Search: “Prophet Security”

The Top 4 Threats We Found by Investigating Every Alert for a Quarter

Prophet Security's quarterly threat report finds identity attacks made up roughly half of confirmed malicious activity, with stolen authenticated sessions bypassing conditional access controls.

Between May 1 and July 31, 2026, Prophet Security investigated every alert in customer environments immediately on arrival; about 7% of completed investigations were confirmed malicious. Direct account/session attacks made up roughly 18% of confirmed activity, with replayed authenticated sessions bypassing conditional access since no re-authentication occurs. Infostealer activity affected about a quarter of investigated organizations, mostly delivered via browsers through compromised websites, malicious ads, sponsored search results and ClickFix fake CAPTCHA gates, with payloads including Lumma Stealer, Vidar, HijackLoader and AsyncRAT. Credential phishing was the largest category at about 28%, with adversary-in-the-middle relays revealed by seconds-long MFA approvals from distant countries and MFA fatigue attacks exploiting automatic unlock policies.

BleepingComputer·Sep 10, 14:00 UTC · 6d agoThreat actor in the wild

PuzzleMask: Abusing Plain Prose as a Covert AI Attack Vector

Check Point details PuzzleMask, a plain-prose technique that bypasses LLM gatekeeper policy checks, letting hidden payloads reach target models unreviewed.

Check Point Research describes PuzzleMask, a prompt-crafting technique that hides policy-violating payloads inside plain-English prose wrappers, bypassing quick LLM-based policy checks without emojis, Base64, or invisible formatting. The researchers tested 23 automated prompts against gatekeepers including GPT-4o-mini, GPT-OSS-Safeguard 20b, Claude 3 Haiku, and Llama Guard 3, and all were classified as safe despite policies that flagged the plain versions. When submitted to GPT-5 in thinking-high mode with a Python interpreter, the target model extracted and acted on the payload in over 90% of trials. The technique is not itself a jailbreak but can carry a jailbreak prompt as payload; mitigations include input paraphrasing, hardened gatekeeper policies, and output monitoring.

Check Point Research·updated Sep 11, 05:53 UTC · 5d ago·first Sep 10, 14:32 UTC · 6d agoAI safety & security 2 sources

What the Data Says About AI in Security Operations in 2026

Prophet Security's 2026 survey of 250+ security pros: 40% use AI daily; AI users report 25%+ faster investigations and rising AI-driven attacks.

Prophet Security's State of AI in Security Operations 2026 report, based on a survey of 250+ cybersecurity professionals, found 40% of security teams use AI daily and only 4% have no adoption plans. Teams average 100 daily alerts (up to 1,000 at large firms), leave 28% of alerts uninvestigated, and 60% of respondents said missed alerts led to breaches or downtime. Among AI adopters, 72% report at least 25% faster investigations, 56% observed increased AI-driven attacks, and no respondents grant AI full unsupervised autonomy. Data privacy (44%) and explainability (41%) top the adoption hurdles.

The Hacker News·Aug 27, 11:30 UTC · 20d agoIndustry

Optimizing Credential Blast Radius Through Trust Boundaries and Delegation Under Post-Quantum Authentication Costs

Academic paper models credential blast radius optimization across trust domains under post-quantum latency costs, cutting expected impact by up to 36%.

The paper formulates the joint selection of trust domains and credential-derivation structures under policy and latency constraints as an NP-hard optimization problem, showing the scalarized two-domain direct-issuance case reduces to a weighted minimum cut. In 195 of 230 exhaustive synthetic comparisons, joint optimization produced lower credential blast radius than choosing boundaries first, especially under chained delegation. A trace-derived replay using measured post-quantum authentication costs found the best design reduced expected impact by up to 36% relative to a single domain within the latency budget.

arXiv cs.CR·Sep 3, 23:42 UTC · 12d agoResearch

Gartner: 70% of SOCs will pilot AI agents. Only 15% will see results

Gartner predicts 70% of large SOCs will pilot AI agents by 2028, but only 15% will achieve measurable improvements.

