CodeQL queries from National Vulnerability Database vulnerability data. LLM-generated queries significantly enhanced baseline CodeQL suites, yielding an 82% improvement in average F1-score across a diverse set of real-world vulnerabilities. A cost-benefit analysis shows direct LLM-based scanning of entire repositories is often computationally and financially prohibitive, while LLM query synthesis offers a scalable and cost-effective alternative for large-scale vulnerability detection.
ROSETTA: Efficient and Accurate Privacy-Preserving LLM Decoding via Hybrid CKKS/TFHE Evaluation
ROSETTA is a hybrid CKKS/TFHE homomorphic encryption framework for privacy-preserving LLM decoding, achieving up to 4.8x Softmax and 2.1x end-to-end speedups.
The paper proposes ROSETTA, a hybrid CKKS/TFHE fully homomorphic encryption framework for private inference on generative LLMs, targeting the nonlinear operations that dominate autoregressive decoding cost. It introduces an adaptive segmented lookup-table protocol based on TFHE and a scheme-aware operator-selection framework that assigns each nonlinear operator to CKKS or TFHE to minimize latency. Experiments show up to 4.8x Softmax speedup and 1.5-2.1x end-to-end decoding speedup over the state-of-the-art CacheMir framework.
Evaluating the NIST Bugs Framework Against CWE as a Successor for Automated Vulnerability Classification
NIST Bugs Framework evaluation shows it is more structured and automation-friendly than CWE for automated vulnerability classification, with gaps in attribute guidance.
The paper evaluates NIST SP 800-231's Bugs Framework (BF) against CWE as a target for automated CVE classification using a systematically screened corpus of CVE-to-CWE research. An inter-rater study with 2 subject-matter experts mapping 13 CVEs showed strong agreement on BF's cause and operation axes but only fair agreement on the attribute axis. Automated classification was tested across two LLM deployments under different budgets, and findings support BF as more structured and automation-friendly than CWE, though gaps include under-specified attribute guidance and missing fix commits for closed-source software.
SpliTEE: Improving LLM Inference on Trusted Hardware with Differentially Private GPU Outsourcing
SpliTEE splits LLM inference between Intel TDX trusted execution and untrusted GPUs, using differential privacy instead of encryption to protect intermediate representations.
SpliTEE extends split inference to LLMs, running inference partly inside an Intel TDX TEE while masking intermediate inputs sent to untrusted GPUs with differential privacy rather than encryption. The authors show a prompt-reconstruction attack recovers nearly 80% of prompts from unmasked intermediate representations, motivating the masking. A global sensitivity analysis bounds the required DP noise scale, avoiding quantization and keeping models in floating point. The implementation is nearly twice as fast as full CPU-based TDX inference and 5-15 seconds faster than encryption-based Slalom with higher accuracy, evaluated on Llama-3.2-3B and Qwen3-4B.
Bridging the First-Hour Gap: Evaluating AI Reliability and Benchmarking Deficiencies in Cyber Incident Response for Law Enforcement
Survey of playbooks, LLMs, RAG, and agentic AI for law-enforcement cyber first responders finds RAG most viable but benchmarks inadequate for legal requirements.
The paper surveys decision-support architectures (playbooks, LLMs, RAG frameworks, agentic AI) for frontline law enforcement during the first hour of a cyber incident, where volatile digital artifacts risk procedural errors and evidence attrition. RAG-based systems are identified as a relatively viable intermediate solution, though prompt sensitivity and confident hallucinations in legal contexts pose major risks. The authors find current cybersecurity benchmarks insufficient for law enforcement safety and legal demands, and argue for a new benchmark focused on naive query robustness and evidence preservation.
BlueSTAR: Tiered Agentic Architecture for Autonomous Cyber Defense
BlueSTAR is a tiered agentic LLM architecture for autonomous cyber defense, validated on live enterprise IT/OT cyber ranges against seven attack chains.
Researchers present BlueSTAR, a tiered agentic architecture for autonomous cyber defense in enterprise IT/OT networks that transforms high-volume security telemetry into compact indicators of compromise. It pairs deterministic containment for known threats with LLM reasoning for attacks requiring contextual and cross-cycle analysis, and introduces a resilience metric jointly weighing attacker reach, mission-critical impact, and defensive disruption. Evaluation on two live cyber ranges with seven attack chains based on real-world intrusion techniques covered credential theft, repeated compromise, concurrent attackers, and attacks on physical processes.
LLM-Based Penetration Testing in the Presence of Honeypots
Studies honeypot-aware budget allocation for LLM attack agents, showing detector-guided policies let agents skip deception and compromise real hosts efficiently.
The paper formalizes LLM attacker behavior against honeypots as a budgeted decision process, where agents choose to continue or skip targets when honeypot suspicion arises. A detector-guided policy lets LLM agents allocate execution budget effectively across a mixed host pool in a controlled testbed. Findings show LLM-driven attackers can reason about heterogeneous artifacts and use honeypot suspicion to guide target selection, challenging traditional deception defenses that rely on realism and obscurity against human or script-driven attackers.
Engineered Persuasion: Evaluating Personalized Pretexts in LLM-Generated Spear Phishing
A study of 180 US workers found each LLM phishing personalization level raised click-intention odds by 28%, but credibility depends on context fit.
The arXiv paper evaluates how personalized pretexts in LLM-generated spear phishing affect perceived credibility, using 180 US working adults across 1,436 evaluations of emails with four cumulative personalization levels, from workplace context to shared-project details. Convincingness rose 2.40 points per level in sensitivity analysis and click-intention odds increased 28% per level, while non-clickers shifted toward deleting rather than reporting. Qualitative coding showed details matching the recipient's role and routines supported credibility, whereas incorrect, vague, or channel-inappropriate details raised suspicion. The authors argue personalization effectiveness depends on pretext fit, with implications for workplace security training.
Harnessing LLMs for Automating BOLA Detection
Unit 42's BOLABuster methodology uses LLMs to automate detection of broken object-level authorization vulnerabilities, uncovering flaws in Grafana, Harbor, and Easy!Appointments.
Palo Alto Unit 42 details BOLABuster, a methodology combining large language models with heuristics to automate detection of broken object-level authorization (BOLA) flaws, which traditional fuzzing and static analysis struggle to find. The approach uses LLM reasoning to understand application logic, map endpoint dependency relationships, and generate and interpret test cases. It found CVE-2024-1313 in Grafana, CVE-2024-22278 in Harbor, and 15 CVEs in Easy!Appointments. The team is continuing to hunt for BOLAs in open-source and internal projects.