Subgroup of Russia’s Sandworm compromising US and European organizations, Microsoft says
Vulnerabilities mentionedAll →
| CVE | Vulnerability | CVSS | EPSS | Flags | Affected | Exposure | Published |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2021-34473 | SSRF (CWE-918) in Microsoft Exchange Server Enabling RCE (ProxyShell) Microsoft Exchange Server contains a server-side request forgery (SSRF, CWE-918) in the Autodiscover service that unauthenticated remote attackers can reach over HTTP. This flaw is the first stage of the widely documented 'ProxyShell' chain, in which the SSRF is combined with privilege escalation and an arbitrary file write in the Exchange PowerShell backend to achieve unauthenticated remote code execution on the server. An attacker who successfully exploits it gains the ability to run code on the Exchange server, and ransomware operators (e.g., Cuba ransomware) leveraged this chain to deploy payloads. Organizations running on-premises Microsoft Exchange Server (2013, 2016, and 2019 per the vendor's advisories) are affected; hosted Exchange Online is a separately managed cloud service. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild: CISA added the flaw to the KEV catalog on 2021-11-03 with known ransomware use, and EPSS assigns it a 100% probability of exploitation within 30 days (100th percentile). Do: Apply Microsoft's July 2021 (or later) Exchange Server security updates, which include the ProxyShell fixes, to all on-premises servers. If patching is delayed, restrict internet access to the Autodiscover/EWS frontend endpoints and consider the URL Rewrite mitigation Microsoft published for ProxyShell. Given the KEV listing and known ransomware use, treat internet-facing, unpatched Exchange servers as potentially compromised and hunt for webshells, unusual Exchange processes, and suspicious account or mailbox activity. | 9.1 | 100% | KEV ransomware PoC |
| masshundreds of thousands of on-prem Exchange servers; public internet scans at the time of disclosure showed roughly 400,000+ internet-exposed Exchange instances,… | |
| CVE-2022-41352 | Path Traversal Arbitrary File Upload in Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite CVE-2022-41352 is an unauthenticated arbitrary file upload flaw in Zimbra Collaboration Suite (ZCS) 8.8.15 and 9.0, rooted in a path traversal weakness (CWE-22) in how the amavis mail scanner hands archives to the cpio utility. An attacker sends a specially crafted archive via email; cpio follows traversal entries and extracts attacker-controlled files into the web root at /opt/zimbra/jetty/webapps/zimbra/public. Uploaded files in that web-accessible directory can lead to remote code execution and incorrect access to other users' accounts, giving network-level attackers high impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CVSS 9.8). Any ZCS 8.8.15 or 9.0 deployment that processes mail with cpio is affected, particularly on Red Hat/CentOS 7 and later where the pax utility (which Zimbra recommends as the safe alternative) is not installed by default. The flaw is actively exploited in the wild: it was added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog on 2022-10-20 with known ransomware use, carries a 95.5% EPSS score, and public reporting ties Zimbra exploitation to campaigns including Russia-linked Sandworm/Seashell Blizzard access operations. Do: Apply updates per vendor instructions, and as an immediate mitigation install the pax package on the Zimbra host (amavis automatically prefers pax over cpio once it is present; note pax is not in default Red Hat installations after RHEL/CentOS 6, while it is a prerequisite on Ubuntu). Also inspect /opt/zimbra/jetty/webapps/zimbra/public for unexpected uploaded files and review mail flow logs for suspicious archive attachments, given confirmed in-the-wild and ransomware-related exploitation. | 9.8 | 95% | KEV ransomware PoC |
| largetens of thousands of internet-exposed Zimbra servers (public scan counts have shown roughly 40,000-60,000 exposed instances) | |
| CVE-2023-23397 | Zero-Click Elevation of Privilege in Microsoft Outlook (Forced NTLM Credential Leak) CVE-2023-23397 is an elevation of privilege vulnerability in Microsoft Outlook caused by improper input validation (CWE-20) combined with authentication bypass via spoofed authentication data on the channel (CWE-294), allowing an attacker to force Outlook to authenticate to an attacker-controlled SMB/WebDAV server. It is triggered when Outlook processes a crafted email or calendar object — for example a meeting or task reminder whose sound property points to an attacker-supplied UNC path — and requires no user interaction. That authentication exchange leaks the victim's NTLM credential hash, which the attacker can crack offline or relay to authenticate as the victim and access resources such as Exchange mailboxes, effectively escalating privileges. Affected software spans Microsoft 365 Apps, Microsoft Office (including the Long Term Servicing Channel), and Microsoft Outlook, which are deployed across enterprises, governments, and militaries worldwide. It is actively exploited in the wild — added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2023-03-14 with a 97.4% EPSS — and Microsoft has warned of exploitation by Russia-aligned threat actors in campaigns against government and military mail servers, with patches shipped in Microsoft's March 2023 security updates. Do: Apply Microsoft's March 2023 security updates to Microsoft 365 Apps, Office/LTSC, and Outlook immediately, per CISA's required action. As interim mitigation, enable Extended Protection for Authentication or add accounts to the Protected Users group to block the NTLM credential leak, and audit calendar and task reminder sound properties for UNC paths (Microsoft published an audit/cleanup script for this) while watching for unexpected outbound SMB/WebDAV connections from hosts running Outlook. | 9.8 | 97% | KEV |