A Gartner report by analysts Craig Lawson and Andrew Davies projects that by 2028, 70% of large SOCs will pilot AI agents for Tier 1 and Tier 2 operations, but only 15% will achieve measurable improvements without structured evaluation. Prophet Security's State of AI in Security Operations 2026 survey found 40% of security teams use AI daily and 56% are evaluating or piloting it. The report offers evaluation questions covering workload reduction, TDIR outcomes, vendor viability, analyst upskilling, and autonomy boundaries to counter AI washing in the market.

Help Net Security·Sep 9, 05:00 UTC · 7d agoIndustry

SCHERI: Provably Secure Speculation Under the Constant-Time Policy for CHERI (Extended Version)

Researchers formally prove existing CHERI speculation proposals leak secrets and present SCHERI, a processor design with end-to-end Spectre-resistant constant-time guarantees.

The paper builds a formal framework reasoning jointly about capability safety, speculative execution, and information-flow security on CHERI architectures. It demonstrates that existing secure-speculation proposals fail to preserve constant-time confidentiality guarantees and can transiently leak isolated secrets. The authors present SCHERI, a new processor design formally proven to provide end-to-end secure speculation for the constant-time policy, resilient to Spectre attacks.

arXiv cs.CR·Sep 15, 16:33 UTC · 1d agoResearch

Week in review: Linux rootkit deployed on F5 BIG-IP APM devices, Cisco FMC bugs exploited

Weekly roundup: Cisco FMC and N-able N-central zero-days exploited in the wild, MikroTik RouterOS hijacks, Microsoft Patch Tuesday ships two exploited zero-days.

State-sponsored and financially-motivated attackers are actively exploiting CVE-2026-20079, a critical authentication bypass in Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center (FMC), alongside CVE-2026-20316. N-able issued an emergency hotfix for CVE-2026-86218, a critical pre-auth RCE in the N-central RMM platform exploited in the wild. CERT Polska disclosed six RouterOS vulnerabilities being chained to hijack internet-exposed MikroTik devices. Microsoft's September 2026 Patch Tuesday shipped a record patch count including two zero-days, while roughly 67,000 Trezor customers faced phishing after a shipping-partner breach and researchers privately disclosed a zero-click WeChat worm to Tencent.

Help Net Security·Sep 13, 08:00 UTC · 3d agoExploit / PoC in the wildCVE-2026-20079CVE-2026-20316CVE-2026-862182· 1 read

Trusting-Trust Attack against an Entire Linux Distribution (via the strip utility)

ArXiv paper shows the trusting-trust compiler backdoor technique can compromise an entire Linux distribution via the strip utility.

The paper (arXiv 2607.24888) demonstrates that Ken Thompson's trusting-trust attack, long viewed as a compiler-specific threat, can backdoor an entire Linux distribution by targeting the strip utility. A compromised tool reproduces its backdoor in subsequent rebuilds of itself, generalizing the attack surface beyond compilers. The finding has supply-chain implications for build reproducibility and distribution trust, though it is a research result with no observed real-world exploitation.

Lobsters · security·Sep 5, 10:58 UTC · 11d agoResearch

The Collective Cyber Defense letter wrote your next vendor questionnaire

Op-ed argues the 200-company Collective Cyber Defense letter's three endorsed metrics should become standard vendor procurement questions.

More than 200 companies including Microsoft, Google, AWS, CrowdStrike, Anthropic and Okta signed an August 27 open letter calling for faster cyber defenses against AI-enabled attacks. The letter endorses three measurable metrics: coverage, containment speed, and verified remediation. The author turns those into five concrete procurement questions buyers should pose at vendor renewals, while noting the letter contains no deadlines, dollar figures or measurable targets.

CyberScoop·Sep 1, 10:00 UTC · 15d agoIndustry

Grok exfiltrates user data when malicious instructions are encrypted

Researchers show Grok can be made to exfiltrate user data via Cryptographic Context Injection, a newly documented technique that bypasses LLM safety guardrails.

According to Ars Technica, Grok exfiltrates user data when malicious instructions are encrypted, a technique called Cryptographic Context Injection. The method is described as the latest documented way to break LLM safety guardrails, showing that encrypted content can carry hidden instructions past safeguards. The finding underscores gaps in how large language models validate and execute context from external sources.

Ars Technica · Security·Aug 20, 13:00 UTC · 27d agoAI safety & security1

Photos: Black Hat USA 2026

Help Net Security·Aug 6, 00:00 UTC · Aug 6, 2026Vulnerability

Has anybody seen my keys? A key-hierarchy strategy for rack-level security

Oxide's RFD 0301 proposes a rack-level key hierarchy using Shamir secret sharing and a trust quorum to protect data-at-rest keys.

Oxide's request for discussion (RFD 0301) lays out a key-hierarchy strategy for rack-level security, deriving keys from a rack secret protected by Shamir secret sharing across a trust quorum of sleds, with keys exchanged over authenticated sprockets sessions. The document maps which keys protect control-plane data, metrics, Crucible extents, and authentication tokens, and defines open questions on key lifecycle, locality, and compromise handling. Future work includes sealing shares with the root of trust so an attacker would need to steal K whole sleds to reconstruct the rack secret.

Hacker News · security·Sep 7, 02:14 UTC · 9d agoResearchHN 52↑ · 3 comments

Understanding the Security Boundary of Obfuscation-based On-Device LLM Protection

Researchers formalize obfuscation primitives for TEE-protected on-device LLMs and show a Collapse attack breaks ArrowCloak, TSQP, and LoRO, then extend the boundary.

The paper formalizes obfuscation primitives for TEE-Shielded LLM Partition (TSLP) schemes that offload computationally intensive layers from a Trusted Execution Environment to external GPUs. A novel primitive-guided attack, Collapse, demonstrates a shared vulnerability in prominent published methods including ArrowCloak (Security'25), TSQP (S&P'25), and LoRO (NeurIPS'25). The authors then introduce two new obfuscation primitives and integrate them with existing constructs to formulate an extended security boundary (O_ext).

arXiv cs.CR·Sep 9, 12:51 UTC · 7d agoAI safety & security

Post-quantum cryptography adoption and the national security implications

Opinion analysis argues quantum computing favors nation-state espionage, leaving lagging post-quantum adoption at critical infrastructure exposed to harvest-now-decrypt-later attacks.

A CSO Online opinion piece argues that the extreme cost and infrastructure requirements of quantum computers will concentrate cryptographically relevant quantum capability among nation-states and a few corporations, favoring espionage and economic espionage over criminal monetization. It highlights harvest-now-decrypt-later risk to long-lived secrets, expert warnings such as Filippo Valsorda's, and diverging CRQC timelines with Google suggesting possibly 2029. The piece predicts governments, banks, and targeted sectors will adopt PQC first while utilities, small hospitals, and local government lag, widening exploitable gaps in critical infrastructure reminiscent of Salt Typhoon-style access.

CSO Online·Sep 9, 09:00 UTC · 7d agoIndustry

Why a cryptographic inventory is key for addressing the quantum computing threat

Tenable argues organizations need cryptographic inventories and phased plans to counter harvest-now-decrypt-later quantum attacks.

Tenable's blog warns that quantum computers will eventually break current public-key cryptographic algorithms, and that "harvest now, decrypt later" collection makes the risk operational today. It recommends building a comprehensive cryptographic inventory and executing a phased operational strategy to migrate toward quantum-resistant protection for stored and transmitted data.

Tenable Blog·Aug 28, 14:01 UTC · 19d agoIndustry

Off Guard: Breaking LiteLLM from authentication bypass to cloud compromise

Wiz found LiteLLM auth bypass (CVE-2026-59822) and post-auth RCE (CVE-2026-59821) chainable to cloud compromise; the bypass is in CISA KEV with in-the-wild exploitation.