| masson the order of hundreds of millions of users (Outlook ships with Microsoft Office/Microsoft 365, the dominant enterprise and government email suite) | |
| CVE-2023-32315 | Unauthenticated Path Traversal in Ignite Realtime Openfire Admin Console CVE-2023-32315 is an unauthenticated path traversal flaw (CWE-22) in the Ignite Realtime Openfire XMPP server that allows a remote attacker to reach pages of the Openfire Admin Console that are reserved for administrative users. It is triggered by sending a crafted HTTP request to the admin console web interface containing path traversal sequences, which bypasses the authentication check protecting those restricted pages. Successful exploitation exposes administrative console functionality to an unauthenticated attacker, potentially enabling further compromise of the server and the chat environment it hosts. Any organization running Openfire is affected, particularly instances whose admin console interface is reachable from the internet. The flaw was added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2023-08-24 and carries an EPSS probability of 100% (top percentile), indicating active exploitation in the wild; ransomware use is not yet documented. Do: Upgrade Openfire to the patched release recommended in the Ignite Realtime advisory for CVE-2023-32315, per the CISA KEV required action; if patching must be delayed, restrict the admin console (default ports 9090/9091) to trusted networks or place it behind a VPN. Review access logs for requests to admin console pages containing traversal sequences, and check for unauthorized admin accounts or configuration changes, since KEV listing confirms exploitation in the wild. | 7.5 | 100% | KEV PoC ×2 |
| large≈ tens of thousands of internet-exposed Openfire servers (~30,000–40,000 per public scans) | |
| CVE-2023-42793 | Authentication bypass in JetBrains TeamCity enables unauthenticated RCE JetBrains TeamCity Server, a widely used CI/CD build server, contains an authentication bypass vulnerability (CWE-288) that lets a remote, unauthenticated attacker gain administrative access without valid credentials. By sending crafted requests to the TeamCity server over the network, the attacker bypasses authentication and can then execute arbitrary code on the server via administrative and build features, achieving full remote code execution. An attacker gains control of the build server and, with it, access to source code, build artifacts, stored secrets and credentials, and a foothold for lateral movement or ransomware deployment. Any organization running an affected TeamCity Server is affected, especially instances reachable from the internet. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild: CISA added the flaw to its KEV catalog on 2023-10-04 with known ransomware use, and EPSS assigns a 100% probability of exploitation within 30 days. Do: Upgrade TeamCity Server to 2023.05.4 or later per JetBrains' instructions, or apply vendor mitigations or discontinue use if patching is not possible (per the CISA KEV required action). Also take unpatched instances off the public internet, and hunt for signs of compromise such as unauthorized administrator accounts, unexpected changes in audit logs and build configurations, and stored secrets or tokens that may have been stolen, given known ransomware exploitation. | 9.8 | 100% | KEV ransomware PoC ×2 |
| largeTens of thousands of TeamCity Server deployments, of which several thousand are internet-exposed | |
| CVE-2023-48788 | Unauthenticated SQL Injection in Fortinet FortiClient EMS Fortinet FortiClient EMS — the central management server for FortiClient endpoint deployments — contains a SQL injection flaw (CWE-89) in versions 7.0.1 through 7.0.10 and 7.2.0 through 7.2.2. The CVSS 3.1 vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N) shows it can be triggered remotely with no credentials and no user interaction: an unauthenticated attacker sends specially crafted packets to the vulnerable management server and can execute unauthorized code or commands. Successful exploitation effectively yields remote code execution on the EMS server and access to its database, enabling follow-on actions such as credential theft, abuse of endpoint management functions, and ransomware deployment. Any organization running the affected EMS versions is exposed, especially where the management server is reachable from the internet. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild: CISA added the bug to the KEV catalog on 2024-03-25 with known ransomware use, and EPSS assigns a ~98.4% probability of exploitation within 30 days (100th percentile). Do: Upgrade FortiClient EMS to the fixed releases per Fortinet's advisory for this CVE (7.2.3 and 7.0.11 or later, i.e., beyond the 7.2.2 and 7.0.10 affected ranges); the CISA KEV required action is to apply vendor mitigations or discontinue use if mitigations are unavailable. Until patched, limit exposure of the EMS web interface to untrusted networks and hunt for signs of compromise — anomalous requests to the management console, unexpected database or admin activity, and follow-on ransomware behavior — since exploitation with known ransomware use is confirmed. | 9.8 | 98% | KEV ransomware |