Wiz scanned roughly 3,074 internet-facing LiteLLM deployments and found 9.6% accepted the default master key sk-1234 or required no authentication, making post-auth attacks effectively pre-auth. The MCP endpoint accepts any Bearer token and grants a valid session (CVE-2026-59822), confirmed exploited in the wild via honeypots and added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. Custom code guardrails allow post-auth root-level RCE via exec(compile(...)) (CVE-2026-59821), while pass-through endpoints lack URL validation, enabling cloud credential theft in post-auth scenarios. All assigned vulnerabilities have been patched; the research was presented at DEF CON 34.

Wiz Blog·Sep 9, 16:06 UTC · 7d agoExploit / PoC in the wildCVE-2026-59822CVE-2026-598211

Google Cloud Targets 2027 for First Major Post-Quantum Security Milestone

Google Cloud set 2027 for its first major post-quantum cryptography milestone to counter store-now-decrypt-later risks, migrating through 2028.

Google Cloud announced a post-quantum cryptography roadmap targeting its first major security milestone in 2027. The plan aims to mitigate store-now-decrypt-later harvest risks, with wider migration goals extending through 2028. The roadmap affects cryptographic protections for Google Cloud services and customer migration planning timelines.

Infosecurity Magazine·Aug 13, 15:00 UTC · Aug 13, 2026Industry

3BB Attacker Used MeshCentral Backdoor for Root Access, Targeted Subscriber Credentials

Hunt.io found an attacker holding root access inside Thai ISP 3BB via a MeshCentral backdoor, targeting subscriber RADIUS credential databases.

Hunt.io discovered an exposed attacker server on June 3, 2026 revealing an ongoing intrusion at 3BB, one of Thailand's largest broadband providers. The attacker maintained hidden MeshCentral agents reporting to www.ayuthayatech[.]com (device group TH-3BB) and held root on internal servers. Recovered scripts sprayed passwords over SSH against more than 55 internal machines, planted web shells, added SSH keys, searched for stored credentials, and targeted RADIUS subscriber credential databases, though exfiltration was not confirmed. The toolkit included a full exploit for FortiGate SSL-VPN flaw CVE-2024-21762 against mail.3bb.co[.]th, but the initial access vector is unestablished, and a cleanup script erased logs while preserving the backdoor.

The Hacker News·updated Sep 15, 05:20 UTC · 1d ago·first Sep 14, 18:01 UTC · 2d agoData breach in the wild 3 sourcesCVE-2024-217621

Attackers Hijack MikroTik Routers Through Internet-Exposed SSH Without Authentication

CERT Polska warns attackers exploit internet-exposed MikroTik SSH for unauthenticated full admin control; attacks observed since at least September 2.

CERT Polska warned on September 5 that attackers exploit MikroTik routers with internet-reachable SSH to gain full administrative control without authentication, calling the two-flaw combination 'MikroTrick'. Successful attacks date to at least September 2; no victim count or attacker identity was disclosed. MikroTik shipped fixed RouterOS releases: 6.49.21, 7.23.4 (with 7.23.5 fixing an IPv6 DHCP regression), 7.24.2, and 7.25beta3. CERT recommends immediate updates, checking for unauthorized configuration changes, and restricting SSH, WWW/WWW-SSL, and bandwidth-test services on unpatched devices.

The Hacker News·Sep 6, 09:32 UTC · 10d agoExploit / PoC in the wild

Access Control as Verified Parse Constraints

Researchers verify a class of EverParse validators that correctly enforce access-control policies, deploying a machine-checked enforcement gate on seL4.

The paper targets enforcement-code bugs in commercial security gateways by proving that forward-only, backtrack-free EverParse validators are verified recognizers for a bounded finite-state class that includes access-control decision functions with fixed-offset fields and bounded disjunction. Encoding a bounded policy language into a fixed-size byte buffer allows an SMT solver to verify the enforcement code once, covering all byte values, policies, requests, and sessions. Editing rule content over a fixed endpoint set requires no new proof, while adding endpoints reruns the toolchain. A deployment on the seL4 microkernel ensures every request passes through the gate and unverified components cannot corrupt the enforcement chain.

arXiv cs.CR·Sep 11, 06:33 UTC · 5d agoResearch

Protecting Tokens and Assertions from Forgery, Theft, and Misuse: Implementation Recommendations for Agencies and Cloud Service Providers

NIST and CISA publish final interagency report with implementation guidance for protecting tokens and assertions from forgery and misuse.

CISA released a final NIST/CISA interagency report guiding federal agencies and cloud service providers on protecting identity assertions, access tokens, and cryptographic mechanisms underlying modern authentication and authorization. It addresses forgery, theft, and misuse of signed tokens that adversaries use for lateral movement and data access in hybrid and multi-cloud, SSO, federation, and API-based environments. The final version updates token validation, secrets management, and detection-at-scale guidance gathered via the Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative, and supports Executive Order 14306 and Secure by Design principles.

CISA Advisories·Sep 15, 12:00 UTC · 1d agoAdvisory

Stealing AI Reasoning Traces

Researchers demonstrate a decryption jailbreak that extracts encrypted reasoning traces from Anthropic, OpenAI, and Google LLM APIs via weaker sibling models.

The paper exploits the fact that encrypted chain-of-thought blocks returned by LLM providers are interchangeable across sessions, users, and models within a provider's ecosystem. Injecting an encrypted trace into a weaker, less-safeguarded model from the same provider forces it to output the trace in plaintext, bypassing anti-distillation mechanisms. Decoding 315,320 reasoning blocks scraped from public repositories recovered 367 PII artifacts and 182 credentials, showing large-scale private data leakage. The flaw also enables hidden hazardous information disclosure and invisible prompt injections embedded in encrypted blocks; mitigations were proposed after responsible disclosure.

Schneier on Security·Sep 8, 10:20 UTC · 8d agoAI safety & security

PDoS: A Profitable Denial-of-Service Attack against Proof-of-Work Blockchain Liveness

PDoS attack disrupts Proof-of-Work blockchain liveness profitably by combining miner deterrence signals with parasitic revenue extraction from victim pools.

PDoS is a hybrid incentive-driven denial-of-service attack that combines block header signal deterrence with parasitic revenue extraction from a victim pool's share-reward mechanism. By subsidizing attack costs through the victim pool, it lowers the hash-power threshold required to induce rational miners to shut down, unlike prior attacks such as BDoS that demand sustained attacker losses. The authors show a counterintuitive result: in high-fee or high-MEV environments, higher block value increases the attacker's parasitic revenue and can push the attack past break-even into a self-sustaining or even profitable regime. PDoS is claimed as the first attack demonstrating that disrupting PoW blockchain liveness can be economically self-sustaining.

arXiv cs.CR·Sep 11, 05:16 UTC · 5d agoResearch

NIST Issues New Guidance to Protect SSO and API Tokens From Theft and Forgery

NIST released IR 8587 giving agencies and cloud providers recommendations to prevent identity token forgery, theft, and misuse in SSO and API environments.

NIST Internal Report 8587, released September 15, 2026, provides implementation recommendations covering token creation, signing, validation, storage, revocation, and lifecycle management for SAML, OpenID Connect, and OAuth 2.0 environments. It builds on SP 800-53 Rev. 5.1.1 and incorporates lessons from breaches involving stolen signing keys, abused OAuth applications, and replayed federated assertions. Recommendations include strong signing algorithms, strict claim validation, short token lifetimes, token binding, leakage prevention, and monitoring for abnormal token use.

GBHackers·07:44 UTC · 10h agoAdvisory 2 sources

Phishers are hijacking legitimate cloud infrastructure

Kaspersky Securelist·Aug 4, 12:00 UTC · Aug 4, 2026Threat actor1

SpecGuard: Inference-Time Backdoor Detection For Free

SpecGuard detects backdoored LLM behavior at inference time using speculative decoding acceptance rates, adding no extra model computation.