| largetens of thousands of EMS deployments worldwide, with a smaller subset (likely thousands) internet-exposed | |
| CVE-2024-1709 | Authentication Bypass in ConnectWise ScreenConnect Creates Rogue Admin Accounts ConnectWise ScreenConnect (ConnectWise Control), a widely used remote-access and remote-monitoring tool, contains an authentication bypass (CWE-288) in its management interface. An attacker needs only network access to the management interface to trigger the flaw, with no valid credentials or user interaction required. A successful attacker gains administrative control of the ScreenConnect server by creating a new administrator-level account, providing a foothold that has already been used in ransomware campaigns against downstream managed environments. Any organization running ConnectWise ScreenConnect is affected, especially managed service providers and IT teams whose management interface is reachable from the internet; the source data specifies affected products but no version ranges. Exploitation is confirmed and urgent: CISA added the flaw to the KEV on 2024-02-22 with known ransomware use, EPSS assigns a 100% probability of exploitation within 30 days, and ConnectWise warned that no patch was available at the time of disclosure. Do: Follow ConnectWise's instructions immediately: no patch existed at disclosure, so apply the vendor's mitigations or, per the CISA KEV required action, restrict internet exposure of the management interface or discontinue use until mitigations are available, then upgrade to the vendor's patched release as soon as it ships. Audit ScreenConnect servers for unexpectedly created administrator-level accounts and unusual remote sessions, which are the attack's artifacts. Prioritize any instance whose management interface is reachable from the internet, given confirmed in-the-wild exploitation and known ransomware use. | 10.0 | 100% | KEV ransomware PoC ×3 |
| masstens of thousands of internet-exposed ScreenConnect servers (on the order of 10,000-30,000 instances in public internet scans at disclosure), managing millions… |
Full article1,139 words · extracted from therecord.media · click to collapse
A subgroup of a notorious Russian state-backed hacking group has been running a multi-year campaign to gain initial access to dozens of strategically important organizations across the U.S. and Europe. Microsoft’s threat intelligence team published an examination on Wednesday of the “BadPilot campaign” — an effort by a Russian group known as Sandworm, or Seashell Blizzard, to breach sectors like energy, including oil and gas, telecommunications, shipping, arms manufacturing, and the government. Operators behind the campaign have been able to retain access to high-priority targets, helping the Russian military and government to “adapt swiftly and dynamically to the evolving geopolitical landscape,” Microsoft Threat Intelligence said, warning that the “cluster's operations present significant risk to the global community at large.” “Given that Seashell Blizzard is Russia’s cyber tip of the spear in Ukraine, Microsoft Threat Intelligence assesses that this access subgroup will continue to innovate new horizontally scalable techniques to compromise networks both in Ukraine and globally in support of Russia’s war objectives and evolving national priorities,” Microsoft researchers said in the report. The subgroup’s activity has provided Russia with “expansive opportunities for niche operations and activities that will continue to be valuable over the medium term,” according to the experts. Sandworm, which researchers have tied to Russian Military Intelligence Unit 74455, has been active since at least 2013 and is responsible for some of Russia’s most high-profile destructive attacks, including KillDisk and FoxBlade as well as headline-grabbing incidents like NotPetya and Prestige. The group has been repeatedly leveraged during military conflicts and has proven to be highly-skilled at targeting critical infrastructure systems. It has played a central role in Russia’s invasion and attacks on Ukraine. In 2022, the U.S. State Department announced a $10 million reward for information about six hackers working within Seashell Blizzard. The six were implicated in the creation and propagation of the NotPetya malware in charges filed by the Justice Department in 2020. Sherrod DeGrippo, Microsoft’s director of Threat Intelligence Strategy, told Recorded Future News that the concern with the activity they identified is that it shows a significant departure from Russia’s typical operating behavior of narrowly-focused cyber operations. “The activity has been