Researchers propose SpecGuard, an inference-time backdoor detector that repurposes draft-token acceptance rates from speculative decoding as a detection signal at zero added model-computation cost. When a trigger shifts the target model toward attacker-controlled behavior, the clean draft model's acceptance rate changes, exposing the backdoor; the paper formalizes when this signal appears and shows suppressing it weakens the backdoor. Experiments across diverse backdoor types and model families show reliable detection, including stealthy cases invisible to input-level filters. Speculative decoding is positioned as a free, always-on monitor for frequently updated deployed models.

arXiv cs.CR·Sep 10, 16:51 UTC · 6d agoAI safety & security 2 sources2

Hackers exploit new MikroTik RouterOS flaws to hijack routers

Attackers actively exploit a MikroTik RouterOS SSH authentication bypass and privilege escalation chain, dubbed MikroTrick, to fully hijack internet-exposed routers.

Poland's CERT, with help from GPT-5.5-cyber and GPT-5.6-sol, discovered and confirmed active exploitation of a MikroTik RouterOS chain dubbed MikroTrick: SSH authentication bypass CVE-2026-67276 (incomplete RSA public key validation) chained with privilege escalation CVE-2026-86060 (crafted usernames granting full administrative privileges). A third flaw, CVE-2026-67277, allows unauthenticated kernel memory leaks or router crashes via the bandwidth-test service. Fixes shipped September 3 in RouterOS 7.25beta3, 7.24.2, 7.23.4, and 6.49.21, adding a startup compromise-detection mechanism. Shadowserver data showed 122,500 MikroTik devices with exposed SSH interfaces as of September 5, and the CERT published IoCs including two attacker IP addresses.

BleepingComputer·Sep 7, 10:32 UTC · 9d agoExploit / PoC in the wildCVE-2026-67276CVE-2026-86060CVE-2026-67277

A new open standard locks AI weights to approved hardware

OPAQUE releases Weight Custody Manifest, an open standard keeping AI model weights encrypted until receiving hardware cryptographically attests to builder-specified conditions.

OPAQUE, a confidential computing company, released the Weight Custody Manifest (WCM) standard as a developer-preview specification with a Python SDK and a public test suite of 91 cases. WCM keeps model weights encrypted until the receiving infrastructure proves via CPU/GPU attestation that it matches builder-signed conditions, and decryption access can be revoked later if conditions change. OPAQUE says it ran the attestation exchange on an NVIDIA H100 and on AMD and Intel confidential servers hosted on Azure and Google Cloud, with two independent SDK builds producing identical output across 5,948 files. The public quickstart only exercises protocol logic on synthetic evidence and skips GPU cryptographic verification, and the standard cannot distinguish an authorized key from one physically extracted from hardware.

Help Net Security·Sep 10, 04:10 UTC · 6d agoAI safety & security

GAUGE: A Formal Framework for Measuring Cryptographic Security under Heterogeneous Adversary Cost Models

GAUGE frames cryptographic security as profiles over adversary cost models, certifying a ranking reversal between ML-KEM-512 and AES-128 from a 4–5% memory pricing shift.

GAUGE represents cryptographic security as a function over admissible adversary cost models (a security profile), proves profiles are piecewise-linear and concave, and establishes a rating trilemma when two profiles cross. A polynomial-time linear-programming procedure certifies whether the ranking of two schemes is robust, reverses under admissible models, or is genuinely incomparable. Applied to NIST post-quantum standards, the framework certifies a ML-KEM-512 versus AES-128 ranking reversal from a 4–5% shift in memory pricing and measures lattice-sieving cost drift of 9.79 bits per year over eight years. A hybrid X25519 + ML-KEM-768 handshake reduces combined-break probability twenty-fold at a 2.3 kilobyte cost.

arXiv cs.CR·Sep 15, 14:55 UTC · 1d agoResearch

Scalable Composition of Byzantine Agreements under Reorder Attacks

Researchers present the first adversary model combining party corruption with channel reordering attacks, establishing tight security thresholds for composed Byzantine agreement protocols.

The paper presents the first adversary model combining party corruption with adversarial channel attacks that reorder messages across multiple Byzantine agreement executions. It proves impossibility results for authenticated BA under parallel composition when n ≤ 3t or n ≤ 2c + 2t + 1, with matching possibility results when n > max{3t, 2c + 2t + 1}. The authors provide general black-box compilers plus erasure-correcting-code variants that achieve constant multiplicative communication overhead for long messages.

arXiv cs.CR·Sep 9, 02:35 UTC · 7d agoResearch

From Hypervisor to Container: Cloud Security Vulnerabilities, Defense Mechanisms, and Open Challenges

Survey of 120+ cloud security papers (2008-2025) reviews hypervisor and container isolation attacks, scoring defenses with the ADPO framework and CIA impact scale.

This survey reviews over 120 security publications from 2008 to 2025 on breaches of cloud isolation boundaries via virtual machines and containers. Threats examined include VM escape, VM hopping, CPU cache side-channels, container breakouts, vulnerable container images, and DDoS attacks. The authors introduce ADPO, a 0-3 scoring framework rating defenses on accuracy, deployment ease, performance impact, and operational overhead, plus a 1-5 CIA severity mapping for attack impact.

arXiv cs.CR·Sep 15, 05:57 UTC · 1d agoResearch

Keys to the Kingdom: Erlang/OTP SSH Vulnerability Analysis and Exploits Observed in the Wild

Attackers actively exploit CVE-2025-32433, a CVSS 10.0 unauthenticated RCE in Erlang/OTP SSH, heavily targeting OT and critical infrastructure networks.

CVE-2025-32433 enables unauthenticated RCE in Erlang/OTP's SSH daemon via SSH connection protocol messages (codes >= 80) processed before authentication, affecting versions before OTP-27.3.3, OTP-26.2.5.11 and OTP-25.3.2.20. Unit 42 recorded a spike in exploitation between May 1-9, 2025, with 70% of detections on firewalls protecting OT networks, disproportionately affecting healthcare, agriculture, media and high technology. Observed payloads bind TCP-connected shells or launch Bash reverse shells to hosts like 146.103.40.203:6667, with randomized DNS lookups under dns.outbound.watchtowr.com indicating OAST-driven blind RCE validation.

Palo Alto Unit 42·Aug 17, 13:03 UTC · Aug 17, 2026Exploit / PoC in the wildCVE-2025-32433

Closing the Loop: Bidirectional Fully Encrypted Protocols

Researchers show naively composing unidirectional fully encrypted protocols is detectable and construct provably secure bidirectional FEPs, validated in Rust.

The paper introduces formal security definitions for bidirectional fully encrypted protocols (BiFEPs), covering exact shaping, delivery, protocol-state integrity, private half-close, and cross-direction isolation. It shows trivially composing two unidirectional FEPs enables detection attacks via cross-direction dependencies like traffic imbalance and connection tear-down. The authors construct provably secure BiFEPs for datastream and datagram settings, validated with a Rust implementation; no surveyed deployed protocol provides the full set of properties.

arXiv cs.CR·Sep 15, 16:32 UTC · 1d agoResearch

Large Universe Subset Predicate Encryption with IND-CCA Security (with Constant-size Ciphertext and Keys)

New construction achieves first large-universe subset predicate encryption with IND-CCA security and constant-size ciphertexts and keys under subgroup decision assumptions.

The paper proposes the first large-universe subset predicate encryption scheme achieving IND-CCA security with both constant-size ciphertexts and constant-size secret keys. Prior large-universe constructions by Chatterjee and Mukherjee either achieved only restricted selective security with constant sizes or adaptive security with attribute-dependent ciphertext size, and none achieved CCA security. The new construction is proven selectively secure under standard subgroup decision problems. Black-box transformations yield the first CCA-secure WIBE and WKD-IBE with constant-size ciphertexts and keys.

arXiv cs.CR·Sep 14, 10:02 UTC · 2d agoResearch