indiscriminate at times, affecting a wide range of industries across numerous countries and regions, well outside the borders of Ukraine,” she said. “Further, Russia-sponsored military threat actors are considered highly reactive to escalations within the geopolitical environment. This global exploitation activity has helped Russian Intelligence gain access to sensitive industries in numerous locations around the world.” Russia has previously deployed Sandworm for espionage and information operations as well as cyber-enabled disruptions. The cluster of activity covered in the report focuses on the specific subgroup responsible for gaining initial access into targets that may support future Russian intelligence priorities. Over the years, the operation has expanded beyond Eastern Europe into the U.S. and U.K. “While some of the subgroup’s targeting is opportunistic, its compromises cumulatively offer Seashell Blizzard options when responding to Russia’s evolving strategic objectives,” the researchers explained. The group has focused on compromising internet-facing infrastructure to enable Sandworm to persist on high-value targets and support tailored network operations. Since early 2024, Microsoft incident responders observed the hackers exploiting vulnerabilities like CVE-2024-1709 — which affects IT remote management and monitoring software ConnectWise ScreenConnect — and CVE-2023-48788, which impacts Fortinet FortiClient EMS security software. These operations evolved out of previous access efforts between 2021 and 2023 that focused on Ukraine and specific sectors in Central and South Asia, and the Middle East. In 2022, its primary focus was on the energy, retail, education, consulting, and agriculture sectors in Ukraine but the next year it expanded globally. “It frequently prioritized sectors that either provided material support to the war in Ukraine or were geopolitically significant,” the researchers said. “In 2024, while the exposure of multiple vulnerabilities likely offered the subgroup more access than ever, it appeared to have honed its focus to the United States, Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom.” There is some evidence that the group is somewhat opportunistic given that it was observed carrying out attacks on organizations that have no utility to Russian strategic interests. The company’s incident responders saw “significant later post-compromise activity” in targets that are strategically significant to Russia. Microsoft was able to tie the subgroup to Sandworm based on the tactics used, the tools deployed and distinct post-compromise activities. “We have also observed the initial access subgroup to pursue access to an organization prior to a Seashell Blizzard-linked destructive attack,” the company said. “This persistent access is noted in at least three cases to have preceded select destructive attacks attributed to Seashell Blizzard, highlighting that the subgroup may periodically enable destructive or disruptive attacks.” The group has used third-party internet scanning services to find targets and commonly exploit at least eight vulnerabilities, as follows: After exploiting bugs, the hackers deploy remote management tools like Atera Agent and Splashtop Remote Services to maintain their access to compromised systems. In some cases, the hackers inserted malicious code into otherwise legitimate sign-in portals to steal credentials like usernames and passwords — allowing them to move laterally within organizations. “This subgroup has leveraged exploiting a variety of recent public vulnerabilities since late 2021. This shows a focus on being agile and keeping track of new CVEs as a potential way to gain access to targets quickly,” DeGrippo explained. She noted that historically, Sandworm’s operations are assessed to be a key component of Russia’s overall strategy for destabilizing Western institutions and emerging or established democracies, and has been one of the lead threat actors they have seen operational in Ukraine since the 2022 invasion. Last year, Ukraine’s government said the group was responsible for attacks on nearly 20 energy facilities in the country in an effort to amplify the impact of Russian missile and drone strikes on critical infrastructure. Ukraine’s computer emergency response team (CERT-UA) said the hackers deployed several new and previously known malware variants to infect energy, water and heating suppliers in 10 regions of the country in March 2024. The group has also been implicated in attacks on Ukraine’s largest telecom, internet providers, government agencies and a popular Ukrainian military app. Google-owned Mandiant discovered in 2024 that the group established an infrastructure allowing Russian military forces to exfiltrate encrypted Telegram and Signal communications from mobile devices captured on the battlefield. Russia’s objectives
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Jonathan Greig
is a Breaking News Reporter at Recorded Future News. Jonathan has worked across the globe as a journalist since 2014. Before moving back to New York City, he worked for news outlets in South Africa, Jordan and Cambodia. He previously covered cybersecurity at ZDNet and TechRepublic.
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